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In this thesis I review New Zealand’s present inheritance laws which are characterised by: 
• 20 disparate statutes stretching back 100  years; 
• a lack of clear and consistent policies; 
• a failure to adapt to fundamental changes in life expectancy, re-partnering and family groupings that have 
taken place over the last 40 years; 
• inconsistent judicial decision-making; 
• dual jurisdiction of the Family Court and High Court; 
• mechanisms to avoid the consequences of the current legislation. 
Calls for urgent and fundamental reform have been met by piecemeal ad hoc changes. In contrast, reform in 
Australia has been systematic and carefully analysed.  
After considering the two common inheritance regimes around the world (the fixed rule scheme and the court-
based discretionary system), I reach two fundamental conclusions: 
• adoption of an inheritance code; 
• recognition of the principle of testamentary freedom. 
In addition I recommend a number of changes to New Zealand’s inheritance laws, and in particular: 
• acceptance of the primacy of the position of a surviving spouse or partner; 
• replacement of the current family protection and testamentary promises claims with support and 
contribution claims; 
• restriction of estate claims to spouses, partners and minor children; 
• recognition of the rights of “accepted children” (stepchildren and whangai); 
• clarification of the ability to compromise and contract out of claims; 
• empowering one court to administer all inheritance laws; 
• anti-avoidance measures; 
• equating the rights of spouses, civil union partners and long term de facto partners on separation.  
I conclude this thesis with a skeleton of the proposed inheritance code including drafts of some of the key 
provisions. 
Word length 
The text of this paper (excluding abstract, table of contents, footnotes and bibliography) comprises 49,345 
words.   




HISTORY AND BACKGROUND 
I Origins 
Inheritance or succession laws in New Zealand have a long history.  The Wills Act 1837 was 
effectively “imported” from England and remained in force (albeit with numerous 
amendments) for 170 years until the Wills Act 2007 was passed.  New Zealand was the first 
of the Commonwealth jurisdictions to pass family protection legislation in the form of the 
Testator’s Family Maintenance Act 1900.1 The initial proposal by Sir Robert Stout, the 
Limitation of Power of Disposition by Will Bill, was derived from Scots law and limited the 
will-maker’s testamentary power to one third of the estate; a surviving spouse was guaranteed 
one-third as were surviving children. If the will-maker was survived by either a spouse or 
children but not both, up to one-half of the estate was freely disposable.2 
II Initial Legislation 
The Bill was defeated because members were not happy with the mandatory division 
proposed. A further Bill, which was introduced in 1897 and made only slight changes, was 
also defeated.  Despite this, Sir Robert Stout had clearly awakened a social conscience among 
members3 and in 1900 the Testator’s Family Maintenance Act 1900 was passed. After 
criticism by the Court of Appeal,4 the Testator’s Family Maintenance Act 1906 was passed 
and it in turn was consolidated as part of the Family Protection Act 1908.5  In essence, the 
legislation gave (and still gives today) to the Court a wide discretionary power to order 
provision from the estate of a deceased person in favour of a limited class of relatives.  The 
Court must be satisfied that adequate provision is not available from the deceased’s estate for 
the proper maintenance and support of the applicant either under the deceased’s will or on 
intestacy.6 New Zealand pioneered family protection legislation but it was soon followed by 
the Australian states and Canada.7 The Australians refer to it as "family provision" 
legislation. 
III Legislative Developments 
Over the last 100 years there has been a plethora of statutes which affect in various ways the 
ability of New Zealanders to dispose of their estates by will or on intestacy and are still in 
force today.  In historical order these include: 
• Life Insurance Act 1908 which limits the amounts of payments and to whom 
payments can be made under life policies where the deceased is a minor. There are also 
                                          
1 WM Patterson  Law of Family Protection and Testamentary Promises (3rd ed, LexisNexis, Wellington, 
2004) at [1.1]. 
2  Richard Sutton and Nicola Peart “Testamentary Claims by Adult Children – The Agony of the Wise and Just 
Testator” (2003) 10 Otago LR 385 at 386.  
3  Patterson, above n 1, at [1.3]. 
4    Plimmer v Plimmer (1906) 9 GLR 10. 
5  Patterson, above n 1, at [1.6]. 
6  Ibid, at [1.1]. 
7    Northern Territory Law Reform Committee Report on Uniform Succession Laws (NTLRC R 31, September 
2007) at 6.  
   
  2
provisions relating to the application and investment of funds by trustees where the 
funds are payable under a policy for the benefit of minors.8  
• Law Reform Act 1936 which provides that various causes of action subsist for the 
benefit of a person’s estate, and can be continued against, and in some cases can be 
commenced against, his or her estate. There are also procedures for damages or 
compensation against a deceased’s estate where there is no administrator.9 
• Law Reform (Testamentary Promises) Act 1949 which allows a claim on an estate 
where in exchange for services or work rendered or performed, the deceased promised 
provision. The Act provides remedies at the discretion of the presiding judge in 
situations which may not amount to binding and enforceable contracts.  
• Maori Trustee Act 1953 under which the Maori Trustee can apply for grants of 
administration of intestate estates and orders to administer with will annexed where a 
Maori dies leaving a will.10 
• Adoption Act 1955 under which the effect of an adoption order is to make the adopted 
child a child of the adoptive parents for all purposes including inheritance rights and 
duties, and similarly the adopted child ceases to be a child of his or her biological 
parents.11  
• Family Protection Act 1955 allows certain relatives to claim on an estate if the 
deceased has breached moral duties to the claimant; and the court decides that further 
provision is needed for the applicant’s proper maintenance and support. The Act applies 
both where the deceased left a will and on intestacy, and awards are made at the 
discretion of the presiding judge.  
• Trustee Act 1956 which empowers estate trustees to deal with chattels,12 advance 
capital and income to beneficiaries13 and advertise and distribute the shares of missing 
beneficiaries.14 Once a personal representative has completed the duties of executor or 
administrator, he, she or it becomes a trustee and holds estate assets subject to the will 
and the Trustee Act 1956.  
• Simultaneous Deaths Act 1958 applies where two or more persons have died at the 
same time or in circumstances which give rise to reasonable doubt as to which has 
survived the other or others. The Act prescribes what happens to life insurance policies, 
jointly owned property, powers of appointment, wills and trusts.  
• Estate and Gift Duties Act 1968 which contains life expectancy tables and sets out the 
bases for valuations of annuities and life interests under wills.15 
                                          
8  Sections 67B, 67C, 71 and 73. 
9  Sections 3 and 9A. 
10  Sections 12C and 12D. 
11  Section 16. 
12   Sections 39A and 39B. 
13   Sections 40, 41 and 41A. 
14   Section 76. 
15  Section 68F. 
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• Status of Children Act 1969 which largely did away with the former distinction 
between children born inside and those born outside a marriage. It is possible under s 3 
of the Act to distinguish between “legitimate” and “illegitimate” relationships.    
• Administration Act 1969 regulates the administration of deceased estates in New 
Zealand and covers matters such as grants of administration, court procedures, rights 
and duties of administrators, and procedures for small estates. The Act sets out the 
regime and priorities of entitlements on intestacy;16 it also sets out the time limits that 
apply to notices of claim for further provision from an estate and the lapse of these 
notices,17 and interest on legacies.18 
• Property (Relationships) Act 197619 in Part 8 deals with the division of property 
where a spouse, civil  union or de facto partner dies. It more or less equates the 
entitlements of spouses, civil union and de facto partners to relationship property on 
death with their entitlements on separation. The Act sets out the procedures and time 
limits for relationship property claims on death, and regulates the priorities of 
competing claims by other partners and children of the deceased.  
• Family Proceedings Act 1980 which provides for the recovery of child support and 
spousal maintenance from a deceased estate and the priority of such obligations.20 The 
Act sets out the procedures for making applications and the Family Court is given wide 
powers to vary or fix the incidence of payments of maintenance as between the assets 
of the estate. The Act sets out the effect of a judicial separation order on intestacy.21  
• Protection of Personal and Property Rights Act 1988 which empowers property 
managers and attorneys to have new wills approved by the Family Court for persons 
who have lost mental capacity. The Family Court also has power to prohibit a person 
from completing a will.22 
• Te Ture Whenua Maori Act 1993 which applies to estates comprising any beneficial 
interest in Maori freehold land and promotes the retention, use, development and 
control of Maori land. The Act provides that Maori customary land is inalienable and 
cannot be disposed of by will, and Maori freehold land can be left by will to restricted 
classes of relatives of the deceased. The Act is subject to the provisions of the Family 
Protection Act 1955.23 
• Insolvency Act 2006 which in Part 6 deals with insolvent or bankrupt estates. A 
creditor or beneficiary can apply for an order that the estate be administered under Part 
                                          
16  Where a person dies without a will or does have a will but it does not dispose of the whole estate; see ss 77-
79. 
17  Sections 47-50. 
18  Section 39. 
19   The 2001 Amendment Act including Part 8 came into effect on 1 February 2002. 
20   Sections 180 and 181 . 
21  Section 26. 
22  Protection of Personal and Property Rights Act 1988, s 54. 
23   Riddell v Public Trust [2004] NZFLR 33 (DC).       
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6 of the Act, and the Court can order administration by Public Trust or some other 
person.24 
• Succession (Homicide) Act 2007 which codifies the law disqualifying a person who 
kills another from benefiting from the deceased person’s estate or property. A “killer” 
is not entitled to any interest in property under the victim’s will or on intestacy of the 
victim, cannot make a family protection claim, and has a restricted testamentary 
promises claim.  
• Property Law Act 2007 which contains provisions about the personal liabilities of 
estate administrators for obligations of the deceased person and provisions relating to 
instruments conferring an estate or interest in property on a person’s heir or next of 
kin.25 
• Wills Act 2007 which covers most aspects of New Zealand law in respect of wills 
including: 
• who may make a will; 
• requirements for the validity of wills; 
• rules for changing, revoking and reviving wills; 
• effect on wills of events such as marriage and dissolution; 
• disposition by will to children and issue; 
• mutual wills; 
• correction of wills; 
• admissibility of external evidence in the interpretation of wills; 
• special rules for the wills of military and seagoing persons. 
• Judicature (High Court Rules) Amendment Act 2008 which sets out in Part 27 the 
High Court Rules relating to grants of probate and letters of administration of deceased 
estates. The rules set out where applications must be filed, who is entitled to obtain a 
grant, priorities amongst competing claimants, and the forms required to be used by 
claimants.  
While these statutes have been amended from time to time, all of them currently remain in 
force in New Zealand. 
IV Current Problems 
What are the current problems with New Zealand’s inheritance and succession laws? 
• The law is contained in at least 20 different statutes (set out above) which means that it 
is complicated for New Zealanders and their advisors to gain access to the relevant laws 
                                          
24   Section 385. 
25   Sections 7-10. 
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and clear statements of the law.  A given situation may be governed by a number of 
these statutes, and there is no accessible guide as to which statutes apply.  
• There are also common law rules not set out in statute. For example, rules and case law 
relating to testamentary capacity, undue influence and duress affect the validity of wills 
but are not set out in any of the 20 statutes discussed above. Again, this raises the 
problem of accessibility.  
• The current statutes were passed at different times over the last 100 years.  During that 
time, and particularly over the last 40 years, there have been huge changes in (a) the life 
expectancies of New Zealanders; (b) the numbers of dissolutions of marriage, 
remarriage and re-partnerings; (c) the bases of personal relationships (for example gay 
relationships) and societal attitudes towards the same; and (d) emergence of "blended 
families" (that is couples with children of previous relationships, living in new 
relationships).  Few of the statutes reflect these changes.  
• Most of the current laws do not contain clear statements of policy or principles; and to 
the limited extent they exist, they do not reflect contemporary attitudes of New 
Zealanders about obligations on death, even if there is consensus on these obligations. 
• Older legislation such as the Law Reform Act 1936, the Law Reform (Testamentary 
Promises) Act 1949, and Family Protection Act 1955 feature long, convoluted 
sentences with minimal punctuation and use of undefined terms. For example, s 2(5) of 
the Family Protection Act 1955 is as follows: 
For the purposes of this Act the estate of any deceased person shall be deemed 
to include all property which is the subject of any donatio mortis causa made 
by the deceased: 
Provided that— 
(a) No claim in respect of any property to which this subsection relates shall lie 
against the administrator by any person who (under any order of the Court 
under this Act) becomes entitled to the property or to any benefit therefrom; 
and 
(b) In all other respects the provisions of this Act and of sections 46 to 51 of 
the Administration Act 1969 shall apply in respect of that property in the same 
manner as those provisions would apply to the property if it were part of the 
estate of the deceased which was properly distributed by the administrator 
immediately after the expiration of 6 months from the date of the grant in New 
Zealand of administration in the estate of the deceased without notice of any 
application or intended application under this Act in respect of the estate, 
whether the order of the Court is made before or after the expiration of the said 
6 months. 
• There is uncertainty and lack of consensus about the priorities of competing claims.26 
There can be competing claims on an estate by a surviving partner, children of different 
relationships, a person to whom a promise was made, and creditors. The rules on 
balancing these claims, particularly where the estate is small, are not clear.  
                                          
26   See for example Hamilton v Hamilton [2003] NZFLR 883 (HC). 
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• The courts struggle with nebulous expressions such as “moral duty”27 “wise and just 
testator”28 “maintenance and support”29 and “serious injustice”,30 and the consequence 
is inconsistent and unpredictable decisions. This was acknowledged by the Court of 
Appeal in Williams v Aucutt31 where Blanchard J stated that there was substance in 
criticisms of the way in which the courts have applied the present law.  
• The use of Latin terms in legislation such as “donatio mortis causa”,32 “prima facie”,33 
and “administrator ad litem”34 creates confusion and the impression that the law is out 
of touch with ordinary people. Few schools teach Latin today, and it can no longer be 
assumed that ordinary New Zealanders have a reasonable understanding of Latin terms.  
• Will-makers’ clear intentions are defeated by judicial “re-writing” of wills.35 In chapter 
2 I illustrate that despite clear directions from the Court of Appeal, judges continue to 
“rewrite” wills. It should be noted in this context that ss 31 and 32 of the Wills Act 
2007 do empower the High Court to correct wills and use external evidence to interpret 
wills.   
• Litigation costs rather than merit are forcing settlement of claims against estates. There 
has long been an assumption that costs will be paid from the estate, and this is certainly 
true of the administrator’s costs of providing information to the court and the parties. 
This problem is not unique to New Zealand.  
• Various New Zealand Law Commission (“the Law Commission”) reports have been 
produced but only random implementation or reform has resulted.36 The Law 
Commission stated in 1996 that the law of testamentary claims is in urgent need of 
review and that the policies which now lie behind the law are unclear.37 No 
fundamental reforms have occurred since then.  
• Our intestacy regime has been in place for 40 years but does not reflect current social 
attitudes on a deceased person’s obligations and has failed to keep pace with 
inflationary changes, particularly property values. I will discuss in chapter 4 of this 
thesis the increasing acceptance both in New Zealand and overseas of the primacy of 
claims by surviving spouses or partners, particularly after a long relationship. 
Fundamental to this is the provision of adequate long-term accommodation, but this is 
complicated by the fact that increases in property values have outstripped inflation.  
                                          
27   Family Protection Act 1955, s 3(2). 
28   Patterson, above n 1, at [2.2]. 
29   Williams v Aucutt [2000] 2 NZLR 479 (CA) at [52]. 
30   Re Williams (deceased): Kinniburgh v Williams [2004] 2 NZLR 132, [2004] NZFLR 467 (HC); Public 
Trust v Whyman [2005] 2 NZLR 696. 
31   Williams v Aucutt, above n 29, at [68]. 
32   Family Protection Act 1955, s 2(5) and Simultaneous Deaths Act 1958, s 3. 
33   Status of Children Act 1969, s 8(2) and (3). 
34   Law Reform Act 1936, s 9A(3). 
35  See Strand v Strand [2004] NZFLR 452 at 464 (FC); see also John Caldwell “Family Protection Claims” 
(2008) 6 NZFLJ 4. 
36   For example Law Commission  Succession Law: Testamentary Claims (NZLC PP24, 1996); Law 
Commission Succession Law: A Succession (Adjustment) Act (NZLC R39, 1997); Law Commission  
Succession Law: A Succession (Wills) Act (NZLC R41, 1997). 
37   Law Commission Succession Law: Testamentary Claims, above n 36, at [7] and [8]. 
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• Family trusts, transfers of assets to third parties and structures such as joint ownership 
have been used to defeat inheritance claims.38 Over the last 15-20 years there has been 
a massive increase in the number of family trusts set up in New Zealand, and one of the 
main drivers of this is asset or inheritance planning.  
• Some aspects of our inheritance laws such as family protection and testamentary 
promises claims are handled primarily in the Family Court but others such as will 
interpretation and estate/trust administration are handled exclusively in the High Court.  
If a particular case raises a number of issues, this may require separate proceedings to 
be filed in the High Court and the Family Court. Traditionally, all estate and trust 
matters were handled exclusively in the High Court but there have been significant 
inroads on this over recent times. This has resulted in uncertainty, and it is time to 
undertake a fundamental review.  
V Outline of Discussion 
It is apparent from this background that fundamental changes are required to New Zealand’s 
succession and inheritance laws.  Piecemeal changes will not work. In this thesis I discuss the 
following: 
(1) Should New Zealand adopt one comprehensive succession or inheritance code?  What 
are the benefits and detriments of a code? 
 (2) If a code is adopted what principles and policies should underpin that code? Is there 
sufficient consensus to formulate principles and policies? 
(3) Inheritance laws have been the subject of lengthy discussion papers by the Law 
Commissions in Australia and Scotland39 over recent years.  In Australia the "Uniform 
Succession Laws Project" has been implemented in part over the last 10-15 years.  
Those papers and that project raise the following important issues which I believe are 
common also to New Zealand: 
• Who is entitled to share in an estate on intestacy and what should those shares be? 
• Who is entitled to claim further provision from an estate?  What are the 
philosophical bases for the various claims on an estate?  Do claims by spouses 
and partners differ from adult spousal maintenance or economic disparity claims? 
Do claims by minor children differ from child support? 
• Should provision be linked to entitlements on intestacy or fixed shares prescribed 
in the code or should provision be determined by a court in its discretion? Should 
there be a mixture of fixed shares and discretionary awards? 
• What provision should be reserved for surviving spouses, civil union and de facto 
partners?  Should this provision be linked to relationship property rights as is 
currently the case under Part 8 of the Property (Relationships) Act 1976?  What 
                                          
38  See for example Public Trust v Whyman, above n 30; and Patterson, above n 1, at [4.20]. 
39  For example New South Wales Law Reform Commission Uniform Succession Laws: Family Provision 
(NSWLRC R110, 2005); Queensland Law Reform Commission Family Provision (QLRC R58, 2004); 
Scottish Law Commission Discussion Paper on Succession (SLC DP136, 2007). 
   
  8
provision (if any) should be made for surviving spouses and partners in a short 
term relationship?  Should such provision be limited to spouses and partners or 
should it extend to persons who live in a close personal relationship with the 
deceased? 
• What provision should be reserved for children of the deceased?  Should that 
provision be limited to dependent children or children under a certain age?40  If 
the latter, what age should apply and should this increase for children undertaking 
fulltime study? Should provision be based upon obligations to maintain and 
support or should there be some “recognition factor” as currently exists in New 
Zealand?41 
• Should provision be required for step-children, children dependent upon the 
estate and whangai?42 Should dependent parents be able to make a claim for 
further provision? Should grandchildren, and especially adult grandchildren, be 
able to make a claim?  
• How have other countries dealt with these issues? In Australia and Scotland there 
has been significant research completed in this area. Australian family provision 
laws are based upon and are similar to New Zealand’s family protection laws, 
whereas Scottish succession law is much closer to the fixed inheritance regimes 
which are common in Europe. While the major problems are common to both 
countries, the outcomes of the reports differ.  
(4) Should there be anti-avoidance measures to overcome transfers of property and the use 
of family trusts and other structures to defeat entitlements? If so, how extensive should 
these measures be? 
(5) Should interests in Maori land continue to be governed by a separate scheme? To what 
extent should Maori estates be subject to family provision and testamentary claims 
legislation?  
(6) Should it be possible to contract out of a claim for further provision such as currently 
exists for relationship property?43 If so, who should be able to enter into such contracts 
and what safeguards need to be put in place? Should court approval be a prerequisite?  
(7) The Law Reform (Testamentary Promises) Act 1949 is unique to New Zealand. Is it 
necessary to maintain this statute or is this type of claim more conveniently covered by 
the law of fiduciaries, contract or constructive trust? How have other countries dealt 
with this issue?  
(8) Is it desirable for inheritance issues to be heard in one court or is the current dual 
jurisdiction preferable?  If one court is preferable which court should have jurisdiction? 
                                          
40  The age at which a child ceases to be dependent varies in different countries.  As noted in the Scottish Law 
Commission’s Discussion Paper , above n 39, in France there is a lifelong reciprocal obligation to maintain 
between parents and children. 
41  See for example Williams v Aucutt, above n 29, at [52]. 
42 A person adopted in accordance with Maori custom. 
43  Property (Relationships) Act 1976, s 21. 
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(9) What about assets located overseas? Should the current distinction between movable 
and immovables be maintained? Can this be improved?  
(10) If a code is adopted what should be included?  What is the outline of the proposed 
code? Should claims falling outside the code be without any remedy?  
VI Summary 
New Zealand’s current inheritance laws are not working nearly as well as they ought to. 
There is urgent need for fundamental reform. The best outcome for New Zealand will be a 
comprehensive code expressed in plain English, covering all or almost all inheritance and 
succession issues, based upon carefully considered policies and containing clear, effective 
procedures. Piecemeal reform is no longer adequate.  
In the following chapters I discuss the benefits and detriments of a code and the underlying 
policies for a code, and attempt to come up with answers to the questions posed in this 
chapter.  
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Chapter 2 
BENEFITS AND DETRIMENTS OF CODIFYING INHERITANCE 
LAWS 
I Codification 
One approach is to address the problems set out in chapter 1 one by one. Is this the best way 
to resolve them? The argument in this thesis is that the best way to resolve the current 
problems with New Zealand’s succession laws is to create a modern, comprehensive code 
along the lines of “codes” such as the Property (Relationships) Act 1976, the Crimes Act 
1961 and the Succession (Homicide) Act 2007. Would the codification of inheritance laws 
solve or alleviate the problems identified in chapter 1 of this thesis?   
It is important first to establish what is meant by a "code" or "codification" of laws.  A code 
has been defined as "a system or collection of laws".44  The word "code" signifies:45 
… a whole system of law, such as Code Napoleon of France, or the whole of the law on a 
particular subject such as the Bills of Exchange Act.  A codifying statute is an Act which 
purports to be a complete statement of the law on the particular subject (both the statute 
law and the common law) at the time when it was passed.  Examples of statutes which 
purport to be codifying Acts are the Minors' Contracts Act 1969 (see s 15) and the 
Contractual Mistakes Act 1977 (see s 5). 
The Oxford Companion to Law states in respect of the word "code":46 
From the fifteenth century onward the term came to be applied to a more or less 
comprehensive systematic statement in written form of major bodies of law such as the 
civil law or the criminal law of a particular country, superseding the mixture of customs, 
decisions and bits of legislation which had previously applied. 
Codification of New Zealand's inheritance laws therefore involves amalgamation of all 
existing statutes and the common law in one code or statute.  The intention is to replace all 
existing statutory and common law rules in one omnibus code or statute. 
Codification differs from consolidation of some existing statutes. Consolidation is not 
comprehensive and will not involve articulation of underlying principles and policies for all 
inheritance laws in New Zealand. Codification is far preferable.  
II Effects of Codification 
I now discuss whether codification will overcome or lessen the impact of the various 
problems listed in chapter 1.  
                                          
44  Peter Spiller (ed) Butterworths New Zealand Law Dictionary (6th ed, LexisNexis, Wellington, 2005) at 50. 
45  Ibid. 
46  DM Walker (ed) The Oxford Companion to Law (Oxford University Press, Oxford, 1980) at 234. 
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A Scattered nature of the law 
The current law is contained in or scattered across at least 20 different statutes47 which makes 
access to the relevant laws difficult.   
The current statutes have been passed over a period of 100 years (1908-2008) and reflect a 
piecemeal approach to reform in this area.48 The number of statutes has also resulted in some 
confusion or at least cross-over from inheritance law into relationship property rights49 and 
contractual obligations.50 It is difficult to understand, for example, why the provisions in the 
Wills Act 2007 setting out the requirements for a valid will, and the intestacy provisions in 
the Administration Act 1969 for those who die without a will, should be kept separate from 
the provisions in the Family Protection Act 1955 enabling wills and the intestacy rules to be 
challenged and changed. Even more confusing (to lawyers as much as anyone) is the fact that 
rules relating to notice of intention to make claims under the Family Protection Act 1955 and 
Property (Relationships) Act 1976 are contained in ss 45-51 of the Administration Act 1969. 
The reports completed by the Scottish and Australian Law Commissions propose 
comprehensive legislation covering as many inheritance and succession issues as possible. 
The New South Wales Law Reform Commission stated:51 
Whether uniform or consistent, all the succession laws must be up to date.  The law of 
wills, intestacy, family provision, administration and probate and administration of 
assets, must be brought together in one piece of legislation and must share, as far as 
possible, a common underlying principle.  Unnecessary provisions and old language must 
be recognised and removed.   
In the foreword to the Law Commission’s Report “Presentation of New Zealand Statute 
Law”52 the President, Sir Geoffrey Palmer, stated that in New Zealand we need a systematic 
programme for weeding out statutes that are out of date and revising and rewriting old Acts to 
make them more readable. The President also noted the legislature’s habit of passing big 
amending Acts that render incoherent the statute as a whole.  He recommended that we “re-
enact the whole thing rather than adopt a sort of cut and fill approach”. 
In addition to the multitude of statutes, inheritance law is also governed by a number of 
common law rules which have resulted from, and have been refined by, court decisions but 
are not set out in statute. Examples in relation to wills include the following:53 
• Testamentary capacity: A party seeking to prove a will must establish that it was 
signed by a will-maker of sound mind, memory and understanding, and who was a free 
agent. 
                                          
47  See chapter 1 of this thesis. 
48  The Law Commission recognised the need for fewer statutes in Succession Law: A Succession (Adjustment) 
Act (NZLC R39, 1997). 
49  Property (Relationships) Act 1976, Part 8. 
50   Law Reform (Testamentary Promises) Act 1949. 
51  New South Wales Law Reform Commission Uniform Succession Laws: Family Provision (NSWLRC IP11, 
1996) at xiv. 
52  Law Commission Presentation of New Zealand Statute Law (NZLC R104, 2008). 
53  These statements of the various common law rules are derived from John Earles (ed) Dobbie’s Probate and 
Administration Practice (5th ed, LexisNexis, Wellington, 2008) at ch 50.  
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• Undue influence: Undue influence exists where the faculties of the will-maker have 
been so impaired that he or she ceases to be a free agent and has succumbed to the power 
or control of another; the effect of undue influence is to invalidate a will. 
• Duress: Where a will-maker is compelled to make a will or is prevented from altering a 
will by force or threats by a person who stands to benefit, and testamentary intention is 
overborne.  
• Lack of knowledge or approval of will: It is essential to the validity of a will that at the 
time of signing the will-maker knew and approved the contents of that will. 
Over many years court decisions on will interpretation have been guided by various rules of 
construction that are not set out in statute but are nevertheless part of New Zealand’s 
inheritance laws. Examples include the following:54 
• words used in a will should be construed in their ordinary or primary sense; 
• legal and technical terms should be construed strictly; 
• every word used in a will should be given effect; 
• a will should be considered as a whole and the will-maker’s intentions should not be 
deduced merely from particular parts; 
• where there is doubt about the construction of a will provision, the court should favour a 
construction that avoids intestacy; 
• if language used in a will can be construed in two different ways, the first of which will 
yield an absurd result and the second a fair and reasonable disposition, the second 
construction will be adopted by the court; 
• a will-maker can create his or her own “dictionary” within a will which will guide the 
interpretation of the will.   
Having succession laws in New Zealand contained in one code rather than spread across 20 
different statutes, a number of common law rules and various rules of construction will make 
our laws easier for members of the public, their advisers and judges to access and understand.  
Inheritance laws directly affect all New Zealanders and it is therefore very important that they 
be accessible and easy to understand55. 
B Old and outdated laws 
The current laws were passed at different times over the last 100 years.  
Over the last 100 years there have been significant changes in: 
                                          
54  These rules of construction have been drawn from A Alston (ed) Garrow and Alston Law of Wills and 
Administration (5th ed, Butterworths, Wellington, 1984) at ch 49. 
55  Lord Bingham of Cornhill “What is the Law?” Robin Cooke Lecture 2008, Victoria University Faculty of 
Law, Wellington, 4 December 2008 stated that “the Law should be accessible and so far as possible 
intelligible, clear and predictable”. 
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• life expectancies; 
• the numbers of dissolutions of marriage, remarriages and re-partnerings;  
• the numbers of blended families; 
• societal attitudes towards personal and family relationships (and in particular, gay 
relationships). 
According to Statistics New Zealand, since 1975-77 life expectancy has increased by 6.8 
years for females and 9.2 years for males; life expectancy for women was 82.2 years and for 
men 78.2 years as at March 2009.56 At the beginning of the 20th century, half the population 
of New Zealand was under 23 years of age;57 as at 31 March 2010 half of New Zealand’s 
population was aged over 36.6 years. The median age for males is now 35.5 years and 37.5 
years for females. The percentage of New Zealand’s population aged 90 years and over 
increased from 2.7% in 1996 to 3.9% in 2010.58 
The number of marriage dissolutions each year increased between 1971 and 1998 from 3347 
to 10,037.59 The Family Court made 9700 disolution orders in 2008.60 De facto unions are 
more common than marriage among younger New Zealanders; among women aged 20 to 24 
years 62% of those in partnership at the 1996 census were in a de facto union; the 
corresponding figure for men was 73%.61  One textbook puts it this way:62 
However the 1970s and 1980s witnessed gradual changes in the composition of the 
traditional nuclear family unit. The paradigm unit of a married couple with one primary 
wage earner and children born in wedlock, although still the dominant configuration, 
began to be challenged by a variety of other domestic relationships. Divorce rates 
increased rapidly and single parents headed more families. More women were in paid 
employment.  The number of couples in de facto relationships was also on the increase. 
These trends are not unique to New Zealand. In Scotland there were 2656 divorces in 1965, 
13,373 in 1985 and 10,940 in 2005.63 Between 1980 and 2007 life expectancy for Scottish 
males rose from 68 to 75 years, and Scottish females from 75 to 80 years.64 In Australia the 
number of divorces rose from 41,400 in 1981 to 55,308 in 2001, and in 2001 72% of couples 
indicated they had cohabited prior to marriage compared with 31% in 1981.65  In Australia 
over the last 100 years male life expectancy at birth increased by 24 years from 55.2 years in 
                                          
56  “Births and Deaths: March 2009 quarter”(2009) Statistics New Zealand <www.stats.govt.nz>. 
57    “Population Ageing in New Zealand: Key Statistics January/February 2000” Statistics New Zealand 
<www.stats.govt.nz>. 
58   “National Population Estimates: March 2010 quarter” Statistics New Zealand <www.stats.govt.nz>. 
59  “Marriage and Divorce in New Zealand: Key Statistics” (March 2001) Statistics New Zealand 
<www.stats.govt.nz>. 
60   “Marriages, Civil Unions and Divorces: Year ended December 2008” (2009) Statistics New Zealand 
<www.stats.govt.nz>. 
61   “Demographic Trends: 2001 - Reference Report”(2001) Statistics New Zealand <www.stats.govt.nz>.  
62  N Peart, M Briggs and M Henaghan (eds) Relationship Property on Death (Thomson Brookers, Wellington, 
2004) at [1.7]. 
63   Scottish Law Commission Discussion Paper on Succession (SLC DP136, 2007) at 1. 
64   “Life Expectancy and Healthy Life Expectancy” (2009) Scottish Government <www.scotland.gov.uk>. 
65   “Marriage and Divorce in Australia” (2002)Australian Bureau of Statistics <www.abs.gov.au>.  
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1901-1910 to 79.2 years in 2006-2008, and female life expectancy at birth increased over the 
same period by 25 years from 58.8 years to 83.7 years.66  
It is now very common at death for a person's children to be middle-aged and independent, 
and for a person to be in a second or third marriage or relationship and therefore to have 
competing obligations to a surviving spouse or partner, middle-aged children of a prior 
marriage or relationship, and grandchildren.  It is common also for a person’s second spouse 
or partner to have children and grandchildren of his or her own who are very much part of the 
“family” group. In the 1950s and 1960s when much of our current legislation was enacted the 
traditional nuclear family was predominant and legislation reflected this. Legislation from 
that era was not intended to cover the very different personal and family relationships that are 
common today. These issues are discussed further in chapter 4. 
Professor Rosalind Croucher, an Australian Law Reform Commissioner, said this:67  
Dynastic expectations are one thing; increasing longevity is another.  If we live into our 
90s - and many of us will - then dynastic expectations are really those of another century.  
The inheritance of our children is their early childhood - their education (from long day 
care, through to private school, for many; and then to university) - they get 'their 
inheritance' as part of their 'maintenance, education and advancement in life'.  Parents 
don't die now in a way that produces an orderly fulfilment of dynastic expectations of 
children. 
… If we earn our way into a comfortable middle age, and then, do not quietly fade away 
within a decade or so of retiring, we will need our own savings to support our old age - 
and to enjoy it.  John Langbein has spoken of the fact that children now 'get their 
inheritance early' - largely through an investment by parents in their education. 
Why should we continue to travel, cramped and uncomfortable, at the back of the plane, 
just to facilitate dynastic expectations, when we have earned the right not to?  The liberal 
philosophers lauded the self-reliant individual and the value in the sweat of the brow -  
the true justification of property.  The expression of that in our law is the right to travel at 
the front of the plane (or nearer to it) in our dotage and to let, indeed encourage, our 
children along their own road in life.  (It is the Reg Ansett philosophy.)  It is, indeed, the 
age of the self-funded retiree. 
Many of the current laws were enacted before these changes took place.  If anything, the pace 
of change has increased, and yet New Zealand is still governed by laws that were enacted 
many years ago in a very different society. 
Laws which 
• take these changes into account;  
• are accessible; 
• are comprehensively set out in a code; and 
                                          
66   Australian Bureau of Statistics website < www.abs.gov.au>. 
67 Rosalind F Croucher "Towards Uniform Succession in Australia - a Progress Report" at 29 (paper presented 
at Law Society of South Australia Succession Law Conference, Adelaide, 7 May 2009). 
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• reflect New Zealand society in the 21st century 
would receive wider acceptance by the community, would be easier to understand and would 
create greater consistency in court decisions. 
C Statements of policies and principles 
The current laws do not contain clear statements of policy or principles.  
Modern legislation usually contains full statements of the underlying policy and principle but 
this is not the case with many older statutes.  In the area of inheritance law, the Law Reform 
(Testamentary Promises) Act 1949 states at the outset that the Act is “to make better 
provision for the enforcement of promises to make testamentary provision for services 
rendered.”  The policy behind the Act was explained in McCormack v Foley as follows: 68 
The mischief which it was designed to remedy was largely the tendency of testators to 
persuade people to render services to them by promises later found to be too vague to 
establish at common law contracts enforceable against the estate.  It also overcame 
evidential difficulties under the Statute of Frauds.  It did not displace the common law as 
to testamentary contracts but created a new discretionary jurisdiction similar, in that the 
object was to enforce the deceased’s “promises” – an expression itself liberalised during 
the history of the statutory jurisdiction. 
However, the policies behind the Act are not set out in the statute itself and short of studying 
the relevant decided authorities, or perhaps Hansard, it is difficult to know the rationale for 
this legislation. 
The same comments apply equally to the Family Protection Act 1955. There is an initial 
statement to the effect that the Act is to consolidate and amend enactments relating to claims 
for maintenance and support out of the estates of deceased persons. Apart from that, there are 
no clear statements of policy or principle in relation to the Family Protection Act 1955 other 
than perhaps in some of the decided cases. One commentator says:69 
Although the original underlying social purpose of the Testator’s Family Maintenance 
Act 1900 aimed to ensure that poor dependants of the deceased did not become a burden 
on the state, the Courts quickly came to approach the legislation much more expansively 
and to extend their jurisdiction beyond cases of actual want. 
One of the criticisms of the Family Protection Act 1955 is that over the years there have been 
conflicting and contradictory decisions particularly around the concepts of need, maintenance 
and support.  Clear statements of policy would assist immeasurably. 
The Administration Act 1969 is stated to be an Act “to consolidate and amend certain 
enactments relating to the administration of the estates of deceased persons”.  However, the 
intestacy provisions in Part III go way beyond that; they deal with the distribution of the 
estates of deceased persons who die without wills.  There are no statements of policy or 
principle underpinning the intestacy regime set out in Part III of the Act. 
                                          
68  McCormack v Foley [1983] NZLR 57 (CA) at 61; see also WM Patterson  Law of Family Protection and 
Testamentary Promises (3rd ed, LexisNexis, Wellington, 2004) at [13.1]. 
69  John Caldwell “Family Protection Claims by Adult Children: What is Going On?” (2008) 6 NZFLJ 4 at 4. 
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In contrast, modern legislation such as the Succession (Homicide) Act 2007 contains 
statements of its purpose, effect and application. The Succession (Homicide) Act 2007 sets 
out as its purpose the codification of the law that prevents a person who kills another person 
by committing homicide from benefitting as a result of the victim’s death from the victim’s 
estate or other property arrangements.70 The Act also sets out its effect and application which 
are to replace the rules of equity, law and public policy that prevent a killer from receiving, 
becoming entitled to or claiming interests in property as a result of the death of the killer’s 
victim.71  
Clear statements of policy and principle provide assistance to judges when interpreting 
statutes, which in turn, enhance the quality of decision-making and aid counsel and legal 
advisers. Statements of policy and principle promote community understanding of the law. 
To some extent the absence of these statements of policy from many of our existing 
inheritance laws is due to the ages of the statutes; it is very rare for older legislation to be in 
the form of a code. Any inheritance code would need to be in line with current legislative 
practices of including statements of policy and principle and should ensure consistency in 
policy and principle across the whole area of inheritance or succession law. 
D Drafting issues 
Much of the legislation in this area contains long complicated sentences with minimal 
punctuation and the use of terms that are not defined in the particular statute but have been 
defined or given specific meanings in case law. By way of example, s 2(5) of the Family 
Protection Act 1955 was set out in chapter 1. Another example is s 3(1) of the Law Reform 
(Testamentary Promises) Act 1949 which is as follows: 
Where in the administration of the estate of any deceased person a claim is made against 
the estate founded upon the rendering of services to or the performance of work for the 
deceased in his lifetime, and the claimant proves an express or implied promise by the 
deceased to reward him for the services or work by making some testamentary provision 
for the claimant, whether or not the provision was to be of a specified amount or was to 
relate to specified real or personal property, then, subject to the provisions of this Act, the 
claim shall, to the extent to which the deceased has failed to make that testamentary 
provision or otherwise remunerate the claimant (whether or not a claim for such 
remuneration could have been enforced in the lifetime of the deceased), be enforceable 
against the personal representatives of the deceased in the same manner and to the same 
extent as if the promise of the deceased were a promise for payment by the deceased in 
his lifetime of such amount as may be reasonable, having regard to all the circumstances 
of the case, including in particular the circumstances in which the promise was made and 
the services were rendered or the work was performed, the value of the services or work, 
the value of the testamentary provision promised, the amount of the estate, and the nature 
and amounts of the claims of other persons in respect of the estate, whether as creditors, 
beneficiaries, wife, husband, civil union partner, children, next-of-kin, or otherwise. 
Older legislation seldom contains adequate definitions of terms or expressions used. For 
example, the Simultaneous Deaths Act 1958 contains words or expressions such as 
“devolve”, “issue”, “devise”, “donee” and “in default of appointment”. These words and 
expressions are not defined in the Act itself but all of them have specific meanings which 
                                          
70  Section 3. 
71  Section 5. 
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have resulted from court decisions that in some instances may go back many years.72 To 
many people such expressions are incomprehensible or at least easily misunderstood without 
the benefit of the decided cases. There is also the frequent use of Latin terms in older 
legislation which I discuss later in this chapter. 
If accessibility and clarity are seen as desirable objectives, then significant parts of our 
current inheritance laws need to be replaced. Some of New Zealand’s current statutes are 
archaic and regarded as out of touch with ordinary New Zealanders.  
E Competing claims 
There is uncertainty and lack of consensus about the priorities of competing claims.   
The Property (Relationships) Act 1976  provides that claims under Part 8 of that Act have 
priority over other claims such as those under the Family Protection Act 1955 and Law 
Reform (Testamentary Promises) Act 1949.73 However, if a relationship property claim is 
made, there is uncertainty about the extent to which this claim can be “topped up” under the 
Family Protection Act 1955 and how such claims compete with other family protection 
claims.74 The Court of Appeal pointed out in McCormack v Foley75 that while family 
protection legislation and testamentary promises legislation operate in the same social area 
and both impose restraints on testamentary freedom, each statute is unique and the underlying 
concepts are different. Competing claims by a second spouse or partner and children of a first 
marriage are common but there is no guidance in the legislation on how to prioritise these 
claims.  In Hamilton v Hamilton,76 it was decided that if there are competing claims under the 
Family Protection Act 1955 and the Law Reform (Testamentary Promises) Act 1949, neither 
has automatic preference over the other. Patterson notes77 that a claim founded in contract 
takes priority over a family protection claim (which is made against the net estate) but not 
against a testamentary promises claim (which is made against the gross estate). The 
legislation, apart from the Property (Relationships) Act 1976,78 contains no guidance on the 
priorities of competing claims.   
It is in the interests of clarity and certainty to have transparent rules governing the priorities 
of competing claims. Clear rules will facilitate settlement of claims and avoidance of 
litigation costs. A single code, with statements of principle and policy, subjective expressions 
replaced by objective tests and, as far as possible, rules regulating the priorities of competing 
claims, will promote greater certainty and consistency in judicial decisions. 
F Undefined and uncertain terms 
The courts struggle to grapple with nebulous expressions such as “moral duty”, “wise and 
just testator”, “maintenance and support” and “serious injustice” and this results in 
inconsistent and unpredictable decisions.   
                                          
72  See for example the definitions of “devise” and “issue’ in N Kelly, C Kelly and G Kelly Garrow and 
Kelly’s Law of Trusts and Trustees (6th ed, LexisNexis, Wellington, 2005) at cxi and cxvi. 
73  Section 78(1)(c). 
74  Patterson, above n 68, at [8.11]. 
75  McCormack v Foley [1983] NZLR 57 (CA). 
76  Hamilton v Hamilton [2003] NZFLR 883 (HC). 
77  Patterson, above n 68, at [13.7]; Breuer v Wright [1982] 2 NZLR 77 (CA); Hamilton v Hamilton, above n 
76. 
78  Section 78(1)(c). 
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Caldwell describes the position in the following terms:79 
The oft-stated protestation that the Courts will refuse to modify the will in the interests of 
fairness, but rather will only interfere with the testamentary disposition to the extent 
necessary to remedy the perceived breach of moral duty has always audaciously begged 
the fundamental question of exactly what constitutes a “moral” (or to put it another way 
“fair”) testamentary provision. 
As well it might be beneficial if it could come to be more openly acknowledged that the 
outcome of any family protection claim is ultimately determined more by the exercise of 
subjective judicial value judgements than the application of any normative principles. 
The meaning of “moral duty” under the Family Protection Act 1955 was discussed in a 
research paper in 1997.80 The paper concludes at page 47: 
The concept of moral duty under the Family Protection Act 1955 is an outdated and 
unsound addition. It was first developed at a time when values and ideals were very 
different to those held by a large percentage of New Zealanders today … in our modern 
multi-cultural society it is impossible to agree on exactly what should constitute a moral 
duty. 
To similar effect Virginia Grainer comments:81 
Whereas the inter vivos duties have been responsive to societal change, the family 
protection moral duties have not evolved  to the same extent. The family protection moral 
duties need to be brought in line with current inter vivos duties. They need to be aligned 
to the changes that have taken place so that they are appropriate for today’s environment. 
She also says:82 
Given the problems inherent in the use of the moral duty test, New Zealand would be 
well advised to follow England’s example and devise a new family protection regime not 
reliant on the questionable moral duty concept. 
The expression “serious injustice”83 has created particular uncertainty in terms of the 
threshold for granting leave under section 88(2) Property (Relationships) Act 1976. Another 
question is whether the same term should be interpreted in identical fashion under ss 88(2) 
and 21J Property (Relationships) Act 1976. The decisions in Re Williams: Kinniburgh v 
Williams,84 Public Trust v Whyman,85 Morgan v Public Trust86 and Harrison v Harrison87 
illustrate the difficulties the Court has had.88  In Whyman the Court of Appeal held that the 
                                          
79   Caldwell, above n 69, at 4. 
80  RJ Scott “Moral Duty Under the Family Protection Act 1955: Necessary Element or Outdated and Unsound 
Addition” (LLB (Hons) Research paper, Victoria University of Wellington, 1997).  
81  Virginia Grainer “The Family Protection Act 1955 Time for Reform?”(LLM Thesis, Victoria University of 
Wellington, 1997) at 94. 
82  Ibid, at 120. 
83   Property (Relationships) Act 1976, ss 21J and 88(2).  
84   Re Williams (deceased): Kinniburgh v Williams [2004] 2 NZLR 132; [2004] NZFLR 467. 
85   Public Trust v Whyman [2005] 2 NZLR 696 (CA). 
86   Morgan v Public Trust HC Auckland CIV-2006-404-003636, 20 November 2006. 
87   Harrison v Harrison [2005] NZFLR 252 (CA). 
88   See also Nicola Peart “Scared to Death” (paper presented to New Zealand Law Society Trust Conference, 
Wellington, June 2007). 
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High Court in Re Williams went too far in suggesting that the level of justice required to 
warrant leave is "intolerable". The Court of Appeal went on to say that s 88(2) was intended 
primarily to address situations of the type presented in that case.89 In Morgan90 Venning J 
compared ss 21J and 88(2) and noted the sections appeared in different parts of the Act, they 
dealt with different issues and a number of the indicia in s 21J would not be relevant to 
consideration of “serious injustice” under s 88(2). The Judge distinguished Harrison v 
Harrison91 which dealt with "serious injustice" under s 21J. 
It is unfair to ask judges to make decisions affecting the lives of people based on such 
uncertain expressions. It is also very unfair on the public and their advisers.  The results are 
uncertainty and inconsistency. 
The use of Latin terms such as “donatio mortis causa”,92 “prima facie”93 and “administrator 
ad litem”94 is not desirable in an age where such terms are no longer in common use and 
Latin is taught in very few schools. To many New Zealanders these terms are 
incomprehensible and reinforce the impression that the law is out of touch with ordinary 
people. 
A code which eliminates such expressions or, to the extent they are used, contains clear 
practical definitions, will reduce this uncertainty. 
G Re-writing wills 
Will-makers’ clear intentions are being defeated by judicial “re-writing” of wills.   
Despite statements that the Family Protection Act 1955 does not authorise judges to “re-
write” wills,95 the reality is the judges continue to do just that.96  Caldwell argues that the 
purpose of the Family Protection Act 1955 is to authorise judges to undertake testamentary 
re-writing and this means that a "will can never be regarded as anything more than a tentative 
disposition of property pending the ultimate decision by the Court".97  In Williams v Aucutt,98 
the Court of Appeal stated "... there are pointers to concerns that some orders in recent years 
may have been out of line with current social attitudes to testamentary freedom relative to 
claims by adult children." In the same case Blanchard J stated:99 
Nonetheless there is substance in the criticisms of the way in which courts sometimes 
apply the present law. It is to be remembered that the court is not authorised to re-write a 
will merely because it may be perceived as being unfair to a family member and it is not 
for a beneficiary to have to justify the share which has been given. 
                                          
89   Re Williams (deceased): Kinniburgh v Williams, above n 84, at [47] and [48].  
90   Morgan v Public Trust, above n 86, at [27]. 
91  Harrison v Harrison, above n 87.  
92  Simultaneous Deaths Act 1958, s 3 and Family Protection Act 1955, s 2(5). 
93  Status of Children Act 1969, ss 8(2) and (3). 
94  Law Reform Act 1936, s 9A(3). 
95  Williams v Aucutt [2000] 2 NZLR 479 (CA) at 497. 
96   See for example Strand v Strand [2004] NZFLR 452 (FC) at 464, where Judge McCormick explicitly does 
this; see also Haines v Chellew and Haines HC Auckland CIV 2004-404-004556, 21 October 2008  where 
the High Court overturned a Family Court decision which rewrote the deceased's will. 
97   Caldwell, above n 69, at 4; Welsh v Mulcock [1924] NZLR 673 at 682. 
98   Williams v Aucutt, above n 95, at [45]. 
99  Ibid, at [68]. 
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In that case, the Court of Appeal100 articulated the difficulties of assessing current social 
attitudes in a complex and ever-changing environment. This goes to the heart of the problem.  
There are no objective or clear guidelines against which judges can assess current social 
attitudes and of course, the social environment is always changing. It is not surprising that 
inconsistent decisions result. A code based upon updated and agreed principles and policies 
and which enshrines testamentary freedom as a fundamental objective, will help ordinary 
New Zealanders and their advisers in their asset planning arrangements. 
One problem with a code is that over time it too will become outdated and out of step with 
the changing social environment. However, if properly chosen, many of the principles and 
policies will endure and remain relevant at least for a considerable time. Those policies that 
become outdated (indeed all policies) should be reviewed as time passes. A single code 
would be far easier to review and update than the present multitude of statutes and rules of 
common law. 
H Litigation costs 
Litigation costs rather than merit are forcing settlement of estate claims and have become a 
major issue in recent years.101 The uncertainty of current laws in this area, discussed above, 
compounds the problem. A single code based upon agreed and clearly enunciated principles 
will assist will-makers and their advisers and minimise litigation costs. 
This is a particular problem for modest estates. The current practice of requiring all affected 
parties to be served and the general practice of ordering that the costs of the parties be borne 
by the estate102 often mean that it is not economic to defend family protection claims even 
though they may have little merit. For example, a wealthy 60 year old son has been left out of 
his mother's will and modest estate but agrees to accept a small legacy in settlement of his 
claim; most if not all of his legacy could be swallowed up in legal expenses. 
Estate litigation costs are also a major concern in Australia. The New South Wales Attorney-
General John Hatzistergos stated in September 2008:103 
The bill addresses widely held concerns about the increasing and disproportionate costs 
of family provision proceedings.  The bill seeks to prevent people from making 
unmeritorious claims and accessing money from the deceased's estate to fund their legal 
costs without any restriction.  There are numerous instances of cost blowouts in family 
provision proceedings in New South Wales.  For instance, a case in which the legal costs 
reached $605,000 for a relatively modest estate.  The judge commented that the legal 
costs were far greater than the amount that any of the claimants could have hoped to 
receive in a family provision order and called the case "a dark stain on the administration 
of justice".  Another was a case in which costs approached $100,000 for an estate valued 
at less than $400,000.  In that case, the applicant tried to appeal after failure in the first 
instance.  The applicant's appeal was dismissed both because it was without merit and 
because further litigation might have left a beneficiary of the estate without her home.  
                                          
100   Ibid, at  [44]. 
101   Law Commission  Succession Law: Testamentary Claims (NZLC PP24,  1996) at  [40]. 
102   Patterson, above n 68, at [17.40]. 
103 Leonie Englefield “Family Provisions, Particularly in Respect of the Uniform Succession Laws” (paper 
presented to Law Society of South Australia, Adelaide, 7 May 2009). 
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Another was a case regarding an estate of $412,000, which occupied a half-day hearing, 
where the costs were $90,000.  The judge quite rightly described the costs as "excessive". 
I Law Commission reports ignored 
Various Law Commission reports have been produced but only random implementation or 
reform has resulted.   
Radical changes were enacted in 2001 (to have effect in 2002) which meant: 
• de facto partners (including same sex partners) could make family protection claims; and 
• de facto partners (including same sex partners) could make claims under Part 8, Property 
(Relationships) Act 1976;104 and 
• these same partners have entitlements on intestacy under the Administration Act 1969. 
These rights were extended to civil union partners in 2005.105 
In 2007, the Wills Act was passed with the intention of consolidating the numerous 
amendments to the original Wills Act 1837. Although some changes were introduced, the law 
was not fundamentally changed. The same is true of the Succession (Homicide) Act 2007 
discussed above.  Although these changes resulted from Law Commission recommendations, 
they were effected in isolation. They continue the piecemeal approach to reform of the law in 
this area. Indeed, at the time of writing, further amendments to the Wills Act 2007 are 
proposed. 
Nevertheless, the fundamental problems raised in various Law Commission Reports 
remain106 and there is no immediate prospect of reform. A new code which takes into account 
the changes recommended by the Law Commission and where appropriate, implements those 
changes, would be a major step in the right direction. In Australia there has been an ongoing 
process of reform under their Uniform Succession Laws Project.107 
J Intestacy rules 
New Zealand’s intestacy regime has been in place for more than 40 years but does not reflect 
current social attitudes towards a deceased person’s obligations; it has also failed to keep 
pace with inflationary changes and particularly property values.   
As from 1 June 2009 a surviving spouse or partner receives the first $155,000 of the 
deceased’s estate, the personal chattels and one third of the residue; where there are surviving 
children they take the other two thirds of the residue.108 The trend of legislation over recent 
years (and this is based upon Law Commission recommendations) is to increase the 
entitlements of surviving spouses and partners.109 This is mirrored in the recommendation of 
                                          
104  Claims by the survivor on death to relationship property. 
105  Property (Relationship) Amendement Act 2005, s 3(4); Relationships (Statutory References) Act 2005, s 7. 
106   For example, Law Commission, above n 101; also Law Commission Presentation of New Zealand Statute 
Law (NZLC R104, 2008). 
107   Rosalind Croucher, above n 67. 
108   Administration Act 1969, s 77. 
109   For example Part 8 of the Property (Relationships) Act 1976 which came into effect in 2002. 
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the Scottish Law Commission’s Discussion Paper on Succession.110 Similarly the trend in 
Australia has been to limit claims by non-adult children and shift the balance in favour of the 
spouse or de facto partner.111 The New South Wales Succession Amendment (Intestacy) Act 
2009 provides that a surviving spouse receives the whole estate if the deceased is not 
survived by issue and where there are surviving issue the statutory legacy available to the 
surviving spouse is $350,000 112 Our current intestacy laws, although updated from time to 
time, do not reflect these trends. 
The statutory legacy of $155,000 applies where death occurred after 1 June 2009113. The 
previous statutory legacy was $121,500 which was set on 3 June 1998; it did not change for 
11 years. From June 1998 to June 2008 the median sale price of a residential property in New 
Zealand rose from $163,000 to $340,000; it more than doubled114.  According to the Reserve 
Bank of New Zealand CPI Inflation Calculator, between 1998 and 2008 the total change in 
inflation in New Zealand was 25.6%. The cost of $121,500 in 1998 increased to $152,607.70 
in 2008115. The statutory legacy would have been sufficient to purchase a residential home in 
1998 albeit for less than the median sale price; that is unlikely to be the case at the time of 
writing. 
For example, take a case where the main asset of an estate is a home worth in the region of 
$500,000. As the intestacy laws currently stand, and assuming no application is made under 
the Property (Relationships) Act 1976, if the deceased is survived by a second spouse or 
partner and children of a previous relationship, the second spouse/partner would have to pay 
approximately $230,000 to acquire the share of the children in the home. The same rules 
apply where there has been only one marriage or relationship. Many New Zealanders would 
consider this unfair, particularly if the second relationship lasted for 20 years or more. New 
Zealand’s present intestacy laws are discussed in more detail in chapter 5. 
A single code which takes into account current community attitudes and overseas trends, and 
which recognises the primacy of the surviving spouse or partner’s position on intestacy, 
would prevent the unfairness that can result in the situation described above.  The code could 
also recognise the importance of keeping the family home and chattels for a surviving spouse 
or partner and create a different regime to allow for this. 
K Anti-avoidance provisions 
The transfer of assets to third parties and use of discretionary family trusts and structures 
such as joint ownership to defeat inheritance claims are common asset planning measures in 
New Zealand.   
It is a common asset planning tool to set up a family trust to avoid or defeat inheritance 
claims. The law in this area is not certain.116 The Scottish Law Commission discussed anti-
avoidance provisions in its Discussion Paper on Succession117 and the New South Wales Law 
                                          
110   Scottish Law Commission Discussion Paper on Succession (SLC DP136, 2007) at [2.57]. 
111  New South Wales Law Reform Commission Uniform Succession Laws: Family Provision (NSWLRC IP11, 
2006) at [1.37]. 
112   Schedule 1, Chapter 4, Parts 4.1 and 4.2.   
113   Administration (Prescribed Amounts) Regulations 2009. 
114   “Market Trends” Real Estate Institute of New Zealand ,www.reinz.org.nz. 
115   New Zealand Inflation Calculator <www.rbnz.govt.nz>. 
116   Patterson, above n 68, at [4.20]. 
117   Scottish Law Commission, above n 110, at Part 4. 
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Reform Commission recommended notional estate orders.118 Prior to the removal of estate 
duty in New Zealand in 1991 duty was assessed on the deceased's notional estate119 and the 
concept of a notional estate is still in use under the Protection of Personal and Property Rights 
Act 1988.120 A single code could include anti-avoidance provisions such as severance of joint 
ownership and notional estate awards which the courts could apply in inheritance cases. Anti-
avoidance provisions are in place in other areas of the law such as bankruptcy and 
relationship property disputes, and while they are not always simple in their application, they 
can be effective in preventing evasion. 
In Public Trust v Whyman121 the Court of Appeal strained to allow infant children of the 
deceased to make a claim on property jointly owned by the deceased and his new partner.  As 
the cases on section 88(2) Property (Relationships) Act 1976 show, the law is far from clear; 
in particular, the term “serious injustice” has caused difficulty.122  A single code setting out 
clearly the basis and the circumstances when joint ownership can be severed will create 
greater certainty and consistency of decision-making. 
L Jurisdiction - which court? 
Should one court have jurisdiction in inheritance law; if so, which court? 
A code would normally prescribe which court is to have primary jurisdiction for all disputes 
and applications. It would be unusual for a code to require different courts to have 
jurisdiction on different issues within the same code. 
A single inheritance code is likely to result in the identification of one court to have primary 
jurisdiction in the handling of disputes under the code and also administrative matters such as 
grants of administration. A code will also set out the process for all appeals. 
The jurisdiction of the Family Court has expanded since its creation in 1981 but there are still 
significant areas that are the sole preserve of the High Court. The codification process will 
force a re-think of the jurisdictional issues in this area and will result in a more streamlined 
process for dispute resolution.  The High Court’s traditional jurisdiction in all inheritance law 
issues has been diminished over recent years. For example, most family protection and 
testamentary promises claims are commenced in the Family Court, but undue influence and 
lack of testamentary capacity cases must be filed in the High Court. However the Family 
Court has jurisdiction to determine whether a person has mental capacity to sign an enduring 
power of attorney.123 This has created confusion and unnecessary complexity which will be 
discussed in chapter 6 of this thesis. The emergence of the Family Court as a specialist court 
over the last 30 years points the way towards one specialist court handling all inheritance 
cases.  
                                          
118  New South Wales Law Reform Commission Uniform Succession Laws: Family Provision (NSWLRC R110, 
2006) at [3.20]. 
119   For example s 8 Estate and Gift Duties Act 1968 which included powers of appointment in the dutiable 
estate. 
120   Section 62. 
121   Public Trust v Whyman, above n 85. 
122   Re Williams: Kinniburgh v Williams, above n 84; Public Trust v Whyman above n 85; Morgan v Public 
Trust, above n 86. 
123  Waldron v Public Trust HC Auckland CIV 2009-404-00485, 19 January 2010.  
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III Benefits v Detriments 
As stated at the commencement of this chapter, a code or codifying statute involves 
amalgamating all statutes and common law rules.   
In light of the problems outlined earlier in this chapter, a comprehensive updated and well-
drafted inheritance code will result in: 
• accessibility for all; 
• debate and following debate, clarification of the relevant policies; 
• better understanding of the law and relevant principles by professionals and the general 
public;  
• reduced likelihood of disputes; 
• consistency of judicial decision-making; 
• greater likelihood of settlement of disputes; 
• less delay and reduced legal costs in litigation; 
• clearer advice to will-makers and consequent reductions in disputes. 
One detriment of a code is that it can be or become rigid and inflexible. Because of its all-
encompassing nature, injustice can result in individual cases. However this needs to be 
weighed up against the current uncertainty, inconsistency and unfairness of our succession 
laws. It needs to be remembered that a hotchpotch of narrow statutes can also become rigid 
and hard to amend. The significant benefits of a code which are set out above also need to be 
taken into account. One way to deal with inflexibility and rigidity is to ensure that the code: 
• is based on accepted policies which are clearly analysed and enunciated;  
• sets out clearly the entitlements of specified parties, who can claim further provision and 
the rationale for such rights;  
• allows some judicial discretion or flexibility in certain areas and within the accepted 
categories of beneficiaries and claimants. 
Another potential detriment is that the code needs to be comprehensive; other causes of 
action are excluded. What should be included in the code and what should be excluded? For 
example, should claims to relationship property on death come within the proposed 
inheritance code or remain within Part 8 of the Property (Relationships) Act 1976 alongside 
provisions relating to division of property on separation? Should existing common law rules 
such as those relating to testamentary capacity and undue influence be defined and 
specifically included within the proposed code? Or should they be preserved as causes of 
action outside the proposed code? Do the rules for construction of wills fit within a code and 
rules of interpretation? The answer must be to include all causes of action specifically within 
the proposed code in order to ensure its integrity and to overcome the difficulties and 
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criticisms of the current laws discussed in this chapter. If that is correct, it is essential that all 
existing causes of action are carefully analysed and those that are to be retained need to be 
included and clearly articulated124 within the proposed code. 
Having said that, there can be limits to a code.  For example the Property (Relationships) Act 
1976 is a code125 but in Kerridge v Kerridge and Others the Court of Appeal decided that:126 
while the PRA is a code in respect of transactions between spouses in respect of property, 
it is not a code in respect of all available remedies between spouses for all possible legal 
disputes that may arise between them. 
In that case Mrs Kerridge claimed that Mr Kerridge deceitfully led her to believe in 2000 that 
he would transfer a property from a trust to their joint names when he never intended to do 
so. The Court of Appeal upheld the High Court’s refusal to strike out the claim in deceit. The 
strike out application was argued on the basis that s 4 of the Property (Relationships) Act 
1976 which says that the Act is a code was intended to cover any and all claims that arose 
between spouses in respect of property and the section should not be read down. It was 
contended that it is not sufficient reason to circumvent the Act on an ad hoc basis whenever 
an aggrieved party finds him or herself without a remedy. The Court of Appeal held that the 
claim in deceit was not in the category of property transactions caught by s 4 and therefore 
was not barred. Similarly in Mosaed v Mosaed127 the Court of Appeal distinguished an 
enquiry into accounting for a profit from the division of matrimonial property. Therefore, 
while it is important for an inheritance code to include accepted inheritance claims, it will not 
necessarily close the door on all potential claims between partners.  
Another benefit of the codification exercise is that it shows up inconsistencies.  There will be 
an interpretation section, so that words will be defined the same way rather than different 
ways in different statutes as at present. By way of examples, the terms “final distribution” 
and “movable property situated in New Zealand” have different meanings under the Family 
Protection Act 1955 and the Law Reform (Testamentary Promises) Act 1949.128 There will 
be a jurisdiction section, specifying which court deals with cases in the first instance, and also 
addressing private international law issues.  Existing processes and practices will be critically 
analysed in light of modern conditions. 
IV Summary 
In 2001 radical changes were made to relationship property in New Zealand.129 This was in 
response to significant social changes that had occurred130 and in particular the increasing 
numbers of de facto and same sex relationships and the uncertainty of the law. The Property 
(Relationships) Act 1976 is a code.131 The same social changes and increases in life 
expectancy affect inheritance laws which are also unclear, outdated and inadequate. A similar 
legislative response (codification) is overdue. 
                                          
124  For example, s 30 of the Wills Act 2007 is arguably a codification of the previous case law relating to 
mutual wills. 
125   Section 4. 
126  Kerridge v Kerridge and Others [2009] 2 NZLR 763, [2009] NZFLR 705 (CA) at [52]. 
127   Mosaed v Mosaed (1996) 15 FRNZ 15 (CA), [1999] 3 NZLR 634. 
128  Patterson, above n 68, at [13.26] and [16.3]. 
129   Property (Relationships) Act 1976. 
130   N Peart, M Briggs and M Henaghan (eds), above n 62 at [1.7]. 
131   Section 4. 
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The history of inheritance laws in New Zealand over the last 100 years has been a tale of 
fragmented reactions to specific problems having currency at particular times. The outcome 
in 2010 is a patchwork of archaic and poorly drafted statutes lacking any underlying, let alone 
modern, statements of policy. Suggestions for reform by the Law Commission have been 
actioned on a random basis, or ignored. 
This area of the law affects all New Zealanders. It is unsatisfactory from the point of view of 
good legal policy and public accessibility to continue piecemeal reform. While significant 
work and resources are needed, the time has come for an inheritance code to replace the 
mishmash of our current inheritance laws. In 1997 the New Zealand Law Commission 
pointed out that 27,000 people die in New Zealand each year and many leave assets.132 It 
concluded that the need for review is urgent.133 
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The common law has recognised and protected private property rights in New Zealand (and 
in overseas countries) for many years.134 At a very fundamental level, the question that 
inevitably arises is the extent to which restrictions should be imposed on the ability of the 
owner of private property to deal with his or her property on death.  At one extreme the 
USSR decreed in 1918 that on death the property of a deceased person became the property 
of the State; however, in 1964, a new system of inheritance was brought in that was similar to 
that existing in western countries.135 At the other extreme, prior to 1900 in New Zealand,136 a 
will-maker had unrestricted power to dispose of assets by will.   
There are two main competing principles. On the one hand, the argument that a person has 
the right while alive and within the law to deal with personal property as he or she chooses; 
this should continue on death. On the other hand, the argument that on death all property 
should pass to the State so that the State can use that property for the benefit of all citizens. 
Most states choose a middle course. In Australia, for example, the position has been 
described as follows:137 
For many years the State chose a middle course - allowing the testator freedom of 
distribution but abstracting a substantial slab of the proposed distribution by way of death 
or inheritance taxes.  This happy compromise was thwarted by a controversial 
Queensland Premier who abolished such impositions in his State.  This was, at first, 
considered by other State governments as a local and hazardous eccentricity, until an 
alarming number of their own citizens (with their assets), started to decamp for the 
pleasures of the Queensland Gold and Sunshine Coasts, now further enhanced by the 
prospect of unencumbered testamentary disposition.  Rather hastily, the other State and 
Territory governments fell into line, as did, eventually, the Federal Government.  State 
rivalry may be one of the unexpected advantages of the Federal system. 
But to allow unfettered freedom of testamentary distribution conflicts with the second 
principle of fairness and justice. Testators can be forgetful, capricious or malicious. 
Should they thereby be permitted to ignore persons towards whom they had a clear moral 
obligation by reason of dependency, obligation or relationship? The classic case is the 
dutiful daughter giving up youth, marriage and career to look after the aged parents who 
leave her destitute; but that is just one example of many. Should the law step in to 
convert the moral obligation to a legal one? … 
It was left to the more enlightened Dominions to redress the balance. Pioneered by New 
Zealand in 1900 and followed by the Australian States and Canada, measures were 
enacted that allowed the Courts, within certain defined limits, to make provision or 
                                          
134   However, no such protection is contained in the New Zealand Bill of Rights Act 1990. 
135   Ken Mackie Principles of Australian Succession Law (LexisNexis, Chatswood (NSW), 2007) at [1.10]. 
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further provision out of the estate of a testator for persons whose claims should in 
fairness or justice be recognised. 
As noted by Patterson138, the ability of a will-maker to exclude his spouse or children from 
provision in his will139 and the injustice resulting from this was the major impetus for the 
Testator’s Family Maintenance Act 1900. 
II Options 
Most countries have therefore attempted to compromise between total testamentary freedom 
on one hand and the interests of the deceased’s family (and the consequent obligations placed 
upon the State) on the other.  Two trends have emerged.140 In some European countries, 
including Scotland, the immediate relatives have fixed shares of which they cannot normally 
be deprived.  In contrast, in countries like New Zealand, Australia and England, while 
testamentary freedom is recognised, the courts have discretionary powers to order adequate 
provision for the proper maintenance of certain dependents of the will-maker if the will fails 
to do this.141 These different approaches have been described as the “fixed rule scheme” and 
the “court-based discretionary system”.142 The first policy issue that arises is whether New 
Zealand should change its current court-based discretionary system for a fixed rule scheme. 
Each of these systems is advocated in strongly contrasting LLM theses by Andreas Bauer143 
and Virginia Grainer.144 Bauer advocates legal enforcement of a moral duty to recognise 
“deserving” family members by wills because the benefits achievable for children, family and 
society as a whole patently outweigh the loss of personal liberty. Under his model 50% of an 
estate would pass in fixed shares to statutory heirs, and the deceased would be able to deal 
with the remaining 50% by will. The benefits of his model are: 
• Family harmony and smooth functioning of families resulting from explicit recognition of 
the need to recognise family members. 
• It is open and not subject to undue influence. 
• It is more democratic and results in sharing fortunes on death. 
• There is more certainty and less litigation.  
• Fixed share systems work in many countries. 
In his view the disadvantages of the testamentary freedom/discretionary approach practised in 
New Zealand are: 
• There is more litigation and consequent costs. 
                                          
138   Patterson, above n 136, at [1.2]. 
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• Significant information is needed to support or refute claims.  
• The result depends upon individual judges and their personal views. 
• Will-makers’ discretions are open to abuse.  
• Court decisions are not democratically legitimate because judges are not elected. 
• Estate planning is difficult because precise criteria cannot be prescribed for every case.  
• Unlike the fixed share system, the focus is on money, not moral duty. 
• Family relationships are poisoned by claims. 
• Administration of estates is delayed and more expensive.  
• Testamentary freedom is very much an English or common law approach which is not 
practised world-wide and is inconsistent with Maori concepts of land ownership which 
recognises a strong, spiritual attachment to land (as discussed in chapter 5 of this thesis).  
Bauer does acknowledge the following issues with his model: 
• To back up the model it is necessary to have a tracing system and powers to set aside 
lifetime transfers of property and transactions; he suggests that gifts over a certain level 
and within 10 years of death be caught.  
• Reconciling the interests of second spouses/partners and children of the deceased; he 
proposes lifetime agreements for the surviving spouse under which children will forfeit 
their right to claim when the first spouse dies. He does not suggest reserved shares for de 
facto partners. 
• There are problems with defining “deserving” heirs and he suggests there should be 
“flexibility” where some children have greater educational or other needs and also where 
a child has looked after the deceased for many years. 
• He suggests that relationship property and testamentary promises claims should have 
priority over other claims.  
• He acknowledges the problem of farms or large areas of land being split under a fixed 
share regime and suggests discretion and power to maintain farms after death. 
• He supports the New Zealand Law Commission’s proposals on memento claims.  
The problems with this model are: 
• It requires a complicated, expensive and time consuming system of setting aside lifetime 
transactions over a lengthy period of time.  
• It is not clear who will administer and pay for this system and the tracing required to 
support it.  
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• Investigations of lifetime transactions, tracing and applications to set aside such 
transactions will result in more litigation, expense and delay.  
• The lack of flexibility in cases where some children  have greater needs or deserve greater 
recognition for help provided to the deceased will result in unfairness and will increase 
not decrease family disharmony.  
• Fragmentation of farms and large areas of land remains a very real issue. 
• The New Zealand experience with estate duty was that many people went to great lengths 
to set up schemes to get around obligations which they did not accept; a forced share 
regime is likely to be regarded in the same way with the consequent emergence of an 
avoidance industry.  
• There is  uncertainty about the respective priorities of fixed shares and other claims. 
III Testamentary Freedom 
Virginia Grainer put the case for unlimited testamentary freedom as follows: 
• It is consistent with a person’s rights; that is, a person has a right to deal with assets while 
alive as he or she chooses and this should not change on death.  
• It facilitates altruism. The family protection regime expedites one possible prioritisation; 
that is, family members have priority over charities which may have greater needs. 
Charities rely on donations, and the family protection regime reduces the ability to give to 
charity by will.  
• It facilitates wealth distribution. The Family Protection Act 1955 perpetuates the status 
quo and entrenches financial inequality.  
• It facilities social control. It can serve to support family and social order by providing the 
will-maker with an opportunity to maintain, reward or punish selected individuals. 
Automatic entitlements can have the opposite effect. 
• It creates flexibility. The understanding of “family” today is very individual, and people 
should have the flexibility to deal with assets in accordance with their individual view of 
“family”.  
The proposals for reform set out in chapter 13 of the Grainer thesis are: 
• New Zealand law should be changed so that it corresponds as nearly as possible to 
complete testamentary freedom. The only justifiable limitations are those consistent with 
the limitations on the will-maker’s freedom of discretion while alive.  
• The Family Protection Act 1955 should be repealed and statutes enforcing duties relating 
to matrimonial property, spousal support and child support should be amended to provide 
for enforcement of testamentary duties that correspond to those inter vivos requirements. 
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• Spousal maintenance applications should be made during the first two years after the 
death of the deceased person on the same basis as awards are made after separation. After 
two years, awards would be made on the same basis as awards are made now after 
dissolution of marriage. 
• The Child Support Act 1991 should be amended so that a child support claim can be 
made against a deceased estate on the same basis as it would be made against property 
during the will-maker’s life. Adult children would have no entitlement to make claims 
against an estate apart from assistance for training and education up until the age of 25 
years. This would be consistent with inter vivos duties.  
• With regard to the Law Commission’s 1996 proposal145 that it should be possible to 
prevent a will-maker from disinheriting a child in a way that is capricious or vindictive or 
vitiated by mistake of fact, Grainer comments that this is premised on the questionable 
assumption that adult children have a right to inherit from their parents.146 Judgement on 
these issues is very subjective.  
• In summary, Grainer recommends that the Family Protection Act 1955 should be repealed 
and maintenance obligations of a will-maker should be extended to the situation where 
one party has died.  
The problems with this proposal are: 
• Spousal maintenance and child support obligations are calculated on a person’s income, 
not assets. When a person dies, in most cases their income is reduced or completely cut 
off; however, assets are likely to become available. Calculations based on income which 
is no longer available have to be changed. In most cases the extent of assets available for 
a claim is important not past income. As pointed out by Garnett Crowhen147 maintenance 
is based largely on income whereas family protection claims are usually paid out of 
capital.  
• The proposal to pay spousal maintenance in stages, that is, at death (as if separated), and 
again two years later (as if marriage dissolved) will drag out estate administration; this is 
not desirable. It is not a practical proposal. 
• Maintenance and child support are assessed on the basis that a partner or former spouse 
will be alive and can contribute in non-financial ways. On death this is obviously not the 
case. Some compensation needs to be made for lack of non-financial contributions.  
• Grainer’s views on the “individual” nature of family are at odds with the Maori view on 
whanau, hapu and iwi. The classic Maori view is that membership of the groups provides 
meaning and purpose.  
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IV Fixed Rule Scheme or Court-Based Discretionary System? 
The relative merits and deficiencies of both systems have been discussed in recent reports by 
the Scottish Law Commission148 and by the New South Wales Law Reform Commission.149  
The English Law Commission also considered that it would be undesirable to change laws of 
estate distribution in such a way as to cause more applications to Court for greater 
provision.150  The comparative merits and defects of the two contrasting systems are: 
• The advantages of a fixed rule scheme are certainty and convenience.  People can 
prepare wills with knowledge of the likely outcome.  The delays, costs and 
inconvenience of litigation are minimised as are the costs and time involved in estate 
administration.151 
• The major disadvantage of a fixed rule scheme is rigidity.  Unlike the court-based 
discretionary system, factors such as the conduct of the parties and the competing needs 
of claimants and beneficiaries are usually irrelevant in fixed rule schemes.   
• Another disadvantage of a fixed share system is that it is usually limited to a small 
number of classes of claimants.  Unlike a court-based discretionary system, a fixed 
share system usually provides for only a small list of parties. 
• A further disadvantage of a fixed rule scheme is that an owner of property is deprived 
of the ability to decide what is to happen on death to property that in many cases he or 
she has acquired and developed. An unwanted and possibly undesirable regime is 
imposed on the property owner. This has meant, in the case of farms or large blocks of 
land, fragmentation of ownership amongst a person’s heirs rather than retention by an 
heir of choice; this has led in turn to inefficient and problematic use of the land.  
• The advantages of a court-based discretionary system are flexibility and the ability to 
take into account many factors in different situations. Also, awards can take various 
forms such as lump sum payments, transfers of property or periodical payments. 
• The disadvantages of a court-based discretionary system are uncertainty and 
inconvenience.152 While previous decisions provide some guidance, the outcome 
depends very heavily on the particular circumstances.153 A discretionary system also 
provokes litigation and the consequent cost, delay and upheaval at a time when the 
family are still adjusting to bereavement.154 
• Experience with court based discretionary systems has shown that the class of those 
who can claim widens according to changing social mores.  As one report notes:155  
                                          
148   Scottish Law Commission, above n 142. 
149   New South Wales Law Reform Commission Uniform Succession Laws: Intestacy (NSWLRC R116, 2007). 
150   England and Wales Law Commission Distribution on Intestacy (Working Paper 108, 1988) at 37. 
151   Scottish Law Commission, above n 142, at [3.33]. 
152   Ibid, at [3.34].  
153   See Re Z [1979] 2 NZLR 495 at 508 where Cooke J stated “it may not be profitable to try to lay down rules 
of practice purporting to crystallise some aspect of the standard testator’s moral duty”. 
154   Scottish Law Commission, above n 142, at [3.34]. 
155  Northern Territory Law Reform Committee, above n 137, at 7. 
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Once a Court is given power to override the testator's discretion and impose its own 
discretion in accordance with broad principles of equity, it becomes difficult to argue that 
such principles should be restricted only to some specific cases and not to others.  Non-
relatives for instance may be more deserving of and dependent on the testator's bounty 
than relatives. 
The Scottish Law Commission favoured retention of a fixed rule scheme for surviving 
spouses and civil partners but recommended a discretionary court-based system for 
dependent children and cohabitants. In contrast, the New South Wales Law Reform 
Commission favoured retention of a court-based discretionary system; however, it also 
recommended reduction of the classes of potential claimants under this system. 
V New Zealand Perspective 
The reports of both the Scottish and New South Wales Law Reform Commissions illustrate 
that neither system is perfect and there are advantages and disadvantages to both.156 It is, 
however, important that as far as possible, our laws reflect the views of our society. In its 
1997 Report the Law Commission comments:157 
Although most people want to pass on their assets to members of their family, a research 
study undertaken in New Zealand suggests that older people value their freedom of 
disposition and right to decide who their beneficiaries will be:  Thorns (1995) A Social 
Policy Journal of New Zealand, 30, 38.  A British study drew similar conclusions, see 
Finch and Masson – Negotiating Family Responsibilities (Tavistock/Routledge, London 
1993). 
In a 2006 survey conducted in New Zealand, 60% of 2274 respondents believed that a parent 
did not have a duty to pass on wealth to his or her children and only 21% of respondents 
thought children had any right to expect an inheritance from their parents.158  It is difficult to 
accurately assess the views of our society, if indeed, a clear predominant view exists.  
Caldwell points out that the views expressed in this 2006 survey were consistent with the 
1997 recommendations of the Law Commission (set out above) and he commented that: 
“There can now really be little doubt that contemporary thinking currently leans heavily in 
favour of testamentary freedom.”159 
However, as the Law Commission also pointed out,160 there is no social inquiry that supports 
the assumption that there is general acceptance of the exact content of a will-maker’s moral 
duty.  The Law Commission proceeds to say that New Zealand society is not culturally and 
ethnically homogenous which can make it difficult for will-makers to have their different 
ethnic and cultural values recognised, respected and protected.161  Further evidence of this are 
the provisions relating to succession to Maori land contained in Te Ture Whenua Maori Act 
1993, discussed later in this chapter and the discussion on Maori land and property interests 
in chapter 5 of this thesis.  
However, it is very unlikely that New Zealand will change to a fixed rule scheme in view of: 
                                          
156   See for example, Scottish Law Commission, above n 142, at Part 3. 
157  Law Commission Succession Law: A Succession (Adjustment) Act (NZLC R39, 1997) at [14], footnote 28. 
158   John Caldwell “Family Protection Claims by Adult Children:  What is Going On?” (2008) 6 NZFLJ 4. 
159   Ibid. 
160   Law Commission, above n 157, at [33].  
161   Ibid at [33].  
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• the long history (over 100 years) of our current court-based discretionary system and 
complete absence of the fixed rule scheme in our history;162 and 
• the importance of the principle of testamentary freedom (which is implicit in the court-
based discretionary system) to New Zealanders;163 and 
• the fact that none of the Law Commission Reports on succession or inheritance law has 
advocated a fixed rule scheme and recent reports in both England and Australia (whose 
histories in this area are similar to ours) advocated retention of a court-based 
discretionary system. 
Can we use a mixture of the fixed rule scheme and the court-based discretionary system? As 
stated above, the Scottish Law Commission favoured retention of a fixed-rule scheme for 
surviving spouses and civil union partners, but recommended a discretionary court-based 
system for dependent children and cohabitants. This approach has been criticised because no 
overarching rationale is given for applying different regimes to different classes of claimants, 
and no specific justifications are given for preferring certainty and convenience in one case, 
and individual desert in another.164 One commentator has stated that the English (court-based 
discretionary) system will probably get the morally right and fair answer in more cases than 
others because the court is given discretion to take account of all the morally relevant factors 
with special weightings for some of them.165 
However, despite retention of a court-based discretionary system, many of the problems 
identified in chapter 1 of this thesis can be avoided, or at least minimised, by making the 
following changes (some of which were recommended by the New South Wales Law Reform 
Commission):166 
• greater limitations on who can apply for further provision; 
• clarification of the grounds upon which awards can be made involving perhaps 
establishment of the need for proper maintenance and support rather than “recognition”; 
• a clearer and perhaps more restrictive definition of “need”;  
• financial limits (to be imposed by statute) on the courts’ discretionary powers. 
 
                                          
162   As stated early in chapter 1 of this thesis, initial proposals in the 1890s to introduce a fixed rule scheme 
based on Scots Law were defeated and to the writer’s knowledge, there have been no proposals since then to 
reintroduce it.  Although arguably, the fixed entitlements on intestacy under the Administration Act 1969 
and rights to relationship property on death under Part 8 of the Property (Relationships) Act 1976, are forms 
of fixed shares. 
163   See John Caldwell, above n 158. 
164   Hilary Hiram “Reforming Succession Law: Legal Rights” (2008) 12 Edinburgh Law Review 77 at 81-86. 
165   N MacCormick “Discretion and Rights” (1989) 8 Law and Philosophy 23 at 33-34. 
166   New South Wales Law Reform Commission Uniform Succession Laws: Family Provision (NSWLRC R110, 
2005) Draft Family Provision Bill 2004 clauses 6 and 10, which limit who can apply and when Orders can 
be made. 
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Arguably the individualism of testamentary freedom clashes with the Maori communal view 
of property; whanau members working together for the care and management of land and 
taonga.167  
However, the principles of testamentary freedom relate to personal assets; it has never been 
possible for an individual to dispose of communal property. The proposal in chapter 5 of this 
thesis is that the current regime in relation to Maori land, as prescribed in Te Ture Whenua 
Maori Act 1993, is retained and specifically recognises the communal nature of Maori land 
and taonga.  
The special historical link between Maori and land will be maintained; as will recognition of 
an individual’s place in whanau, hapu and iwi. Testamentary freedom will still apply to assets 
other than land. 
This issue is further discussed in chapter 5 of this thesis.  
In conclusion, one of the guiding principles of an Inheritance Code is the importance of 
freedom of testation: the properly expressed wishes of the will-maker should be given 
primacy. Judicial intervention should be limited to situations where it is essential. Therefore 
retention of the longstanding court-based discretionary regime as opposed to the fixed rule 
regime is proposed.  
 
                                          
167 M Henaghan and B Atkin (eds) Family Policy in New Zealand (3rd ed, LexisNexis, Wellington, 2007) at 49. 
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Chapter 4 
POLICIES ON CLAIMS AGAINST AN ESTATE  
I Who Should be Able to Seek Provision? 
To avoid any uncertainty, this chapter deals with claims for further provision from an estate 
which are akin to current family protection claims. I am not dealing with challenges to a will 
on the bases of lack of testamentary capacity, undue influence or an alleged testamentary 
promise; those claims are conceptually different. 
From the outset our family protection legislation and its Australian equivalents set out a list 
of eligible claimants; the list was largely restricted to spouses, children and grandchildren.  
However, in July 1998 Victoria, uniquely among the Australian states, dispensed with the list 
of eligible applicants and made it possible for any person to make a claim so long as the 
deceased had a responsibility to make provision for the proper maintenance and support of 
that person.168 In determining whether an applicant qualified, the Victorian Court has to 
consider 12 factors such as the nature and length of the relationship between the applicant 
and the deceased, the deceased’s obligations to the applicant, the size of the estate, the 
financial resources and needs of the applicant, the age and any disabilities of the applicant, 
benefits previously given to the applicant, and the conduct of the applicant. 
The intention was to avoid the harsh consequences that may occur where a meritorious 
person is prevented from bringing a claim because of the legal status of his or her relationship 
with the deceased; and to change the focus instead on the nature of the relationship with and 
the moral responsibility of the deceased.169 It is the nature of the relationship between the 
applicant and the deceased that is crucial to the existence of responsibility to provide from the 
estate. 
A recent case under the Victorian legislation Sinclair v Forsyth170 involved a couple who 
enjoyed a lengthy social and personal relationship (which included sexual intimacy and a 
deep abiding friendship) but where financial independence was largely preserved and 
separate homes were maintained.  The applicant resided with her former husband and their 
children throughout the 12 year relationship with the deceased. The Judge found that this 
relationship was the "shaping force" in their lives and awarded the applicant 50% of the 
$800,000 estate.  While this approach does have some obvious attractions, it is notable that 
none of the other Australian states have followed this track and the following disadvantages 
are inherent: 
• This approach increases rather than decreases the number of potential claimants which 
goes against the trend towards testamentary freedom. 
• The decision in Sinclair v Forsyth171 indicates that an award is made on the nature of 
the relationship rather than need or dependency. 
                                          
168   Administration and Probate Act 1958 (Vic), s 91. 
169  Leonie Englefield “Family provisions, particularly in respect of the uniform succession laws” (paper 
presented to Law Society of South Australia, Adelaide, 7 May 2009). 
170   Sinclair v Forsyth [2008] VSC 250. 
171  Ibid.  
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• In such cases the Court is heavily reliant on the (often uncontradicted) evidence of the 
survivor which is not always the safest course to the truth. 
• This approach is likely to lead to greater rather than less uncertainty which, as 
mentioned in chapter 2 of this thesis, is one of the problems with our present laws. 
While this approach is of interest, it is highly unlikely after 100 years of family protection 
legislation that New Zealand will follow Victoria and abandon its list of eligible claimants. 
A Spouse/partner 
Since 2002 a spouse or partner has been entitled on death to 50% of relationship property 
under Part 8 of the Property (Relationships) Act 1976.  Should a spouse, civil union partner 
or long term de facto partner of a deceased person retain a right to make a claim for further 
provision from the estate of a deceased spouse or partner?  The right to make a claim was 
recognised more than 100 years ago in the Testator’s Family Maintenance Act 1900 which 
gave the Court discretion to make adequate provision for the proper maintenance and support 
of the deceased’s wife, husband or children if the deceased failed to do so in his or her 
will.172  The reports of the Law Commissions of New Zealand, Scotland, England and New 




towards giving more recognition to the needs of the surviving spouse or partner. 
(particularly if the spouse has been retired for 15-20 years) and may live another 10-15 years. 
                                         
… there is no doubt that needs of the surviving spouse or partner have become more and 
more important over time.  … this reflects a trend in most comparable jurisdictions 
As noted in the report of the New South Wales Law Reform Commission,174 when the 
Statute of Distributions was passed in England in 1670, the average life expectancy at birth 
was approximately 38 years for men and 36 years for women; although those who made it to 
25 years could expect to live on average until 55 years.  In Australia in 2001-2003, the 
average life expectancy at birth was 77.8 years for men and 82.8 years for women.175  As 
noted in chapter 2 of this thesis, life expectancy in New Zealand since 1975 has increased by 
6.8 years for females and 9.2 years for males; life expectancy for women was 82.2 years and 
for men 78.2 years as at March 2009.176 The consequences of this are first, that the children 
of a deceased person are now, at the deceased’s death, often in their forties and fifties and 
therefore in most cases, not financially reliant upon their parents; and secondly, the surviving 
spouse or partner (in their seventies or eighties) is often more reliant upon the deceased, 
When the Property (Relationships) Act 1976 was enacted, the right to make a separate 
application for further provision on death was specifically preserved.177   The entitlement to 
half of the relationship property was consistent with the other provisions of the Act for equal 
division and was separate from obligations arising on death which had long been recognised 
 
172  See s 2; see also N Peart, M Briggs and M Henaghan (eds) Relationship Property on Death (Thomson 
Brookers, Wellington, 2004) at [1.4].  
173  New South Wales Law Reform Commission, Uniform Succession Laws: Family Provision (NSWLRC 
R110, 2005) at [1.37]. 
174   Ibid, at [1.15] and [1.37]. 
175   Ibid, at [1.15].  
176   “Births and Deaths: March 2009 quarter”(2009) Statistics New Zealand <www.stats.govt.nz>. 
177  See s 57. 
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in the Family Protection Act 1955.  As noted by the New South Wales Law Reform 
Commission178 recognition of the needs and primary position of a surviving spouse or partner 
has, if anything, increased and therefore the right to make application for further provision 
should be retained. 
more detail later in this chapter because they raise a number of important issues in respect of: 
• the difference between relationship property and inheritance rights; 
 a relationship of short duration should have the same rights 
as other de facto partners;  
• whether separation affects the right to make a claim; and 
• competing claims between a spouse/partner and children of the deceased.   
te of a deceased person both in relationship 
property and family protection-type claims.   
B Close personal association 
lationship exists.  It is not 
necessary for there to be a sexual relationship or cohabitation.  
of the relationship with the deceased.  It is 
therefore subject to the same criticism, namely: 
of potential claimants and thereby goes 
against the principle of testamentary freedom. 
                                         
I discuss the claims of surviving spouses, civil union and de facto partners (“partners”)179 in 
• whether de facto partners in
It is sufficient for present purposes to say that as a class, spouses and partners should be 
included as potential claimants on the esta
What of a person who lives in a close personal association or relationship with the deceased 
but does not qualify as a de facto partner?  While they have rights in contract and tort which 
are enforceable against an estate, they do not have inheritance or succession rights as such.  
The New South Wales Succession Act 2006180 includes amongst eligible claimants "a person 
with whom the deceased person was living in a close personal relationship at the time of the 
deceased person's death".  This was intended to cover non-sexual relationships such as an 
adult daughter caring for an elderly parent; in contrast the South Australian definition of this 
term was expressly intended to include de facto and same sex unions.181  In New Zealand the 
Domestic Violence Act 1995 includes within the meaning of domestic relationship a person 
who has a "close personal relationship" with another person and the Court may have regard to 
a number of factors in deciding whether a close personal re 182
This mirrors to some extent the approach taken in Victoria which is discussed above in that it 
focuses on the nature rather than the category 
• It increases rather than decreases the number 
 
178  New South Wales Law Reform Commission, above n 173, at [1.37]. 
179   The report of the Scottish Law Commission describes them as “Civil partners” in its Discussion Paper on 
Succession (SLC DP136, 2007). 
180   Section 57. 
181   Leonie Englefield, above n 169, at [5].  
182   See Domestic Violence Act 1995, s 4. 
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• Courts will tend to make awards based on the nature of the relationship rather than need 
or dependency. 
• The court is heavily reliant upon the uncorroborated evidence of the survivor. 
 will that does not provide for the other person in the close 
personal relationship) that a potential claim will arise. If this is the situation, it must be very 
 Zealand will follow this approach in light of the legislative history in 
this area and the principle of testamentary freedom discussed in chapter 3 of this thesis. 
estate and the Queensland Law Reform Commission had similar proposals.  The reports of 
in his or her minor child. For example, if a child or parent is overseas, 
relief may be available, and there are other exemptions in the Child Support Act 1991.187 
                                         
• Greater rather than less uncertainty is likely to result. 
On scrutiny it seems unlikely that valid inheritance claims by a person in a close personal 
relationship with the deceased will arise very often. If assets are held jointly they will pass 
automatically to the survivor. For many years Public Trust have done free wills, as do many 
solicitors, so there is no financial impediment to signing a will. De facto relationships under 
the Property (Relationships) Act 1976 require neither cohabitation nor a sexual 
relationship,183 so many in a close personal relationship will qualify as de facto partners. 
Therefore it is only if the deceased holds property in his or her sole name or as a tenant in 
common, the relationship does not qualify as a de facto relationship and the deceased dies 
intestate (or even less likely, with a
doubtful that a claim should be available; particularly if the deceased has gone to some 
lengths to leave out the claimant.  
It is unlikely that New
C Minor children 
There can be little argument that minor children of a deceased person should be able to claim 
further provision from the estate of the deceased.  If the will-maker had survived, there would 
normally have been obligations to provide for minor children and this obligation transfers to 
the estate on death.  This was recognised in the Testator’s Family Maintenance Act 1900.  
The report of the New South Wales Law Reform Commission184 includes non-adult children 
as one of three categories of persons who can make application for further provision from an 
185
the Law Commission186 agree. This raises issues about the basis for such provision and also 
competing claims with a surviving spouse or partner which are discussed later in this chapter.   
For the sake of clarity, I propose that the current right of minor biological or adopted children 
of a deceased person to make a claim for further provision from the deceased's estate be 
retained; this right would subsist irrespective of whether the child was being maintained or 
eligible to be maintained by the deceased.  There are situations where a parent has no 
obligation to mainta
 
183  Section 2D(2) Property (Relationships) Act 1976 lists nine factors to be taken into account when 
determining whether a de facto relationship exists and “common residence” and the existence of a sexual 
relationship are only two of these factors.  
184   New South Wales Law Reform Commission, above n 166, Draft Family Provision Bill 2004 cl 6. 
185  Queensland Law Reform Commission Family Provision (QLRC R58, 2004) Family Provision Bill 2004 cl 
6. 
186   Law Commission, above n 157, at [70].  
187  Section 25. 
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However, in principle a minor child should be eligible to claim against the estate of a natural 
or adopting parent. 
When does a person cease to be a minor? Under the Age of Majority Act 1970 a person 
ceases to be a minor at 20 years of age. However, the Minors’ Contracts Act 1969 provides 
that a minor is a person aged under 18 years188 and 18 is the age in the United Nations 
Convention on Rights of the Child. The Scottish Law Commission proposed that a new 
“alimentary obligation” should be available to a child of the deceased, and it further proposed 
that “child” should mean a person under the age of 18 years, or if undergoing appropriate 
education or training, a person under the age of 25 years.189 Under the Child Support Act 
1991, liability for child sup 190port terminates when the child turns 19 years.  Many New 
Zealanders are still in tertiary education at 19 or 20 years of age and are therefore dependent 
anders would regard a 21-year-old as an adult; sufficient 
time has been allowed to commence and advance tertiary study or qualifications. It is 
 practice in New Zealand to specify that the entitlements of children 
vest on attaining 21 years of age.  
on for the children of a deceased person to be in their 40s and 50s and 
completely financially independent from their parents.  Why should the deceased have 
oblig Law 
Comm
 for children reflect a static society where inherited wealth was very 
important:  nowadays there are many more opportunities for people to amass their own 
children to seek further provision be limited to those to whom the deceased owed a 
                                         
or semi-dependent. I propose therefore for the purposes of succession law, that  a minor be a 
person aged under 21 years. 
A number of New Zealanders aged 18 years are still at secondary school so 18 years is too 
young. The problem with extending claims to children aged up to 25 years if undergoing 
“appropriate” education or training, as proposed by the Scottish Law Commission, is that it 
begs the question what is “appropriate” education or training? Does it have to be fulltime, or 
will part time do? Does the training need to be job or career specific, or will any study or 
training do? By the age of 21 years most New Zealanders have had the opportunity to 
complete tertiary qualifications, or be three years into tertiary education. While the age of 21 
years differs from the ages specified in the Child Support Act 1991 and the Age of Majority 
Act 1970, and may add further confusion in the minds of many as to when a minor legally 
becomes an adult, most New Zeal
common will drafting
D Adult children 
Adult children of a deceased create greater problems. With increased life expectancies it is 
now very comm
ations to provide for those children on death?  As noted in the report of the Scottish 
ission:191 
Compulsory shares
wealth and indeed are expected to do so.  Inheritance from a parent should no longer be 
viewed as a right. 
The New South Wales Law Reform Commission192 recommended that the rights of non-adult 
 
188  Section 2. 
189  Scottish Law Commission Discussion Paper on Succession (SLC DP136, 2007) at [3.80]. 
190  Section 5. 
191  Scottish Law Commission, above n 189, at [3.96]. 
 
192   New South Wales Law Reform Commission, above n 166, cls 7 and 11. 
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responsibility to provide maintenance, education or advancement in life.  The Commission 
also set out a list of relevant factors to be taken into account by the Court and the list includes 
any physical, intellectual or mental disability of the proposed applicant.  The financial 
is justify imposing a legal obligation on the parents to provide on 
death for independent adult children? As noted earlier in this chapter, many New Zealanders 
cult to believe that this all too 
common scenario was envisaged by the framers of the original legislation or that the Family 
intended for this type of application. 
In 1997 the Law Commission recommended in respect of adult children that they should have 
• in respect of valuable benefits they have conferred on a parent during the parent’s 
d and it is possible without unfairness to those 
otherwise entitled to the estate of the deceased to provide periodical payments 
at is sought by the child is no more than a memento or keepsake of modest 
value; and these memento claims would be disposed of swiftly and simply by a disputes 
                                         
resources and needs of the applicant were also seen as a relevant factor. 
In the context of claims by adult children, the most understandable cause of complaint in 
New Zealand is the increasingly common situation where the surviving parent of adult 
children gives his or her estate to a new spouse or partner (who is not a parent of the 
deceased’s adult children) and thereby effectively disinherits them. The complaint is that 
assets built up by both parents of the adult children pass to a third party rather than to the 
children; that is, the adult children miss out on the assets built up by both of their parents and 
a third party receives them. While these situations undoubtedly create disappointment for the 
surviving children, does th
do not accept that it does.  
The other side of the coin is the increasingly common scenario where a middle-aged child has 
neglected his or her parent for many years thereby placing a physical and financial burden on 
other children during the parent's later years.  When left out of the will the neglectful middle-
aged child, who may be well off financially, makes a family protection claim against what 
may be a modest estate. The other children feel duty bound to defend the claim and their 
parent’s expressed wishes. The result is significant legal costs, delay in administration and a 
fragmented family. There is no question of financial need or desert. While these cases are 
often settled financially, personal relationships can be destroyed by the process. The 
decisions in this area refer to "recognition"193 but it is difficult to see how an award of money 
by the Court replaces recognition by the deceased.  It is diffi
Protection Act 1955 was 
E Law Commission 
only the following claims:194 
lifetime; or  
• where they are genuinely in nee
sufficient to alleviate that need; or 
• where wh
tribunal. 
In essence, the Law Commission proposed that very limited claims be available to adult 
children. Indeed, if the three suggested claims are analysed, there are doubts that even they 
 
193   See Williams v Aucutt [2000] 2 NZLR 479 (CA) at [166].  
194  Law Commission, above n 157, at [72]-[77]. 
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should be retained. In relation to the first, if a child confers a benefit on a parent there is no 
presumption under New Zealand law that this was a gift; the presumption of advancement 
does not apply in relation to benefits conferred by a child to a parent.195 The benefit will 
therefore be treated as a loan which can be recovered from the parent’s estate; unless a gift 
 with this second category is that it leaves the way open 
to different judges to give inconsistent meanings to terms such as “need” and “unfairness”, 
putting the item in question up for auction at which the competing claimants can bid. This 
come very emotive and divisive, and is best left out altogether.  
The options based on our current laws and the New Zealand, Scottish and Australian reports 
 the deceased; or 
 independent and will reward those who have not. As one commentator 
has pointed out, self-reliance is a laudable principle which is often forgotten in family 
                                         
was intended by the child, in which case it should not be recoverable anyway.  
The second category is genuine “need” where it is possible without “unfairness” to others to 
provide periodical payments. I will discuss the meaning of “need” very shortly in this thesis, 
but in short, “need” has been one of the criteria under the Family Protection Act 1955 for 
many years, and different interpretations of that word have led to some of the current 
problems. The word “unfairness” similarly creates uncertainty and introduces further 
subjectivity to this area. The difficulty
and thereby cause more uncertainty.  
With respect to the third category, mementos or keepsakes, despite what the Law 
Commission says, decisions about which family member should get a ring or other personal 
item often create huge arguments between family members. Sometimes the item in question 
can be valuable and it is unrealistic to suggest that these disputes can be resolved swiftly and 
simply by a disputes tribunal. The claims are often based upon alleged promises by the 




• adult children are eligible to claim if in “need”; or 
• adult children can claim if "dependent" upon
• adult children cannot make any claim at all. 
The problem with “need,” is that this is the ground for claims at present and as just discussed, 
this has led to major problems. Claims by adult children on the ground of need are one of the 
biggest problem areas at present. As pointed out by Sutton and Peart,196 one obvious 
objection to "need" and "dependency" is that if there is no obligation on a parent to provide 
for adult children while alive, it is not logical for this to be imposed on death. Need and 




195   N Kelly, C Kelly and G Kelly Garrow and Kelly’s Law of Trusts and Trustees (6th ed, LexisNexis, 
Wellington 2005) at [14.4.4]. 
196  Richard Sutton and Nicola Peart “Testamentary Claims by Adult Children – The Agony of the Wise and 
Just Testator” (2003) 10 Otago LR 385. 
197   Rosalind F Croucher “Towards uniform succession in Australia” (2009) 83 ALJ 728 at 751. 
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Another problem with “dependency” is that it is very difficult to define precisely. Does it 
need to be financial? Does it include gifts or loans from a parent from time to time? Is partial 
dependency sufficient? If so, how does one define or calculate partial dependency? What if a 
child is dependent on a parent through choice but not necessity? Should it be linked to tertiary 
education? That would be unfair on those who do not have the good fortune to receive 
tertiary education or are simply not academic. One option is to define dependency in narrow 
terms such as limited to full time tertiary study or being in receipt of a sickness or similar 
benefit. The problem with linking entitlements to tertiary study is whether the study needs to 
be job or career specific and fulltime, or whether any part time study will do. In terms of 
eligibility for a State benefit, does this need to be on a long term basis or will short term 
eligibility suffice? Does eligibility need to exist at the time of death or will previous 
eligibility suffice? Will a person who qualifies for accident compensation or cover under a 
disability policy qualify? This leaves the way open to abuse as there may be those who will 
nt against this is 
that it increases the burden on the State but again, this occurs while the parent is alive or at 
eity 
may make it difficult for will-makers and their families to have their different ethnic and 
cultur
sed on the judge’s personal sense 
of the fitness of things shaped by such factors as religious and cultural background, 
e to adult children. These differences 
mean that conscientious will-makers find it hard to know and comply with the 
change their circumstances in order to qualify for further provision. 
If the intention is to create certainty and clarity, the simplest course is to exclude claims by 
adult children completely. Once a child has reached a certain age, regardless of family 
practices, needs or other problems, there is no entitlement to make a claim on a parent’s 
estate. This accords with our current child support laws while a parent is alive and it is 
difficult to justify a departure from this when a parent has died. One argume
present if a parent transfers assets while alive to a discretionary family trust. 
The Law Commission has pointed out that there is no specific evidence to support the view 
that there is general acceptance of the exact content of a will-maker’s moral duty to adult 
children. The Commission also pointed out that it cannot be assumed in this context that New 
Zealand society is culturally and ethnically homogenous and the assumption of homogen
al values recognised, respected and protected.198 As the Law Commission stated:199 
The consequences of the absence of any norm of this kind are that a deceased’s 
perception of his or her moral duty is overruled by a particular judge’s assessment of 
current social norms. This assessment is necessarily ba
family history and attitudes and personal experiences. 
The law has become unclear in its purposes. Failure by the Courts to articulate (beyond 
the obscure concept of moral duty) why precisely they are altering a will-maker’s 
arrangement results in a situation where wills are varied according to the subjective 
values of the particular judge who chances to deal with the matter. This makes it difficult 
to assess whether the Court’s distribution is more commendable than the will-maker’s. 
There are appreciable differences in the awards mad
requirements of the law and bring it into disrepute. 
                                          
198   Law Commission, above n 157, at [33].  
34]. 199  Ibid, at [33]-[
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In the same 1997 Report, the Law Commission noted200 that almost 90% of those who 
commented on claims by adult children, accepted the commission’s analysis that the present 
law is seriously deficient. 
Views on the extent of a will-maker’s responsibility to provide for adult children vary widely 
 will-maker and children; 
tionships between will-makers and their children; 
ic background; 
nd “corrective” types of justice. What are the criteria for redistributing an 
estate? Equality? Fairness? Economic need or dependency? Amount of contact with the will-
blems with “corrective” justice are quantifying “needs”, balancing the 
competing claims of other children and spouses and then dividing up what may be only a 
G Summary 
. 
n views on the scope of that consensus based on personal circumstances, 
cultural values and age. 
depending upon factors such as: 
• the personal circumstances of the
• the differing rela
• cultural and ethn
• personal views; 
• specific assets. 
For example in relation to cultural and ethnic background and specific assets as discussed in 
chapter 5 of this thesis, the Te Ture Whenua Maori Act 1993 recognises that for Maori land 
and taonga201 have a deep spiritual meaning.  
As Sutton and Peart point out,202 even if it is accepted as conventional morality that a will-
maker should provide for adult children, it does not follow that this should become law.  It 
should only become law if capable of being focussed in a satisfactory way; the law should 




1. There is no evidence of consensus in New Zealand that a will-maker owes duties to 
provide for adult children
2. If there is a general consensus on this point, there is likely to be very significant 
variation i
3. There is no clear conceptual basis upon which to base laws requiring provision for adult 
children.  
                                          
200  Ibid, at [35]. 
201  “Taonga” has been defined as a valued possession or anything highly prized and may include any material 
or non-material thing having cultural or spiritual significance for a given tribal group. See N Peart, M 
Briggs and M Henaghan (eds), above n 172 at [17.3.1]; also Waitangi Tribunal Ngawha Geothermal 
Resource Report (Wai 304,1993) at 20.  
202   R Sutton and N Peart, above n 196, at 394-395. 
203   Ibid, at 399.  
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As explained in chapter 1, the policy behind the original family protection legislation was to 
ensure that the needs of spouses and dependent children were met as far as possible from the 
estate of a deceased person. There was no intention to impose mandatory provision for 
independent middle aged children in competition with a surviving spouse or partner. 
However, that has now become common as people are living longer and marrying or re-
partnering later in life. The Court of Appeal decisions discussed in chapters 1 and 2 of this 
thesis204 establish that there is no obligation to establish “necessitous circumstances” in many 
cases, but impose an obligation on the ground of “recognition”. However, the statute itself 
does not refer to “recognition”. The 10% recognition awards discussed and made in a number 
e a court is given power to override a testator's discretion and 
impose its own discretion in accordance with broad principles of equity it is difficult to 
nly to some specified cases and not to others.  It is essential that 
207
So far, I have discussed only biological or adopted208 children of a deceased person. What of 
art 
of the family (“accepted children”)?  In New Zealand, such children have traditionally been 
e years now in New Zealand, liability for 
child support has arisen where a step-parent declaration has been made by the Court; the 
e putative step-parent has exercised in relation to the child; 
e child; 
                                         
of these cases are arbitrary and not articulated in the statute.205 Experience in this area has 
shown that problems arise if a duty is imposed without a clear underlying conceptual basis 
and community acceptance of that conceptual basis. Handing the problem over to judges and 
giving them a wide discretion but minimal criteria (which is the current position) is 
demonstrably unsatisfactory.  
This view has been mirrored in Australia where, as noted by the Northern Territory Law 
Reform Committee,206 onc
restrict such principles o
reform in this area be clear and capable of consistent application.  At present in the area of 
inheritance claims by adult children, that is not possible. It is concluded, therefore, that there 
should be no entitlement for adult children to make testamentary claims as currently exist in 
the Family Protection Act. 
H Accepted children 
minor dependent children who have been accepted and/or brought up by the deceased as p
209
called “stepchildren” or “foster” children. For som
Court looks at the following factors:210  
• the responsibility which th
• knowledge of the parentage of th
 
204  Williams v Aucutt, above n 193 at [50]; Henry v Henry [2007] NZFLR 640 at [45]. 
205  Williams v Aucutt, above n 193 at [76]; Henry v Henry, above n 204 at [46]. 
206   Northern Territory Law Reform Committee Report on Uniform Succession Laws (NTLRC R31, September 
2007) at 7. 
207   Lord Bingham of Cornhill “What is the Law?” (Robin Cooke Lecture 2008, Victoria Faculty of Law,  
Wellington, 4 December 2008) stated that  the “core of the rule of law principle” is that all persons should 
be bound by and entitled to the benefit of laws publicly and prospectively promulgated and publicly 
administered in the Courts. He went on to say that observance of this principle requires that the law should 
be accessible and so far as possible intelligible, clear and predictable.  
208   I am assuming that adopted children will continue to have the same inheritance rights in New Zealand as  
biological children of a deceased person. 
209   The Scottish Law Commission uses the term “accepted children” - see above n 179 at [2.71]. 
210   Child Support Act 1991, s 99; see also Webb and others Family Law in New Zealand (14th ed, LexisNexis, 
Wellington, 2009) at [5.204]-[5.205]. 
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• liability of any other person to maintain the child; 
The Property (Relationships) Act 1976 in s 2 defines “child of the de facto relationship” and 
pendent should be excluded from the right to make a claim. Logically, minor 
accepted children or a child of the family who were being maintained by the deceased should 
or dependent 
stepchildren differ. A stepchild of the deceased can currently make a claim under the Family 
 1955 if being maintained wholly or partly or if legally entitled to be 
maintained wholly or partly by the deceased immediately before death.213 This should extend 
                                         
• appointment as guardian; 
• the marital status of the parties; 
• overall assessment and other factors. 
“child of the marriage.” One text211 notes that a child living with the partners or spouses all 
the time and who is treated by them as part of the family would be a child of the relationship. 
The child should not be a mere visitor and should live in the partners’ residence for a 
significant part of time. The child should be treated as a member of the family as shown 
through inclusion in family life and activities. I refer to this as a “child of the family”.  
One of the purposes of the Testator’s Family Maintenance Act 1906 was to provide for 
dependent minor children. Due to the significant increases in marriage dissolutions, 
remarriage and re-partnering discussed earlier in this thesis, accepted children are now very 
common in New Zealand. If minor dependent children of a will-maker can claim further 
provision, it is difficult to argue that accepted children or a child of the family who are also 
minor and de
be able to make application for further provision from a deceased’s estate.  This right should 
also be extended to “whangai” (persons adopted in accordance with Maori custom) who were 
being maintained by the deceased or were accepted as part of the family unit. “Whangai” do 
not currently come within the class of persons entitled to claim under the Family Protection 
Act 1955.212 
It is difficult to see how the positions of minor dependent whangai and min
Protection Act
to minor accepted children and whangai. For the reasons set out earlier in this chapter this 
should not extend to adult stepchildren, accepted children and whangai. Later in this chapter 
the conceptual basis for claims by accepted children and whangai is discussed.  
I Parents 
The current position in New Zealand is that parents of a deceased person who were being 
maintained wholly or partly by the deceased immediately before the deceased’s death are 
entitled to make a claim.214 Parents who were not being maintained by the deceased can also 
make a claim for further provision where there are no competing claims by a spouse, partner, 
or child of a marriage, civil union or de facto relationship of the deceased.215 Again, as with 
adult children, there is no legal obligation to maintain a parent while the will-maker is alive. 
The State provides a safety net in the form of New Zealand Superannuation for those over 65 
 
211 N Peart, M Briggs and M Henaghan (eds), above n 172, at [2.6.2(1)]. 
212  Re Walker (deceased) [2002] NZFLR 481; Keelan v Peach [2003] 1 NZLR 589 (CA). 
213  See s 3(1)(d). 
214  See s Family Protection Act 1955, s 3(1)(e)(i). 
215  See Family Protection Act 1955, s 3(1)(e)(ii). 
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years and those who have need of greater care are eligible for rest home accommodation. If 
adult children who are dependent upon the deceased are not entitled to make a claim, it 
follows that the deceased’s dependent parents should not be able to make a claim. Indeed 
ave greater eligibility for assistance from the State.  Many people will 
dren but not adult children.  Similarly, if grandchildren have been “accepted” by the 
deceased or were members of the family because, for example, the parent of the 
ild of the will-maker) cannot do so adequately, it may be that 
the will-maker’s primary obligations are to the minor dependent grandchild and not the 
ven if the adult child of a will-maker is responsible for bringing 
up his or her minor children, the will-maker’s obligations to minor grandchildren in 
1955. They do, however, have potential entitlements on intestacy because they are “issue”  
and there are also potential entitlements under the Wills Act 2007 if a will disposes of 
people over 65 years h
provide for parents in their wills, but that does not justify imposing a legal obligation to do 
so. Again, without a clear consensus about the content and extent of a will-maker’s 
obligations to provide for particular parties (such as adult children or parents), it is very 
difficult to legislate clearly for this; attempts to do so are likely to be unsuccessful. 
J Grandchildren 
Currently in New Zealand grandchildren of whatever age can make claims on the estate of a 
deceased person.216 Consideration of claims by grandchildren is affected by provision made 
by the deceased for the parents of the grandchild or grandchildren.217 However, adult 
grandchildren do not “step into the shoes” of a parent who dies before the will-maker.218 If 
the claims of children, stepchildren and accepted children are limited to minor children who 
were being maintained by the deceased, it follows that the claims of grandchildren must be 
similarly limited.  It would be very difficult to justify a duty to maintain and provide for adult 
grandchil
grandchildren (being a child of the deceased) has died prematurely or simply cannot look 
after the grandchildren adequately, they would qualify as accepted children or whangai and it 
follows that such minor dependent grandchildren should be able to make a claim on the same 
basis as accepted children.219 The basis for and extent of such a claim is discussed later in 
this chapter. 
Indeed, taking into account the trend towards longer life expectancies discussed earlier in this 
thesis,220 the needs of minor grandchildren may be greater than those of their adult parents.  
For example, if a will-maker has accepted responsibility to bring up a grandchild because the 
grandchild’s parent (being a ch
grandchild’s adult parent. E
“necessitous circumstances” may be greater than those owed to an adult child, particularly 
one who is well off. The conceptual basis for claims by minor children and grandchildren is 
discussed later in this chapter. 
K Great-grandchildren 
It is now common for New Zealanders to have great-grandchildren when they die. At present, 
great-grandchildren have no rights to claim further provision under the Family Protection Act 
221
                                          
216  Family Protection Act 1955, s 3(1)(c). 
218  derick: Chalk and Others v Hoare and Stout HC Palmerston North CIV 2008-454-736, 18 March 
  
. 
217  Family Protection Act 1955, s 3(2). 
Re Bro
2009. 
219  See Part I, H of this chapter.  
220  See chapter 2 of this thesis. 
221 Administration Act 1969, s 78
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property to “issue”.222 However, it is unnecessary to extend claims for further provision from 
an estate to great-grandchildren because the likelihood of a great-grandchild being 
maintained by a great-grandparent or in need of support from a great-grandparent is very 
remote. Claims by grandchildren for further provision are currently seen as considerably 
weaker than those of children,223 and claims by great-grandchildren must be even weaker to 
the point where in most, if not all, cases it is very difficult to accept there is any duty at all. If, 
however, a great-grandchild has become dependent upon or is “accepted” by a will-maker or 
ild would qualify as an “accepted child” and, on 
that basis, would potentially be able to claim further provision. The basis for a claim would 
der s 3(1)(aa) of the Family Protection 
Act 1955, a de facto partner  can also make a claim if living in a de facto relationship with 
the d s  relationship is not one of short 
duration (generally under 3 years' 225
durat h
(ii) ade a substantial contribution to the de facto 
the relationship property.  These rights have priority at present over family protection, 
    
is a member of the family, that great-grandch
therefore be acceptance by the deceased or being a member of the family.  
II Claims by Spouses and Partners 
It is important to state the current pre-requisites to a claim by spouses and partners. At 
present in New Zealand a spouse or civil union partner (no matter the length of the marriage 
or civil union) can make a family protection claim. Un
224
ecea ed at the date of death and provided that the
 duration).   Even where the relationship is one of short 
ion, t e Court can make an award if satisfied: 226 
“(i) That there is a child of the de facto relationship; or 
That the de facto partner has m
relationship; and 
(b) The Court is satisfied that failure to make the Order would result in serious 
injustice to the de facto partner.”  
This is in keeping with provisions in the Property (Relationships) Act 1976 in respect of 
property claims.  This also has close similarities to the proposals of the New South Wales 
Law Reform Commission.227 The apparent reason for the difference between spouses and 
civil union partners on one hand and de facto partners on the other is that a marriage or civil 
union is seen as a public and binding commitment by both parties whereas this does not 
necessarily exist in a de facto relationship. If there is such a public binding commitment, 
death within the early stages of a marriage or civil union should be treated similarly to death 
at later stages of the marriage or civil union.  Arguably, there may not be the same 
commitment where death occurs in the early stages of a de facto relationship.228 At present, a 
surviving spouse, civil union or de facto partner (other than de facto partners of short 
duration) has significant relationship property rights. These will normally amount to half of 
229
                                      
224  
E for a definition.  In general terms this applies where the de 
ears. 
227  .  
le [2009] NZFLR 69 at [21] contains a comment 
facto relationships. 
222  Wills Act 2007, s 24.  
223  Re Broderick, above n 218. 
 As defined in Property (Relationships) Act 1976, s 2. 
225   See Property (Relationships) Act 1976, s 2
facto partners have lived together as de facto partners for less than 3 y
226   See Family Protection Act 1955, s 4A(2). 
 New South Wales Law Reform Commission, above n 166, at [1.4]
228  A recent Court of Appeal decision Bourneville v Bournevil
about the nature of marriage as opposed to de 
229   This mirrors the entitlements of the parties on separation. 
   
  49 
testamentary promises and claims under the will of the deceased or on intestacy.230 While 
some have argued that separation and death are quite different events and should have 
different consequences,231 in many situations in New Zealand, relationship property is owned 
by both parties to the relationship and very often they have equal entitlements. It is therefore 
simple and logical for those relationship property rights or entitlements to continue after one 
of the partners dies. It would be unfair for relationship property rights to continue after 
separation but disappear in the event of death. In 1997, the Law Commission recommended 
that widows and widowers have rights to apply for a property division and also make a 
“support claim” to permit the claimant 
232
to enjoy a reasonable, independent standard of 
living . There is no need to change the current criteria for relationship property claims on 
re distinct rights and different considerations apply to each.  
Nevertheless, the rights of a surviving spouse, civil union or de facto partner on death to half 
 property are a very relevant factor when assessing a claim under the 
235
before death. The difference is that, legally, a marriage or civil union subsists until a 
                                         
death by spouses, civil union and de facto partners; there is merit in keeping them the same as 
relationship property rights on separation. 
What about family protection-type claims for further provision by a spouse, civil union or de 
facto partner? It has been recognised for some years in New Zealand that property rights 
under the Property (Relationships) Act 1976 (formerly the Matrimonial Property Act) are 
different from family protection claims.  For example, in Re Churchill,233 it was pointed out 
that the purpose of the Matrimonial Property Act 1976 is to enable each spouse to obtain 
proper recognition of what is truly his or hers; whereas the Family Protection Act is intended 
to enforce a duty which is owed to the other to make provision for proper maintenance and 
support out of what is truly his or hers. This is recognised in the Property (Relationships) Act 
1976.234 One right is based on property entitlements and the other on succession or 
inheritance entitlements;  they a
of the relationship
Family Protection Act 1955.  
A Separation  
What should happen when spouses, civil union partners and de facto partners separate prior 
to death? In the case of spouses and civil union partners, at present separation does not of 
itself bar provision under the Family Protection Act 1955; although as Patterson points out,236 
separation may be a relevant factor in terms of moral duty. In contrast, a condition of a de 
facto partner’s right to bring a family protection claim is that the de facto partner and 
deceased were living in a de facto relationship at the date of death.237 Why is there a 
difference? The position in respect of spouses and civil union partners is consistent with the 
provisions in the Wills Act 2007238 that (in the case of spouses and civil union partners) a 
will is not affected by separation unless a dissolution or separation order has been made 
 
 78. 
ove n 157, at [53]. 
ZLR 734. 
235  ed in Wylie v Wylie (2003) 23 FRNZ 156 (CA). 
and Testamentary Promises (3rd ed, LexisNexis, Wellington, 
238  . 
230   See Property (Relationships) Act 1976, s
231   N Peart, M Briggs and M Henaghan (eds), above n 172, at [2.2]. 
232   Law Commission, ab
233   Re Churchill [1978] 1 NZLR 755; see also Re Hilton [1997] 2 N
234   Sections 78 and 57. 
 This was accept
236   WM Patterson Law of Family Protection 
2004) at [8.8].  
237  Family Protection Act 1955, s 3(1)(aa). 
Wills Act 2007, s 19
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dissolution order is made or one or both of the parties dies.239  However, it is anomalous that 
despite a lengthy and perhaps even acrimonious separation and division of relationship 
property, the survivor can make a family protection claim if the marriage or civil union has 
d not be available if the parties have been legally 
separated. Like de facto partners, they should only be able to make a support claim if living 
o partner in a relationship of short duration be able to make a 
family protection-type claim for further provision? At present they cannot, but the court can 
• that the de facto partner has made a substantial contribution to the de facto relationship; 
s logical for a claim to be available in respect of relationship 
property, but it does not follow that a family protection claim should be available; the claims 
not been dissolved.240 Few people are aware of this.  
The termination of a de facto relationship is much harder to define because no dissolution 
order can be obtained by de facto partners. The clearest ways to define termination of a de 
facto relationship are physical separation and death. Unlike marriage and civil unions, there is 
no formal register of de facto relationships. It is strongly arguable that the rights of spouses 
and civil union partners to claim further provision should also terminate on separation even if 
this conflicts with the legal position that marriage and civil unions subsist until death or the 
making of a dissolution order. If a couple have legally separated and resolved property 
matters they should not be required to dissolve their marriage or civil union to prevent a 
family protection claim. Legal separation involves both physical and mental elements.241 
“Legal separation” will need to be defined in the Code and this term is used subsequently in 
this thesis. It is anomalous also that the survivor of a long-term but terminated de facto 
relationship should be worse off than the survivor of a short-term marriage where the couple 
have separated. It is not a satisfactory answer that proof of physical separation is difficult to 
establish (as opposed to a dissolution order): that question frequently arises in relationship 
property disputes while couples are alive and on death. Therefore, the current legal position 
should change: family protection (or as I subsequently call them “support”) claims by 
spouses or civil union partners shoul
with the deceased at the time of death. 
B De facto relationships of short duration 
Should a surviving de fact
make an award if satisfied: 
• that there is a child of the de facto relationship; or 
and 
• that failure to make the order would result in serious injustice to the de facto partner. 
It is important to remember the difference between relationship property and family 
protection claims. If there is a child of the de facto relationship, that child has a right to seek 
further provision; if a minor, a claim can be made on behalf of the child. If the surviving de 
facto party in a relationship of short duration has made a substantial contribution to the de 
facto relationship, then it i
are conceptually different.  
                                          
239  Bourneville v Bourneville, above n 228, at [21] for comments on the difference between a marriage and a de 
facto relationship.  
240  This happened in Re Hilton, above n 233. 
241   See N Peart, M Briggs and M Henaghan (eds) above n 172 at [2.6].  
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If the relationship is less than three years in duration, the couple have not married or entered a 
civil union and the deceased has not made a will in favour of the surviving de facto partner, it 
is unfair to impose family protection obligations in favour of the surviving de facto partner. If 
the couple have not married or entered into a civil union and if the relationship is of short 
duration, it is doubtful that the survivor has achieved the paramount or primary position in the 
deceased’s life that is an important part of family protection claims by spouses and partners. 
Any child of the relationship would have a separate claim. As pointed out in chapter 1 of this 
thesis, the term “serious injustice” has created problems previously under the Property 
erty on death should be incorporated in any inheritance or 
succession code, or should stay in the Property (Relationships) Act 1976. I discuss this point 
 by nature intended to be comprehensive and 
endation that 
surviving spouses or de facto partners should be able to make “support” claims enabling them 
                                         
(Relationships) Act 1976. The clearest and simplest course is to exclude altogether a family 
protection claim by a surviving de facto partner where the relationship is of short duration.  
This raises the question whether the provision in Part 8 of the Property (Relationships) Act 
1976 relating to relationship prop
in chapter 9 of this thesis but in short, a code is
should include all relevant laws.  
C Appropriate conceptual basis for claims 
Bearing in mind the difference between relationship property rights and family protection 
claims, what is the appropriate conceptual basis for claims by surviving spouses, civil union 
or de facto partners for further provision from an estate? Should it be based just on need or 
should there be additional recognition of the importance of the relationship? The New South 
Wales Law Reform Commission noted242 a trend towards giving more recognition to the 
needs of the surviving spouse or partner and this is reflected in the 2009 amendments to the 
New South Wales Succession Act.  For many years, the courts in New Zealand have regarded 
the widow of a deceased as having a paramount claim243 and in the first reported case in New 
Zealand in this area,244 Edwards J pointed out that the position of the widow differed from 
that of the will-maker’s adult children both in needs and in law. While need is a relevant 
factor, the importance of marriage, a civil union or a de facto relationship, particularly where 
it has existed for many years must  give rise to greater obligations and expectations.  In most 
cases there exists an additional element which elevates the importance of the relationship 
beyond mere need or dependency. The Law Commission recommended245 that surviving 
spouses and de facto partners have the right to apply for property division (now under the 
Property (Relationships) Act 1976) and also for a “support” claim to permit the claimant to 
enjoy a reasonable, independent, standard of living until the claimant can reasonably be 
expected to achieve an independent standard of living. The trend overseas also is to give 
greater recognition to the rights of surviving spouses and de facto partners and clearly this 
extends beyond mere financial need.246 The Law Commission’s recomm
to enjoy a reasonable, independent standard of living until reasonably able to achieve an 
independent standard of living should be extended also to civil union partners. 
 
242  New South Wales Law Reform Commission Uniform Succession Laws: Intestacy (NSWLRC R116, 2007) 
at [1.37]; NSW Succession Amendment (Intestacy) Act 2009, Schedule 1, Chapter 4.  
243   Patterson, above n 236, at [8.1] 
244   Re Rush (1901) 20 NZLR 249. 
245   Succession Law: A Succession (Adjustment) Act (NZLC R39, 1997) at [53] and [57].  
246   New South Wales Law Reform Commission, above n 166 at [2.7]. 
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One of the significant changes made by the Property (Relationships) Act 1976 was to 
empower the court under ss 15 and 15A to redress future economic disparity between the 
parties resulting from the division of functions during the marriage, civil union or de facto 
relationship.  However, the focus on future economic disparity precludes the application of 
these sections on death.247  Any disadvantage resulting from this is at present overcome by an 
award under the Family Protection Act 1955 and this should continue by way of a “support” 
award.  While this may appear to create some uncertainty and may appear contrary to the 
arguments advanced earlier in this thesis, for clarity and consistency “support” claims should 
n be minimised for 
the following reasons: 
 
separate property) would be taken into account in a “support” award. 
• The criteria for such an award would have some similarities to the criteria for assessment 
e and survivor, the needs of the survivor and his or her obligations, 
would be taken into account.248 
ply continue existing adult support orders or obligations or make an 
assessment of adult maintenance on death. Virginia Grainer puts forward this argument: 
urse in most cases would be a lump sum payment so that the 
                                         
be made available for a surviving spouse, civil union or de facto partner because of his or her 
special place in the life of the deceased.  Uncertainty and inconsistency ca
• The whole of the deceased’s and the survivor’s property (including relationship and
• The purpose of the award would be to assist the survivor to attain a reasonable 
independent standard of living until reasonably able to achieve that position personally. 
of spousal maintenance under the Family Proceedings Act 1980: matters such as the 
assets of the estat
• Support claims would not be based upon “moral duty” or the likely views of the “wise 
and just testator”. 
Arguably such an award would be similar to adult maintenance as currently allowed under 
the Family Proceedings Act 1980249. It could be contended that, rather than allow specifically 
for an award, why not sim
family protection awards should be replaced by continuation of adult maintenance - to be 
assessed at death (on a basis similar to separation) and two years after death (on the same 
basis as dissolution).250  
However, the conceptual bases for adult maintenance and a support award are very different. 
Adult maintenance is usually paid or awarded where a couple are alive and separate; payment 
is made for a limited time and one of the relevant factors in assessing it is the likely earning 
capacity of each party251. Another factor is ongoing care of minor children.  Based on these 
factors, death is very different from separation.  Awards also need to be reviewed and 
reassessed in light of changed circumstances at death and the possible existence of competing 
claims. Death is very different from separation and obligations to a spouse or partner and the 
ability to finance these obligations will change significantly on death. While it would be 
possible for support payments to be made on a periodic basis as well as in one lump sum, in 
practical terms the better co
 
247   N Peart, M Briggs & M Henaghan (eds), above n 172, at [2.1.5]. 
248   Webb and Others, above n 210, at [5.12]. 
249   Section 67. 
250   Virginia Grainer “The Family Protection Act 1955: Time for Reform?” (LLM Thesis, Victoria University of 
Wellington, 1997) at ch 13.  
251   Family Proceedings Act 1980, s 63(1). 
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estate in question can be wound up and paid out. Payments on a periodic basis will prolong 
estate administration. A further difference is that on separation, non-financial assistance will 
calculated on 25% of what he or she would have received if the deceased had died 
intestate.  Earlier in that report the Scottish Law Commission had recommended that where 
ggest in line with the proposals in Germany and Scotland 
(discussed above) that a surviving spouse, civil union or de facto partner be entitled to make a 
aximum of the statutory legacy. This would of course, be over and 
above any entitlements under the Property (Relationships) Act 1976 or any entitlements 
d be relevant to the 
assessment of any support claim. 
The benefits of this are: 
• To create greater certainty by imposing a financial limit on awards; 
• To minimise the likelihood of disparate and inconsistent awards; and 
E 
One  or 
accom ion to a surviving spouse or partner. As Patterson points out:258 
                                         
continue to be available. After death, non-financial assistance will be lost and compensation 
for this loss is appropriate.  
D Statutory legacy 
The Scottish Law Commission252 undertook a world-wide review of legislation and 
inheritance provision in this area.  The Commission discussed the position in German law 
where a spouse or civil partner is entitled to a Pfichtteil253 amounting to one half of the 
amount which the applicant would have received if the deceased had died intestate.  The 
Scottish Law Commission recommended254 that a surviving spouse or civil partner’s legal 
share be 
an intestate is survived by a spouse or civil partner and issue, the spouse or civil partner 
should receive a fixed sum of £300,000 (or the whole estate if under this amount) and any 
excess over £300,000 is to be divided equally: half to the spouse/partner and half to the 
issue.255 
For many years in New Zealand, surviving spouses (and since 2002 de facto partners) have 
been entitled on intestacy to a “prescribed amount” or statutory legacy256 under the 
Administration Act 1969257 where the deceased was survived by a spouse/partner and issue.  
The statutory legacy is increased by Order in Council. I discuss entitlements on intestacy in 
chapter 5 of this thesis and will set out proposals for the entitlements of surviving spouses 
and partners. For the present, I su
“support” claim up to a m
under the deceased's will or on intestacy; although those entitlements woul
• To link awards to minimum entitlements applicable on intestacy.  
Accommodation 
further aspect needs to be mentioned and that is the provision of housing
modat
 
252   Scottish Law Commission Discussion Paper on Succession (SLC DP136, 2007). 
253   Compulsory portion of the estate. 
254   Scottish Law Commission, above n 252, at [3.46]. 
255   Ibid, at [2.57].  
256   Currently $155,000.00 from 1 June 2009. 
257   Section 77. 
258   Patterson, above n 236, at [4.3]. 
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In particular, if a home has not been provided for the widow by the terms of the 
deceased’s will, the court will usually be prepared to make an award to enable the 
widow, with appropriate contributions from her own resources if necessary, to acquire a 
home. 
I propose, therefore, that the absence or availability of adequate housing accommodation be 
relevant and taken into account in assessment of support awards to surviving spouses or 
 the statutory legacy. At present under s 27(3) of the Property (Relationships) 
ers are enforceable against the personal representative of the person 
 further, however, that unless settled between the claimant and the estate, a support 
Wales Law Reform Commission260 consider relevant 
ant and the deceased including the nature and duration 
 
d as a beneficiary in the deceased’s will; 
 
t the time 
                                         
partners within
Act 1976 occupation ord
against whom it is made. This should continue but be extended so that an occupation order is 
specifically available to a surviving spouse, partner or minor children.  
F Criteria 
I propose
claim be determined by the court in its discretion and that the maximum amount of any award 
be the statutory legacy on intestacy.259 In exercising its discretion, the court should, as 
recommended by the New South 
factors such as: 
• the relationship between the applic
of the relationship; 
• the nature and extent of the deceased’s obligations and responsibilities to the applicant 
and to any other family members; 
• the nature and extent of the deceased’s estate; 
• the financial resources and needs of the applicant and any other person applying for
further provision or name
• any physical, intellectual or mental disability of the applicant or any other person 
applying for future provision or named as a beneficiary in the deceased’s will; 
• the age of the applicant; 
• provision made by the deceased while alive to the applicant or under the deceased’s will 
or on intestacy; 
• the date of the will and circumstances in which it was made;
• whether the applicant was being maintained wholly or partly by the deceased a
of death; 
• whether any other person is liable to support the applicant; 
• the standard of living of the deceased and the applicant while both were alive; 
 
259   See chapter 5 for details of the statutory legacy. 
260  New South Wales Law Reform Commission Uniform Succession Laws: Family Provision (NSWLRC R110, 
2005) at [2.41].  
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• whether adequate housing or accommodation will be available for a surviving spouse or 
partner;  
• any other matter considered relevant by the court. 
These factors, while different, do have some similarities to the factors currently considered 
by the courts in assessing adult maintenance under the Family Proceedings Act 1980. The 
relevant factors for adult maintenance currently are the means of both parties, their needs, 
whether the payer is supporting any other person, the responsibilities of the parties, the 
standard of living of the parties while they were living together, and any other circumstances 
g.  Any award by the court to the surviving spouse, 
civil union partner or de facto partner would have priority over entitlements under the will or 
 would also have priority over any awards to any other applicant for further 
provision; but would not exclude claims by minor children, grandchildren or accepted 
However, “support” claims by spouses, partners (and for that matter, minor children, minor 
children and minor accepted grandchildren) should not have 
priority over claims on an estate under contract or in equity (which I will discuss later in this 
 Property (Relationships) Act 1976 currently provides that 
entitlements to relationship property have priority over: 
                                         
that make one party liable to maintain the other.261 The factors relevant to a support award 
are more extensive because, as discussed earlier, death is different from separation. 
Additional and different factors need to be taken into account and there are obvious changes 
to the assets and income available to meet a claim.  
What is proposed is that after taking these factors (so far as they are relevant) into account, 
the court can award a surviving partner or spouse up to the amount of the statutory legacy 
which would have been available on intestacy. If the deceased did die intestate any award 
would be over and above entitlements on intestacy. The statutory legacy will need to be 
increased on a regular basis as I will discuss in chapter 5 of this thesis. As recommended by 
the Law Commission, the award would be by way of support to permit the surviving spouse 
or partner to enjoy a reasonable, independent standard of living until reasonably able to 
achieve an independent standard of livin
on intestacy and
children of the deceased.  Where there are competing claims the court would determine the 
amounts of such claims in its discretion. 
G Priorities 
accepted children, minor grand
chapter). Section 78(1) of the
• entitlements under a will; 
• entitlements on intestacy; 
• orders made under the Family Protection Act 1955 and Law Reform (Testamentary 
Promises) Act 1949; and 
• duties and fees payable in respect of the estate. 
However, s 78(2) provides that entitlements under the Property (Relationships) Act 1976 do 
not have priority over debts properly incurred by the personal representative in the ordinary 
 
261  Family Proceedings Act 1980, ss 65(2) and (5). 
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course of administration and reasonable funeral expenses. These rules should continue to 
apply and provisions similar to those in s 78(2) should apply to support claims for further 
provisions from an estate;  that is, they do not have priority over properly incurred estate 
debts. Similarly, debts incurred by the deceased in contract and successful equitable claims 
against the deceased's estate should have priority over support claims for further provision.  
Arguably, the exercise of judicial discretion on competing claims by spouses and partners on 
e uncertainty 
and inconsistency. Both groups can be vulnerable depending upon the particular 
• the only competing claimants will be surviving spouses/partners and minor 
• the criteria for awards will be very specific (as set out above) and not based on loose 
• there will be clear financial parameters around the amounts that can be awarded (again 
Therefore based on this discussion the following priorities should apply to claims on estates 
xpenses should have priority as they 
do at present;264 
• relationship property claims follow in priority; and 
                                         
Support claims for further provision should be calculated on the "nett" estate after property 
relationship entitlements, contractual and equitable debts have been deducted. This is 
consistent with the long-standing principle (noted by Patterson262) that a claim founded in 
contract takes priority over a family protection claim which is made against the nett estate. 
one hand and minor children or grandchildren on the other could lead to som
circumstances and therefore, it is not possible to exclude either group. Uncertainty and 
inconsistency will be minimised because: 
• the starting point would be the priority of the surviving spouse or partner; 
children/grandchildren; 
notions such as “moral duty” and the “wise and just testator”; 
as set out above).263 
in this order: 
• estate administration costs and reasonable funeral e
• valid estate debts and proven civil and equitable claims rank next;  
• support claims follow, with priority being given to claims by spouses, civil union and de 
facto partners but with power for the court to decide in its discretion the amounts 
awarded where there are competing support claims. 
To recap, a surviving spouse, civil union partner or de facto partner would first be able to 
make a relationship property claim. Once that is resolved, and provided the survivor was not 
legally separated from the deceased at the time of death, he or she could make a support 
claim on the balance of the estate. Although the support claim of a surviving spouse, civil 
union partner or de facto partner would have priority over support claims by minor children, 
 
262   Patterson, above n 236, at [13.7]  . 
263  See the discussion on limiting claims to the amount of the statutory legacy earlier in this chapter and in 
chapter 5.  
264   Insolvency Act 2006, s 393. 
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grandchildren and accepted children/grandchildren, these claims would not be precluded, and 
in a small estate the presiding judge would exercise a discretion in resolving competing 
claims. In most cases all claims would be heard at the same time. The objective when making 
cto partner would be to permit him or her 
to achieve a reasonable independent standard of living based on the couple’s prior standard of 
 
child of the de facto relationship; or 
nd  
sion noted that overseas jurisdictions have restricted claims by 
children to younger and disabled children both for clarity and to accord better with 
comm rred 
in thi ent 
on to r the 
death
epchildren’s claims are limited. Similarly while will-makers are not required by 
97 report, the Law Commission stated266 that parents’ duties during their 
vide financial support to minor and disabled children and former spouses are 
s remain.  
• minors; or 
                                         
an award to a surviving spouse, civil union or de fa
living. In the case of de facto relationships of short duration there will be no eligibility to
make a support claim but a relationship property claim could still be made on death if: 
• there is a 
• the de facto partner has made a substantial contribution to the de facto relationship; a
the court is satisfied that failure to make an order would result in serious injustice to the de 
facto partner. 
III The Conceptual Basis for Claims by Minor Children or Grandchildren 
In 1997, the Law Commis
unity expectations about the limits of parental responsibility. The Commission refe
s regard to changes in the United States of America and Canada. The Commission w
 highlight the significant inconsistencies between the laws that apply before and afte
 of the will-maker: 265 
There is now a significant inconsistency between the laws that apply before and after the 
death of a will-maker. By contrast to the law that applies after death (the Family 
Protection Act 1955) will-makers’ duties during lifetime to support children financially, 
are confined to children under 19 years of age. The law that applies to will-makers before 
death now also makes provision for support claims by a stepchild if a step-parent has 
assumed in an enduring way the responsibilities of a parent of that stepchild. But on 
death, st
law during their lifetime to support parents or grandchildren, on death those more distant 
relatives may (few actually do), claim financial support. A significant proportion (60%) 
of those who commented on the financial support claim for minor and disabled children 
proposed in the discussion paper supported the basis and priority suggested for those 
claims. 
In the same 19
lifetimes to pro
widely accepted and clearly defined. It noted, however, that by contrast, claims by adult 
children under the Family Protection Act 1955 were in urgent need of review. Thirteen years 
later the problem
A Support 
The Law Commission recommended a “support” claim by children only if the children are:267 
 
265   Law Commission Succession Law: A Succession (Adjustment) Act (NZLC R39, 1997) at [29].  
266   Ibid, at [32].  
267   Ibid, at [70].  
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• under 25 years and undertaking educational or vocational training; or 
• unable to earn a reasonable independent livelihood because of a physical, intellectual or 
mental disability which occurred before the child reached 25 years.   
h as where the will-maker 
ent of economic independence.  The draft clause also sets out factors to be 
bility of the child to meet his or her 
s of dependent children and 
es of support law; 
eased or (b)  minor stepchildren, accepted children, whangai and 
grandchildren of a deceased person who were members of the family (as discussed earlier in 
                                         
With respect to adult independent children, the Law Commission recommended268 that they 
should have only limited claims. I concluded earlier in this chapter that adult children should 
have no claims. 
In relation to other relatives such as grandchildren, stepchildren and parents of the deceased, 
the Law Commission recommended that support claims could only be made on establishing a 
direct responsibility between the will-maker and the claimant suc
has assumed in an enduring way the responsibilities of a parent.  These recommendations are 
in keeping with the views expressed by the New South Wales Law Reform Commission269 
and the Scottish Law Commission.270 As discussed earlier, parents of a deceased person 
should not have rights to claim further provision from the estate.  
The Commission also recommends that stepchildren or grandchildren for whom the will-
maker has assumed in an enduring way, the responsibilities of a parent, be able to make 
support claims.  In 1997 the Law Commission prepared a Draft Succession (Adjustment) Act 
and in clause 28 of that draft Act,271 a support award for a child is defined as being of such a 
kind as to ensure that while the child is entitled to support, the child is maintained in a 
reasonable way and to a reasonable standard and so far as practical, educated and assisted 
towards the attainm
taken into account by the court in assessing a support award272 including age and stage of 
development of the child, other actual or potential sources of support, the amount of support 
provided by the deceased and the actual and potential a
reasonable needs. 
The Commission  commented273 that separating out the claim
limiting such claims to “support” has these advantages: 
• it is clear and specific; 
• it eliminates the confusion which exists in the present law; 
• it complies with community expectations and principl
• it complies with international obligations; 
• it limits children’s claims so that more significant claims (such as those of spouses, civil 
union and de facto partners) can be given full effect. 
The Commission could also have added that this would remove the current inconsistency 
between laws that apply before death and those applying after death.  I agree that claims by 
(a) minor children of the dec
 
268   Ibid, at [72]-[77].  
269   New South Wales Law Reform Commission, above n 260, at [2.13]. 
270   Scottish Law Commission, above n 252, at [3.95] and [3.96].  
271   New Zealand Law Commission, above n 265, at page 86.  
272   Clause 28(3). 
273   New Zealand Law Commission, above n 265, at [71].  
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this chapter) should be limited to “support” claims along the lines set out in the commission’s 
report and clause 28 of the draft Succession (Adjustment) Act.  I will now discuss support 
 other obligations or competing claims may arise which did not exist while 
the person was alive; therefore existing obligations need to be reviewed in light of the 
o meet his or her reasonable needs), another important 
factor is competing claims by a spouse, partner, children or other minor children or 
 sort of training qualifies? Does training 
need to be career specific or will most courses suffice? Does the training need to be fulltime 
                                         
claims by eligible minors.   
B Support claims by children and accepted children 
"Support" claims have similarities to child support obligations while a person is alive.  Under 
the Child Support Act 1991 there are obligations to provide for the maintenance and support 
of qualifying children until aged 19 years (or until the child becomes financially 
independent).274  Money due can be recovered from a deceased person's estate.275  This begs 
the question whether child support obligations should continue after death instead of or in 
addition to support claims. Virginia Grainer suggests that child support claims could be made 
against an estate on the same  basis that they would be made against the will-maker if he or 
she had survived. 276 In general, however, child support obligations are assessed on the 
income of the liable parent277 and in most cases this will be significantly reduced or at least 
significantly affected on the death of the parent.  It is appropriate therefore for the obligations 
to come to an end on death278 and for the situation to be reviewed.  It is also important to 
recall that on death
changed circumstances. Also, if the will-maker had survived, certain non-financial assistance 
would have been provided to children but this will cease on death; some allowance needs to 
be made for this.  
As recommended by the Law Commission, such support awards should be limited to 
ensuring that, while the child is entitled to support, the child is maintained in a reasonable 
way and to a reasonable standard and so far as practical, educated and assisted towards the 
attainment of economic independence. In addition to the criteria suggested by the Law 
Commission for such awards (being age and stage of development of the child, other actual 
or potential sources of support, the amount of support provided by the deceased and the 
actual or potential ability of the child t
grandchildren.  However, I have concluded that no claims should be available to adult 
children and parents of a deceased person.  In this, I have departed completely from the 
proposals of the Law Commission.279 
With regard to the Law Commission’s proposal that support claims be available to children 
under 25 years of age and undertaking educational or vocational training, the issues raised 
earlier in this chapter come up again. Exactly what
or will part time do? My proposal is that claims be available to children, grandchildren or 
accepted children under 21 years on the basis that by that age, most have at least started 
tertiary education and many will have completed it. 
 
274   Child Support Act 1991, s 5. 
275  Family Proceedings Act 1980, ss 180 and 181. 
276  Virginia Grainer, above n 250, at 143. 
277   Child Support Act 1991, s 29. 
278  Child Support Act 1991, s 25. 
279   Law Commission, above n 265, at [72]-[77].  
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With respect to claims by children unable to earn a reasonable, independent livelihood 
because of a physical, intellectual or mental disability which occurred before the child 
attained 25 years, the age limit is arbitrary and will create unfairness for those suffering such 
a disability after the age of 25 years. Most responsible parents (and sometimes other 
relations) will provide by will specifically for a child with these disabilities. If not, there are 
ntitling conduct”, and it can be a complete or partial 
bar to a claim for further provision.  It is harsh to impose a ban on a person who otherwise 
lid claim, particularly a 19 or 20 year old, because of disentitling conduct. A 
children, step-children, accepted children and whangai 
aged under 21 years should be entitled to make a support claim. The basis for such claims is 
rsons under 21 years at the will-maker’s date of death. In 
assessing the award the court will take into account the age and state of development of the 
s of support, the amount of support provided by the 
deceased (for example private schooling), the actual or potential ability of the child to meet 
mants or beneficiaries named 
in the will or entitled on intestacy.  
of Key Principles 
                                         
charitable organisations which support people with various disabilities and of course the State 
ultimately provides benefits and care for people who cannot support themselves. As Virginia 
Grainer points out, there are difficulties defining what is caught by a physical, intellectual or 
mental disability, and what is outside this term.280  
Another problem with linking claims to a reasonable independent livelihood or need is that 
experience both here and overseas with family provision legislation shows that what was 
intended as a very limited claim can develop into a significant industry. This has been the 
experience here with adult claims under the Family Protection Act 1955 and in Australia.281  
One further point needs to be made. There have been rare cases where an applicant’s 
behaviour towards the deceased has been so bad that he or she should be unable to make a 
successful claim. The term used is “dise
282
would have a va
“killer” is prevented from benefitting from a victim’s estate, but otherwise I propose that a 
claimant’s conduct be one of a number of factors to be taken into account in assessing a 
claim, it should not be a complete bar.  
C Proposal 
A deceased person’s children, grand
that the deceased assumed in an enduring way the responsibilities of a parent towards the 
claimant or that the child was a member of the family. This removes the current 
discrimination against a child who may not be the biological child but in all other respects is 
a member of the deceased’s family.  
As recommended by the Law Commission, the purpose of a support award should be to 
ensure that the child is maintained in a reasonable way and to a reasonable standard and so 
far as practical, educated and assisted towards the attainment of economic independence. 
Awards will only be available to pe
child, other actual or potential source
his or her reasonable needs, and competing claims by other clai
IV Summary 
• Relationship property claims should remain as at present. 
 
280  Virginia Grainer, above n 250, at 143. 
281  See Rosalind F Croucher “Towards Uniform Succession in Australia” (2009) 83 ALJ 728 at 739. 
282   Patterson, above n 236, at [4.17]. 
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• Claims under the Family Protection Act 1955 should be replaced by “support” claims 
limited to: 
- a surviving spouse or civil union partner who was not legally separated from the 
- a surviving de facto partner who was living with the deceased in a de facto 
 the deceased at the time of death and 
where it was not a relationship of short duration;  
• 
utory legacy” on intestacy which 
would be set initially at $350,000. 
 and assisted 
towards attainment of economic independence. 
• In respect of competing support claims, a surviving spouse or partner should have 
priority but not to the complete exclusion of minor children, accepted children, 
stepchildren or grandchildren.  Other family or whanau would have no claims but would 
retain entitlements on intestacy or based upon contract or “contributions”. 
 
 
deceased at the date of death; 
relationship and not legally separated from
- any child, grandchild, step-child, accepted child or whangai aged under 21 years at 
the date of the deceased’s death and who was a member of the deceased’s family.   
Support awards should be defined: 
- In the case of a surviving spouse, civil union or de facto partner as an award 
enabling the claimant to enjoy a reasonable, independent standard of living until 
reasonably able to achieve an independent standard of living. Support claims for 
spouses or partners should not exceed the “stat
- In the case of a minor child, stepchild, accepted child, stepchildren or 
grandchildren, as an award of such a kind as to maintain the child in a reasonable 
way and to a reasonable standard and so far as practical, educated
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Chapter 5 
FURTHER POLICIES 
I Principles and Policies on Intestacy  
In 2008 and 2009 there were respectively 769 and 755 grants of letters of administration on 
intestacy in New Zealand.283 A significant number of estates are involved.  It is useful to set 
out some of the relevant principles when drafting an intestacy regime. The Scottish Law 
Commission summarises these principles:284 
• The rules of intestate succession are default rules; they apply only in the absence of a 
valid testamentary disposition. 
• The rules of intestate succession are shaped by principles to which each jurisdiction 
gives different weight and by its own legal tradition. 
• To keep the property in the deceased’s family or kinship group; accordingly intestate 
heirs are generally limited to those related by blood to the deceased. 
• The presumed wishes of the deceased.  The rules of intestacy should by and large mirror 
the provisions for family that people usually make in their wills rather than the 
provisions which the particular deceased might have made if he or she had made a will. 
A written statement or informal will can now be validated by the High Court;285 these 
principles assume that no such document exists. The principle of testamentary freedom 
favours construction of a will that the deceased would have made rather than what most 
will-makers would have done.  However, thousands of intestacies occur in New Zealand 
each year and therefore it is only possible in practice to frame default rules according to 
what the majority will do. 
• The rules of intestacy should be acceptable to a broad spectrum of public opinion; that is 
they should constitute, as far as rules of general application can, a fair and natural system 
that adequately reflects majority views. 
• The rules should be clear, consistent, free from anomalies, relatively easy to understand 
and also as simple as possible in order that people are aware what will happen to their 
property if they die intestate.  If they are unhappy with the result, there is an incentive to 
make a will. 
The Scottish Law Commission also noted the trend towards giving the surviving spouse a 
greater share of the estate.286 It favoured equating the positions of surviving spouses and 
“civil partners” (couples who register their relationships).287 
                                          
283  Email from John Earles, Registrar High Court of New Zealand, regarding grants of letters of administration 
on intestacy (27 May 2010). The estimated level of intestacy in Australia is between 6-14% of all estates, see 
New South Wales Law Reform Commission Uniform Succession Laws: Intestacy (NSWLRC R116, 2007) at 
[1.12]. 
284  Scottish Law Commission Discussion Paper on Succession (SLC DP 136 2007) at [2.2]. 
285  Wills Act 2007, s 14.  
286   Scottish Law Commission, above n 284, at [2.21].  
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The New South Wales Law Reform Commission discussed similar principles when setting 
out the aims of intestacy rules:288   
• Carrying out the presumed intentions of the intestate.  Any system that has to cover all 
situations will not cover individual cases perfectly.  People may fail to produce a valid 
will through no fault of their own and the intestacy rules should be standardised to 
produce a result that will be fair in most cases. 
• Establishing the presumed intentions of an intestate is difficult.  Wills that have been 
written are one of the few reliable sources of information about how people actually 
intend to distribute their property on death.  This conclusion was derived from an 
empirical study of proceedings filed in the Probate Registry of the NSW Supreme Court 
in 2004. 
• It was noted that a number of law reform agencies stated that one of the principal aims is 
to make the rules of distribution simple, clear and certain. 
• The rules of distribution should acknowledge the needs of family members and in 
particular, should balance the competing needs of the surviving spouse/partner and issue 
of the intestate.  The surviving spouse or partner should be given primacy on intestate 
distribution. 
• While provision for deserving family members is desirable, it is very difficult to 
prescribe this in intestacy rules. 
• The inter-relationship between intestacy regimes and family provision regimes is 
important. Family provision regimes are important in dealing with individual cases 
involving issues such as need and desert. 
The Northern Territory Law Reform Committee said this:289 
Generally the rules of distribution on intestacy attempt to apply the community's views 
on what should be done with the estate of a person who has died intestate.  One objective 
is to produce the same results as would have been achieved if the intestate had the 
foresight, the opportunity, the inclination or the ability to produce a will … the Rules of 
intestate succession acknowledge the needs of family members only at the most general 
level. … an important issue to be considered in intestate succession is the need to balance 
the competing requirements of the surviving spouse or partner and the issue of the 
intestate. However, the rules of distribution cannot always treat the needs of family 
members on the individual level. 
The principles set out in the reports from the Scottish and New South Wales Law Reform 
Commissions, which will be discussed shortly, particularly where they coincide, are likely to 
be relevant to New Zealand.  In this regard, the following points are noteworthy: 
• provisions should mirror those usually made by people in their wills; 
                                                                                                                                 
287  Ibid, at [2.22]. 
288   New South Wales Law Reform Commission Uniform Succession Laws: Intestacy (NSWLRC R116, 2007)   
at [1.23] to [1.45].  
289  Northern Territory Law Reform Committee Report on Uniform Succession Laws (NTLRC R31, September 
2007) at 12. 
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• the rules should be simple, clear and certain; 
• the surviving spouse or partner should be given primacy; 
• the word “issue” (all descendants) rather than “children” is used and no distinction is 
made between minor and adult issue.  
I suggest that these principles are also applicable to New Zealand. One further point is that in 
New Zealand the Public Trust Office (now called Public Trust) was established in 1873 to 
provide free wills and encourage ordinary people to make wills and thereby avoid intestacy. 
Some solicitors do this also. In New Zealand, there is no financial barrier to making a will. 
A Current intestacy regime 
The intestacy regime currently in place in New Zealand can be summarised as follows:290 
• If the person dying intestate is survived by a spouse, civil union or de facto partner 
("partner") but no issue or parents, everything passes to the spouse or partner; 
• If the deceased is survived by a spouse/partner and issue, the spouse/partner receives all 
personal chattels, “the prescribed amount” or "statutory legacy" (currently $155,000) and 
one third of the residue; the remaining two thirds of the residue passes to the deceased’s 
issue; 
• If the deceased is survived by a spouse/partner, no issue but a parent, the spouse/partner 
takes the personal chattels, the statutory legacy and two thirds of the residue; the 
remaining one third of residue passes to the surviving parent or parents; 
• If the deceased is survived by issue but no spouse or partner, everything passes to the 
issue; 
• If the deceased is survived by a parent or parents but no spouse/partner or issue, 
everything passes to the surviving parent(s). 
The Administration Act also provides for brothers and sisters, nephews and nieces and 
grandparents if no spouse/partner, issue or parents survive. These provisions do not warrant 
detailed comment because they are a default regime to cover relatively uncommon situations. 
Ultimately, if no relatives survive the intestate deceased, the estate passes to the Crown 
“bona vacantia”;291 that is a rare occurrence but I will discuss and recommend a change to 
what should occur in that event. 
This regime applies to both total and partial intestacies and it has been in place for more than 
40 years. Over that time, there have been very significant changes in life expectancies, rates 
of divorce, the number of second marriages or relationships and the standard of living. It is 
timely to review the principles underpinning our intestacy laws. There have been law 
commission reports in both Scotland and Australia over recent years which review their laws 
on intestacy and I now discuss the findings and recommendations of those reports. 
                                          
290  Full details are set out in the Administration Act 1969, ss 77-79. 
291  Literally “abandoned goods”; see Administration Act 1969, s 77(1)(c). 
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B Scottish proposals for intestacy 
The Scottish Law Commission  made the following findings: 292 
• Where a person dies intestate leaving a spouse or civil partner but no issue, the surviving 
spouse/civil partner should receive the whole estate.  Over the last 100 years or so, a 
major trend has been towards the deceased’s surviving spouse becoming entitled to an 
ever-increasing share of the estate:  “A spouse or civil partner is now seen as a living 
member of the family, not an interloper.”293 “Civil partners” are couples who register 
their relationship,294 de facto couples do not. 
• Where the intestate is survived by issue and by a spouse or civil partner, the spouse/civil 
partner should be entitled to a “fixed sum” (£300,000) or the whole estate if under this 
amount.  Any excess over the fixed sum should be divided equally; half to the 
spouse/civil partner and half to issue. 
• The fixed sum should up-rate annually in line with the change in the Retail Price Index. 
• The spouse/civil partner so entitled to a share of the intestate’s estate should have an 
option to acquire the deceased’s interests in any dwelling-house, furniture and 
furnishings. 
• Nothing short of divorce, dissolution or annulment of a marriage should affect the 
surviving spouse or civil partner’s rights; separation in itself should not affect their 
rights. 
• There should be no distinction between the various classes of surviving spouse or civil 
partner. 
• The commission posed, and left open, the question whether a child accepted by an adult 
as a child of his or her family should be treated as the adult’s own child for the purposes 
of intestate succession. 
C Australian proposals for intestacy 
The New South Wales Law Reform Commission295 made the following recommendations 
which have largely been enacted:296 
• The surviving spouse or partner (including de facto partners) should be entitled to the 
whole of the intestate estate where there are no surviving issue of the intestate.  Again, 
the commission noted increasing public acceptance of the importance of the position of a 
surviving spouse or partner. 
• Where the intestate is survived by a spouse/partner and issue, the spouse/partner should 
be entitled to the whole estate except where some of the issue are from another 
                                          
292   Scottish Law Commission, above n 284, at Part 2. 
293   Ibid, at [2.21]. 
294  Registration is effected under the Civil Partnership Act 2004. 
295   Above n 288 at xiii-xx. 
296   Succession Amendment (Intestacy) Act 2009.  
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relationship.  If issue of another relationship of the deceased survive as well as the 
spouse/partner, the intestate estate should be shared between the surviving 
spouse/partner and the surviving issue. 
• Where the intestate is survived by a spouse/partner and issue of another relationship, the 
spouse/partner should receive: 
- all tangible personal property (personal effects); 
- a statutory legacy of $350,000 (as adjusted from time to time) and interest on it; 
- one half of the residue of the estate;   
the remaining one half share of the residue should pass to the deceased’s issue “per 
stirpes”. 297 
• Where there is more than one spouse or partner (and no issue), each spouse/partner 
should share in the estate.  If there are multiple partners (or a spouse and a partner) and 
issue of the intestate, the partners/spouse would share the entitlements available to a 
spouse/partner as set out above. 
• Stepchildren should not be recognised for the purposes of intestacy and where a person 
has been adopted, previous family relationships should have no recognition for the 
purposes of intestacy. 
• Distributions to relatives of the intestate (including issue) should be “per stirpes”298 in all 
cases. 
The Report of the New South Wales Law Reform Commission contains numerous other 
recommendations which have marginal relevance to the policies or principles I am exploring 
and therefore, I do not propose to discuss them any further.  The 2009 amendments to the 
New South Wales Succession Act 2006 largely follow these recommendations.  
Both of these reports highlight the acceptance in these countries of the primacy of the 
position of the surviving spouse and equivalent of our civil union partner. The report of the 
New South Wales Law Reform Commission puts de facto partners where the relationship is 
more than two years in duration, or a child has been born to the relationship, in the same 
category.299 Both reports also accept that it is important that our laws reflect community 
values and views and the recommendations in both reports do this. Both Scotland and 
Australia have similarities to New Zealand. Scotland has an important difference from New 
Zealand which is the view of Maori and Pacific Island people to succession rules, particularly 
in respect of land. That view is reflected in the Te Ture Whenua Maori Act 1993 which I will 
discuss shortly and the position of “whangai”. While the proposed intestacy regimes in 
Australia and Scotland attempt to be fair and representative, certainly in Australia there is the 
ability for certain relatives to apply to the court for further provision from an intestate estate. 
This is necessary in order to deal with individual cases involving need and desert and has 
                                          
297   Literally, “by stock”; the entitlement of descendants is determined by the entitlement of those who have 
predeceased them and would otherwise have been entitled to take. 
298   Ibid, footnote for a definition of this term. 
299  New South Wales Law Reform Commission, above n 288, at [2.17] and [2.18]. 
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been the case in New Zealand also for many years. The following discussion assumes also 
that relationship property rights of surviving spouses and partners will continue as they are at 
present. 
D Proposed intestacy regime for New Zealand 
What therefore is an appropriate intestacy regime in principle for New Zealand in 2010?  I 
recommend as follows. 
• The surviving spouse or partner should be entitled to the whole of the intestate estate 
where there are no surviving issue. 
• Where the intestate is survived by a spouse/partner and children (whether of a previous 
relationship or not), the surviving spouse or partner will be entitled to: 
- the deceased’s personal chattels and effects; 
- a statutory legacy which I would set at $350,000 (in line with the 
recommendations of the New South Wales Law Reform Commission) and the 
discussion earlier in this chapter on greater recognition of the right of a surviving 
spouse, civil union or de facto partner; 
- the statutory legacy would be increased annually to avoid the erosion in value that 
occurred in respect of the statutory legacy between 1998 and 2009300 and as 
recommended by the Scottish Law Commission; in view of the importance of 
adequate housing and the fact that house prices can outstrip inflation rates the 
statutory legacy should also be reviewed from time to time against property 
values. Patterson cites several cases where adequate housing was considered 
important in claims by surviving spouses.301 
- one half of any residue of the estate over and above the personal chattels and 
statutory legacy; the other half one half of the residue would be shared by the 
surviving children of the deceased in equal shares per stirpes.302 
• If there are multiple partners (or a spouse and a partner) they would share equally the 
entitlements of a surviving spouse or partner. 
E Separation 
What should happen where spouses, civil union and de facto partners separate prior to death? 
In the case of spouses and civil union partners, at present separation does not of itself bar 
entitlement on intestacy unless a separation order was in place at the time of death.303  In 
contrast, a condition of a de facto partner’s entitlement on intestacy is that the de facto 
                                          
300  I highlighted this issue in chapter 2, and the even more dramatic change in the median house sale figures 
between 1998 and 2008.  
301   WM Patterson Law of Family Protection and Testamentary Promises (3rd ed, LexisNexis, Wellington, 
2004), at [4.3]. 
302  Above n 297 for a definition of this term. 
303  Family Proceedings Act 1980, s 26(1); see also Administration Act 1969, s 77A. 
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partner and deceased were living together as a couple when one of them died.304  Why is 
there a difference? The position in respect of spouses and civil union partners is consistent 
with the provisions in the Wills Act 2007305 that (in the case of spouses and civil union 
partners) a will is not affected by separation unless a dissolution or separation order has been 
made before death.  It is also consistent with the present entitlement of a de facto partner to 
make a family protection claim only if living in a de facto relationship with the deceased at 
the date of death.306 The difference is that legally, a marriage or civil union subsists until a 
dissolution order is made or one or both of the parties dies307. The termination of a de facto 
relationship is much harder to define because no dissolution order can be obtained. The 
clearest ways to define termination of a de facto relationship are legally separated308 and 
death. However, it is strongly arguable that the rights of spouses and civil union partners on 
intestacy should also terminate on legal separation even if this conflicts with the long 
standing position that marriage and civil unions subsist until death or the making of a 
dissolution order.  
The arguments advanced earlier in chapter 4 of this thesis in relation to family protection or 
support claims by separated spouses or partners apply equally on intestacy. If spouses or 
partners have been separated and have resolved relationship property, it is anomalous that 
intestacy rights should be available to the survivor. There is no reason in principle why de 
facto partners should be treated differently; there should be consistency. Therefore, the 
current legal position should change:  entitlements of spouses and civil union partners on 
intestacy should not be available if the parties were legally separated at the date of death and 
like de facto partners they should be entitled on intestacy only if living with the deceased at 
the time of death. 
F Short duration 
Should a surviving de facto partner in a relationship of short duration have entitlements on 
intestacy? This raises similar issues to those discussed earlier in relation to rights of de facto 
partners in short duration relationships to make family protection claims. The current legal 
position is the same on intestacy: a de facto partner in a short duration relationship has no 
claim unless the court is satisfied that there is a child of the de facto relationship or that the de 
facto partner has made a substantial contribution to the de facto relationship, and the court is 
satisfied that serious injustice would result if the de facto partner who survives does not 
succeed on intestacy. There is, however, one important difference which is that unlike family 
protection claims, where the court has a discretion, on intestacy a person either qualifies for 
the full entitlement or not; it is all or nothing.  
As discussed in chapter 4 under support awards, if there is a minor child of the relationship, 
that child should have a support claim. If there have been contributions to the relationship 
                                          
304  N Peart, M Briggs and M Henaghan (eds) Relationship Property on Death (Thomson Brookers, Wellington, 
2004) at [2.1.5]. 
305   Wills Act 2007, s 19. 
306  Family Protection Act 1955, s 3(1)(aa). 
307  See also Bourneville v Bourneville [2009] NZFLR 69 at [21] for comments on the difference between a 
marriage and a de facto relationship. 
308   The decided cases and commentators indicate that termination of a relationship has both a mental and a 
physical component. See O v K [2004] NZFLR 507; Julian v McWatt [1998] NZFLR 257; also N Peart, M 
Briggs and M Henaghan (eds), above n 304, at [2.6].  
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then, a relationship property claim can be made. However, just as relationship property and 
family protection claims are conceptually different, so are relationship property claims and 
entitlements on intestacy. It is increasingly acknowledged both in New Zealand and overseas 
that a spouse, civil union partner or long term de facto partner has a special or primary role in 
the life of a person and significant provision should be made for the survivor on death. It is 
doubtful that a short duration de facto partner will have achieved this status. In light of the 
proposed increase in entitlements of spouses, civil union partners and de facto partners on 
intestacy, and the “all or nothing” nature of these entitlements, significant injustice could 
result if a short duration de facto partner could make a claim on relationship property and 
then be entitled to a large entitlement on intestacy. The safest and clearest course is to 
exclude short duration de facto partners from entitlements on intestacy. 
G Issue, children and accepted children 
If the intestate is survived by issue but no surviving spouse or partner, those issue would 
share the estate equally and “per stirpes”.309 
Adoption should have the same legal effect on succession law as is currently the case.310  To 
ensure consistency with the proposals earlier in this chapter in respect of support claims, I 
propose that accepted children or children of the family (who can include step-children, 
whangai, grandchildren and even great-grandchilren) have the same rights on intestacy as a 
child of the deceased. As members of the family, accepted children should have the same 
rights as biological children of the deceased and this would extend to the issue of accepted 
children who die before the deceased. It would also extend through to adulthood because, 
unlike support claims, the purpose of intestacy rules is to provide a default regime for 
distribution, not to maintain or assist those who have not been adequately provided for. As 
stated under support claims in chapter 4 this would remove the current discrimination against 
a child who may not be the biological child of the deceased but in all other respects is a 
member of the deceased’s family. 
H Bona vacantia 
From time to time there are estates which pass "bona vacantia" to the state. In practice the 
relevant Treasury officials are often happy to give favourable consideration to "claims" for 
further provision from relatives or friends who were closely associated with the deceased.  
There is no statutory basis for this approach but it happens in practice. In Australia the 
National Committee on Uniform Succession Laws recommended that the Crown be able to 
"waive" its rights in these situations in favour of any dependants of the intestate, any person 
having a just or moral claim on the intestate, any person or organisation for whom the 
intestate might reasonably be expected to have made provision, any other organisation or 
person.311 As stated above, bona vacantia is rare and a nuisance to Treasury. Giving Treasury 
the type of discretion recommended by the Australian National Committee on Uniform 
Succession Laws accords with what is happening in practice in New Zealand. 
                                          
309  Above n 297 for a definition of this term. 
310  That is, where a person is adopted, he or she has the same rights as other biological children of the adopting 
parents but loses succession rights in respect of his or her biological parents. 
311  New South Wales Law Reform Commission, above n 288, Recommendation 38; subsequently enacted by 
the Succession Amendment (Intestacy) Act 2009, Schedule 1, ch 4 at Part 4.5. 
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Apart from the changes outlined above, the intestacy regime would remain as it currently is 
and distributions to relatives should be “per stirpes”.312 In chapter 4 I concluded that adult 
children should no longer enjoy the right to make application for further provision from an 
estate;  however, I do recommend that their rights on intestacy remain. My reasons for 
excluding adult children from claims for further provision are first, because it offends against 
the principle of freedom of testation, and secondly, because of the impossibility of 
formulating a clear, agreed and simple basis for such claims. Neither of these problems exist 
on intestacy:  first, the will-maker has not exercised the right to sign a will, and secondly, all 
children would be entitled to share equally per stirpes. The intestacy provisions are a set of 
default rules, and once established should be allowed to stand. Currently, adult children have 
entitlements on intestacy and none of the Law Commissions of New Zealand, Scotland or 
New South Wales recommend that this situation changes.  
Entitlements on intestacy would be subject to rights under the Property (Relationships) Act 
1976 and also subject to the rights of spouses, partners and minor children, stepchildren and 
grandchildren to make support claims. 
II Maori Land, Taonga and Property Interests 
A will-maker’s freedom to deal with interests in Maori land is restricted under Te Ture 
Whenua Maori Act 1993. A provision in a will that purports to give Maori land to a person 
other than those specified in s 108 of the Te Ture Whenua Maori Act 1993 is void and of no 
effect.313  Shares in Maori Incorporations are deemed to be interests in Maori land.314  The 
deceased does not need to be Maori.315 Under s 2(2) of the Te Ture Whenua Maori Act 1993, 
the powers, duties and discretions under the Act are to be exercised in a manner that 
facilitates and promotes the retention, use, development and control of Maori land as taonga 
tuku iho (treasures of our past) by Maori owners, their whanau, their hapu and their 
descendants.316 
Since 2005 the owner of a beneficial estate in Maori freehold land can by will, leave that 
interest to the owner’s spouse, civil union or de facto partner for life, or for any shorter 
period. 317 However, a will-maker can leave a beneficial interest in Maori land to some or all 
of the will-maker’s children or remoter issue and that includes “whangai” (child adopted by 
Maori custom).318 On intestacy, a surviving spouse or civil union partner is entitled as of 
right to an interest for life or until remarriage or entry into a civil union or de facto 
relationship. Otherwise, the interests vest absolutely in those entitled to succeed on intestacy 
under s 109 Te Ture Whenua Maori Act 1993; that is, issue (if any) and if there are no issue, 
brothers and sisters. 
                                         
The Family Protection Act 1955 applies to interests in Maori land. There are restrictions on 
the types of orders that can be made. For example a family protection order cannot alienate 
Maori freehold land to a spouse; however, it can confer the right to reside in any dwelling.319  
 
312  Above n 297 for a definition of this term. 
313   John Earles and others Wills and Succession (LexisNexis, Wellington, 2008) at [16.4]. 
314   Ibid, at [16.48].  
315   Te Ture Whenua Maori Act 1993, s 100(1). 
316   John Earles and others, above n 313, at [16.2].  
317   Ibid, at [16.11].  
318   Ibid, at [16.12]. 
319   Ibid, at [16.28]. 
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The courts recognise Maori custom and in particular, the strong attachment of Maori to the 
land.320 
A number of principles have emerged from the interaction of the Family Protection Act 1955 
and Te Ture Whenua Maori Act 1993 and they include:321 
• For Maori, land is more than just an investment; it has a deep spiritual meaning. 
• Great respect must be paid to the will-maker’s judgement. 
• Financial need is a strong factor in favour of approving a claim. 
• There is a prima facie obligation to leave appropriate interests in traditional and family 
land to all the will-maker’s children. 
• Maori cultural considerations will not predominate over a breach of moral duty 
especially if there is financial need; however, there is increasing acceptance that Maori 
custom should have a bearing on the moral duty owed by a Maori will-maker. 
The Property (Relationships) Act 1976 does not apply in respect of Maori land within the 
meaning of the Te Ture Whenua Maori Act 1993.322 No order can be made under the Law 
Reform (Testamentary Promises) Act 1949 which would alienate an interest in Maori 
freehold land to a person to whom that interest could not have been left by will.323 Apart 
from these exceptions in respect of Maori land, Maori are subject to current succession laws 
in New Zealand.  
                                         
The Northern Territory Law Reform Committee concluded that there is now wider 
recognition that customary law should become in some way part of the general law of 
Australia and recommended that aboriginal customary law be recognised as a "source of 
law".324 The Law Reform Commission of Western Australia acknowledged that relevant 
customary laws are still practised in Western Australia for distribution of property on 
death.325 The situation in the Northern Territory is similar. 
Virginia Grainer has suggested inheritance law may be an appropriate area for different rules 
to be developed along lines appropriate for iwi, hapu and whanau because a collective sense 
of moral duty may continue to prevail within tikanga Maori.326 Leaving aside interests in 
Maori land and taonga, which have been dealt with separately for many years, it is difficult to 
see how Maori would regard bank accounts, shares and chattels differently. Unlike land and 
taonga, there is no obvious historic difference in outlook and practice. 
 
320   Re Green (deceased): Green v Robson [1995] NZFLR 330 at 334. 
321   John Earles and others, above n 313, at [16.29].  
322  See Property (Relationships) Act 1976, s 6; see also N Peart, M Briggs & M Henaghan (eds), above n 304, 
at [17.2.1]. 
323  Te Ture Whenua Maori Act 1993, s 106; see also see also N Peart, M Briggs & M Henaghan (eds), above n 
304, at [17.2.4]. 
324   Northern Territory Law Reform Committee, above n 289; also Committee of Inquiry into Aboriginal 
Customary Law "Report on Aboriginal Customary Law" (Report No 28, 30 June 2003) Main Report at 38. 
325   Law Reform Commission of Western Australia Aboriginal Customary Laws (LRCWA R94, 2006) at 223.  
326  Virginia Grainer, above n 250, at 140. 
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Alternatively, others would argue that it is not appropriate and possibly confusing for a 
different set of rules to apply to interests in Maori land; succession rights should be 
standardised and simplified. However in New Zealand we have had special rules for Maori 
land for many years and recognition of the concept of taonga dates back to the Treaty of 
Waitangi. The rules set out in the Te Ture Whenua Maori Act 1993 recognise the special 
attachment of Maori to land and the desirability of avoiding alienation of Maori land 
interests. In some ways these rules are similar to the fixed rule regimes in European countries 
which I discussed and rejected earlier. The difference is however that special rules 
acknowledging that Maori land is communal rather than personal property have been 
accepted and practised in New Zealand for many years.  
One point that does need to be reviewed is the ability of the Maori Trustee to obtain grants of 
administration of estates. Inquiries indicate that while this ability has existed for some time, it 
is seldom, if ever, exercised. If there is no need, consideration should be given to whether this 
should continue.  
The principles applicable to Maori land and estates have been given consideration within the 
last 17 years and seem appropriate to New Zealand in the 21st century.  There is no benefit in 
changing the principles that currently apply other than in the general context of proposed 
changes to family protection and testamentary promises claims discussed elsewhere in this 
thesis. 
III Testamentary Promises Claims 
The Law Reform (Testamentary Promises) Act 1949 is unique to New Zealand.  Under the 
Act a claimant can bring proceedings where: 
• the claimant has rendered services for the deceased (other than services which arise out 
of the natural incidents and consequences of life within a close family group); and 
• a promise has been made by the deceased to reward the claimant for those services; and 
• the promise has not been fulfilled either by testamentary provision or some other 
remuneration provided by the deceased.327 
A number of problems with the Law Reform (Testamentary Promises) Act 1949 have arisen 
over the last 60 years: 
• Difficulties of proof have arisen because the person alleged to have made the promise is 
no longer alive. 
• Judicial definitions of “service” have been very liberal and this has led to 
inconsistency.328 
• It is not certain who has priority if there are competing family protection claims and 
testamentary promises claims;329 in Hamilton v Hamilton,330 it was decided that neither 
claim has automatic priority. 
                                          
327   Patterson, above n 301, at [13.1]. 
328   Ibid, at [13.9]. 
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• If the deceased has entered into a contract to make provision by will but failed to carry 
out the promise, a claim can be made in contract and is not affected by competing family 
protection claims; claims under the Law Reform (Testamentary Promises) Act 1949 are 
affected.331   
• The remedy under the Act is discretionary and the Courts have frequently awarded less 
than the amount promised by the deceased.332 
• What constitutes a “promise”? Under the Act the term “promise” includes any statement 
or representation of fact or intention, and it is not necessary that the promise should 
amount to a contractual undertaking;333 indeed, imprecise statements and ambiguous 
language have been accepted as sufficient.334 
• Testamentary promises claims have been used as a “backstop” to family protection 
claims.335 
• The exclusion of services arising out of the “natural incidents” of family life can mean 
that relatives who are ineligible under the Family Protection Act may have no remedies 
available at all.336  
• What exactly are “the natural incidents and consequences of life within a family 
group”337 when the concept of “family group” is fluid? 
• The courts can find that a promise gives rise to a contractual, an estoppel or a 
restitutionary claim and this classification makes a difference to the remedies available. 
The Act obscures this difference.338 
A Developments 
Since 1949, there have been huge developments in New Zealand in remedies based upon 
constructive trust, restitution, unjust enrichment and fiduciary obligations.339  The possible 
evolution of a law of obligations has been flagged.340  Section 3(8) of the Law Reform 
(Testamentary Promises) Act 1949 specifically preserves contractual or other remedies 
outside that Act.  Why then is a specific remedy under the Law Reform (Testamentary 
Promises) Act 1949 needed in 2010?  It is conceptually very different from a family 
protection claim and unique to New Zealand.341 
                                                                                                                                 
329   Ibid, at [13.7].  
330   Hamilton v Hamilton [2003] NZFLR 883 (HC). 
331   Patterson, above n 302, at [13.6]. 
332   Ibid, at [13.1]. 
333  Law Reform (Testamentary Promises) Act 1949, s 2. 
334  Patterson, above n 301, at [13.13]. 
335   Hamilton v Hamilton, above n 330. 
336   See Parata v McGowan [1994] NZFLR 937 at 941. 
337   This phrase was used in Re Welch [1990] 3 NZLR 1. 
338  Law Commission, above n 265, at [41].  
339   Andrew Butler (ed) Equity and Trusts in New Zealand (2nd ed, Brookers, Wellington, 2009) at Part B. 
340   Ibid, at [1.10]. 
341   For example in England such claims can be dealt with under the doctrine of proprietary estoppel – see 
Thorner v Majors and Others [2009] UKHL 18. 
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The mischief the Act was designed to remedy was the tendency of testators to persuade 
people to render services to them by promises later found to be too vague to establish 
enforceable contracts.342  However, in Wishnewsky v Public Trustee,343 a claim based on 
unjust enrichment succeeded where no testamentary promise was proved; subsequently in 
Rennie v Hamilton344 it was decided that if a testamentary promise is established, a claim 
based on unjust enrichment is not available.  A claim based on quantum meruit may also be 
available.345 In McFetridge v Bowater-Wright346 it was decided that a claim based on 
constructive trust would also have succeeded in addition to the testamentary promises claim. 
Because of these alternative causes of action and the development of the law of restitution, 
constructive trusts and fiduciary obligations, and the range of remedies now available, the 
Law Reform (Testamentary Promises) Act 1949 has outlived its usefulness and should be 
repealed. The benefits of this will be one less inheritance law statute and hopefully, 
avoidance of some of the problems listed above. Another benefit will be that inconsistencies 
between the Act and other inheritance statutes will be removed.347 
B Law Commission 
In its 1997 Report348 the Law Commission discussed the various grounds for claims by those 
who contribute a “benefit” to the deceased. Claims can be based on contract, estoppel, 
quantum meruit, trusts and statute (specifically, the Law Reform (Testamentary Promises) 
Act 1949). The Law Commission recommended a statutory provision following the general 
principles of the common law. It suggested:349 
Contributors and those to whom testamentary promises have been made may make a 
contribution claim for an appropriate amount in respect of their unremunerated services 
for the will-maker based on: 
• An express promise to make provision for the claimant; or where there is no such 
promise 
• The estate retaining the benefits of the services in circumstances where it is unjust 
for the estate to do so. 
The Law Commission notes that claims could be made without an explicit promise to reward 
and such "contribution" claims would be separate from "support" claims. 
If the deceased entered into a contract while alive, the terms of that contract can be enforced 
against his or her estate. Secondly, if a constructive or resulting trust can be imposed on 
property owned by a person, this should subsist following death against his or her estate. 
Thirdly, claims based on fiduciary obligations and unjust enrichment should be enforceable 
                                          
342   See McCormack v Foley [1983] NZLR 57 (CA). 
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against a person and his or her estate.  Those causes of action should cover the same grounds 
and remedy the same mischief that the Law Reform (Testamentary Promises) Act 1949 was 
designed to correct. Those grounds would however be narrower and simpler than “services” 
under a testamentary promise which have been liberally interpreted and created 
uncertainty350. 
C Proposed changes  
The recommendations of the Law Commission are consistent with the proposals in this thesis 
that the Law Reform (Testamentary Promises) Act 1949 be repealed and that an inheritance 
code incorporate and retain remedies against an estate based on contract, fiduciary 
obligations, unjust enrichment and implied trust.351 Claims based on an implied trust could be 
described as “contribution” claims as suggested by the Law Commission. The grounds for a 
contribution claim would be the same as for a constructive or implied trust: 
• contributions directly or indirectly; 
• expectation of an interest; 
• such expectation is reasonable; and 
• the estate should reasonably expect to yield an interest to the claimant.352 
These grounds would be included in the proposed inheritance code. 
Claims based on breach of fiduciary obligations by a deceased person would be enforceable 
against the estate. 
These remedies can be specifically incorporated within the proposed code; or most can be 
specifically incorporated and other remedies specifically preserved in the same way that s 51 
of the Property (Relationships) Act 1976 preserves proceedings in tort. The Court of Appeal 
in Kerridge v Kerridge 353 noted that a code does not cover all possible legal disputes that 
may arise (in that case between a couple).  The best course is to include causes of action (and 
remedies) in contract, fiduciary obligations, unjust enrichment and implied trusts within the 
proposed inheritance code and preserve remedies in tort in the same way that the Property 
(Relationships) Act 1976 does. It is probably not possible to cover all future developments in 
this growing area of the law but it is to be hoped that implied trusts, unjust enrichment and 
fiduciary obligations will be sufficiently flexible to provide satisfactory remedies for most 
situations that arise in future. If, however, the law develops in a way that has not been 
anticipated by the proposed code, then legislative reform may be needed; that does not detract 
from the very significant benefits of having a comprehensive code.  
IV Summary of Key Principles 
The key principles formulated in this chapter are: 
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• Testamentary promises and other common law or equitable claims would be replaced by 
“contribution claims”; that is, codified causes of action based on contract, fiduciary 
obligations or contributions (which would be similar to constructive trust claims). 
• Support claims would be relegated in priority behind: 
- estate debts and debts incurred in the course of estate administration; 
- claims against estates based on contract, fiduciary obligations and contributions; 
- relationship property claims. 
• The proposed inheritance code would include a default regime for intestacy which would 
give priority to the position of a surviving spouse, civil union or de facto partner, and 
provide a statutory legacy set initially at $350,000 but updated regularly so as to take 
into account increases in the cost of housing and living. Entitlements of spouses, civil 
union and de facto partners would be limited to those who were living with the deceased 
as a couple at the time of death (or at least not legally separated) and there would be no 
entitlement for surviving de facto partners where the relationship was one of short 
duration.  
• Accepted children who are members of the deceased’s family would have the same 
rights as biological or adopted children of the deceased on intestacy. This would include 
adult accepted children and rights would extend to the issue of accepted children.  
• The restrictions on dealing with Maori land interests in the Te Ture Whenua Maori Act 
1993 would be retained. 
• The Crown should be able to waive its entitlements in the event of bona vacantia in 
favour of dependants of the deceased. 
• The proposed inheritance code would incorporate and replace as far as possible all 




I Two Issues 
Two problems identified in chapter 1 of this thesis have not been discussed so far.  They are: 
• At present some aspects of our inheritance laws are handled primarily in the Family 
Court and others in the High Court. Is it desirable for all matters to be handled in one 
court?  If so what is the appropriate court? 
• To what extent should New Zealand courts have jurisdiction to deal with assets of a 
deceased person that are located outside New Zealand? Should our current rules relating 
to movable and immovable assets change? 
II Family Court or High Court 
Where a particular case raises a number of issues it may be necessary for separate 
proceedings to be filed in the High Court and Family Court. For example if it is alleged that a 
will is invalid due to lack of testamentary capacity or undue influence, proceedings have to be 
filed in the High Court; in the same case it may be necessary for proceedings to be filed under 
the Property (Relationships) Act 1976 and Family Protection Act 1955 in which case the 
Family Court usually has jurisdiction.354 The first two claims are based upon common law 
rules whereas the latter are based upon statutes giving jurisdiction to the Family Court. While 
explicable historically there is no apparent logic to the separate but overlapping roles of the 
High and Family Courts. 
Some examples from various inheritance law statutes illustrate the unnecessary complexities.  
• Under the Property (Relationships) Act 1976 proceedings are commenced in the Family 
Court355 but a Family Court judge can remove a case to the High Court. The test for 
removal is the complexity of the case or any question arising in the proceedings.356 
• Prior to 1 July 1992 proceedings under the Family Protection Act 1955 and the Law 
Reform (Testamentary Promises) Act 1949 were commenced in the High Court. The 
Family Court and the High Court now have concurrent jurisdiction but a Family Court 
judge can refer proceedings to the High Court.357 
• The High Court has jurisdiction under the Administration Act 1969 but registrars rather 
than judges deal with most probate matters.358 The trend over recent years has been to 
                                          
354   Property (Relationships) Act 1976, s 22. 
355   See s 22; previously under the Matrimonial Property Act 1976 the High Court and the Family Court had 
jurisdiction. 
356   Webb and others Family Law in New Zealand (14th ed, LexisNexis, Wellington, 2009) at [7-304]. 
357   Family Courts Act 1980, s 14; WM Patterson Law of Family Protection and Testamentary Promises (3rd 
ed, LexisNexis, Wellington, 2004) at [15.2].  
358   See High Court Rules, r 27.14. 
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extend the powers of registrars in probate matters359 and this follows a similar trend in 
England.360 
• In the Family Court the new position of Senior Family Court Registrar has been created 
with powers to handle a wide range of matters.361 The aim is to reduce the time judges 
spend on administrative decisions and to reduce delays in the Family Court.  
• The High Court has jurisdiction under the Wills Act 2007 but the Family Court can 
approve the will of a person under 18 years of age.362 The Family Court can also 
approve attorneys and property managers signing wills for persons who lack capa 363city.  
                                         
• The Family Court has jurisdiction to determine whether a person has mental capacity to 
sign an enduring power of attorney but not a will.364 
• The Family Court Rules give registrars powers to hear and determine proceedings and 
make directions.365 
• In some cases appeals from the Family Court are by way of rehearing where the appeal 
court can reach its own conclusions of fact and law and make decisions without 
remitting the case back to the Family Court.366 
• The Supreme Court decision in Austin Nichols and Co Inc v Stichting Lodestar367 
requires an appellate court to substitute its decision if it considers the decision under 
appeal is wrong; that is, outside the range of decisions available to the first instance 
court. This can create problems where the court is exercising its discretion as in family 
protection cases.368 
III One Court 
If it is seen as desirable for laws and access to justice to be clear, consistent and simple, then 
it is preferable that one court deal with as many related matters as possible. There are issues 
in relation to Maori land that are best handled in the Maori Land Court; the Maori Land Court 
was set up many years ago for this. However, it is difficult to understand why other 
inheritance or succession issues cannot be handled in one court. It is appropriate that the 
Family Court be given primary jurisdiction for the following reasons: 
 
359   John Earles and others Dobbie’s Probate and Administration Practice (5th ed, LexisNexis, Wellington, 
2008) at [27.30.9]. 
360   John Winegarten, Roland D’Costa and Terry Synak Tristram and Coote’s Probate Practice (30th ed, 
LexisNexis, United Kingdom, 2006) at [25.02]. 
361   Family Courts Amendment Act 2008; see also “Senior Family Court Registrars” New Zealand Law Society 
Law Talk 727 (13 April 2009) at 10. 
362   Wills Act 2007, s 9(3). 
363   Protection of Personal and Property Rights Act 1988, ss 54 and 55. 
364  Waldron v Public Trust High Court Auckland CIV 2009-404-00485 19 January 2010. 
365   Family Court Rules 2002, r 12. 
366   For example s 75 Protection of Personal and Property Rights Act 1988; see also D v S [2003] NZFLR 81 
(CA). 
367   Austin Nichols and Co Inc v Stichting Lodestar [2008] 2 NZLR 141. 
368   See for example The National Heart Foundation of New Zealand and others v Carroll HC Nelson CIV 
2008-442-000495, 25 February 2009. 
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• Wills and succession affect all New Zealanders regardless of background, ethnicity and 
financial circumstances and it is important that access to justice be simplified and made 
as easy as possible369. Approximately 27,000 people die in New Zealand each year.370 
Wills and succession are about families and this area of the law can be categorised as 
part of family law.371 
• Some estate litigation involves modest sums of money and some litigants want to 
represent themselves. For many this will be the first time they are involved in a court 
hearing and it is important that they are not overawed by the formality and technicality 
of court proceedings. Family Court proceedings are conducted in such a way as to 
avoid unnecessary formality;  judges and lawyers cannot wear wigs.372  Similarly the 
Family Court Rules require cases to be dealt with simply, speedily and expeditiously.373 
The position of Senior Family Court Registrar has been created to handle routine 
matters, and new Mediation Rules have been developed which provide for non-judge-
led mediation. 
• The High Court has high filing fees and complex procedural rules; this is not the case in 
the Family Court. In Field v Field Robertson J stated:374 
… the Family Court aided with the Matrimonial Property Rules, will be able to 
obtain more effectively, efficiently, cheaply and quickly, base information than 
could be the case in this Court.  The ability to take action ex parte if there is a 
failure to provide necessary information, the ability to call a conference and 
confront the parties with the reality of their situation in my judgment will be of 
enormous advantage in dealing with the human problem which is presented by 
this case. 
• The Family Court has its own rules which are much shorter than the High Court rules 
and are written in plain English. They were established in 2002 and replace the 
Matrimonial Property Rules referred to in Field v Field.  Most applications do not 
require filing fees.  In contrast the High Court Rules which have recently been rewritten 
have grown significantly in volume over the last 20 years.375  The standard filing fee is 
$900. 
• The trend in recent legislation such as the Property (Relationships) Act 1976 and 
amendments to the Family Protection Act 1955 and Law Reform (Testamentary 
Promises) Act 1949 has been to give primary or originating jurisdiction to the Family 
Court with power reserved to a Family Court judge to transfer complex matters to the 
High Court. The position is similar in some of the Australian States.376 For many years 
                                          
369   David S Beattie Report of Royal Commission on the Courts (1978) at [489]. 
370   Law Commission Succession Law: A Succession (Adjustment) Act (NZLC R39, 1997) at [12]. 
371   For example Webb and others, above n 356 include a number of chapters on inheritance law in their family 
law text. 
372  Family Courts Act 1980, ss 10(2) and (3). 
373  Family Court Rules, r 3. 
374  Field v Field (1989) 5 FRNZ 337 at 340. 
375   McGechan on Procedure the text on the High Court Rules and Procedure has more than doubled in volume 
over the last 20 years. 
376  District Court of Queensland Act 1967, s 68(1)(b)(x). 
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a Family Court judge has been able to refer proceedings to the High Court;377 there has 
been no proposal to change this. 
• In 1997 the Law Commission recommended378 that, as far as possible, all claims should 
be brought in a single set of proceedings and disposed of at the same time; this accords 
with s 4(2) of the Family Protection Act 1955. This objective will be facilitated if one 
court has primary jurisdiction for all claims rather than the High Court and Family 
Court having dual jurisdiction. In the interests of efficient estate administration and 
minimisation of costs it is desirable that, if possible, all claims be dealt with at once. 
• One argument against inheritance or succession issues being handled in the Family 
Court is that these cases can be complex and may involve significant sums of money; 
therefore the skills and expertise of High Court judges are needed. However Family 
Court judges have been handling complex cases without any financial thresholds under 
the Property (Relationships) Act 1976 and Family Protection Act 1955 for many years 
and there are no proposals to change this. The Family Court is seen as a specialist court 
with expertise in dealing with family matters379 and the 1991 amendments to the 
Family Protection Act 1955 and the Law Reform (Testamentary Promises) Act 1949 
which extended jurisdiction to the Family Court under both Acts recognised th 380is.  
                                         
IV Recent Cases 
Some recent decisions tend to refute the claim that High Court Judges bring a greater level of 
expertise to inheritance and relationship property law.  Examples are the following: 
• In Henry v Henry381 the applicant succeeded in a family protection claim against his 
mother’s estate.  In the High Court Asher J allowed the appeal against this decision and 
held that the Court’s approach in family protection cases is analogous to challenges to 
decisions of public officials on the basis of unreasonableness. The Court of Appeal held 
that the High Court Judge was wrong to draw an analogy between judicial review claims 
and family protection claims. The matter was remitted to the Family Court for 
reconsideration. 
• In Kenyon & Another v Clough & Others,382 a family protection case, the High Court 
increased a legacy in a will from $70,000 to $300,000. On appeal this was reduced to 
$150,000 and the Court of Appeal set out several errors in the High Court decision. 
• In Public Trust v Whyman,383 an estate claim, the Court of Appeal was critical of the 
approach of High Court judges in that case and in an earlier case384 in respect of s 88(2) 
Property (Relationships) Act 1976. 
 
377   Family Courts Act 1980, s 14. 
378   Law Commision, above n 370, at page 155. 
379  N Peart, M Briggs and M Henaghan (eds) Relationship Property on Death (Thomson Brookers, Wellington, 
2004) at [14.19]. 
380  See Family Protection Amendment Act 1991, s 3 and Law Reform (Testamentary Promises) Amendment 
Act 1991, s 3. 
381  Henry v Henry [2007] NZFLR 640 (CA). 
382  Kenyon & Another v Clough & Others [2005] NZCA 201 (CA) . 
383  Public Trust v Whyman [2005] 2 NZLR 696 (CA). 
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• In Ward v Ward385 which related to the variation of the terms of a family trust on 
dissolution of a marriage under s 182 of the Family Proceedings Act 1980, the decision 
of the Family Court judge, which was reversed by a High Court judge, was reinstated 
first by the Court of Appeal and subsequently by the Supreme Court. 
• In Rose v Rose386 the Supreme Court and the Court of Appeal both overturned a High 
Court decision in respect of relationship property and made awards more in keeping with 
the decision of the Family Court judge. 
• In Sadler v Public Trust387 which related to the content and extent of the duties of 
executors and trustees in estate administration an earlier High Court decision on this 
issue Re Stewart388 was criticised.  
Another way to deal with this issue is to create a specialist Succession and Trust Law Court; 
indeed there have been calls for the establishment of an Equity Division of the High Court 
similar perhaps to the Chancery Division in England.389 The Chancery Division undertakes 
this role in the United Kingdom but this may not be feasible in a small country like New 
Zealand. What is possible is for succession, trust and elder law cases to be handled in most 
cases by Family Court judges who have shown ability and have experience in this area.  This 
seems a better alternative to retaining significant areas of work solely within the jurisdiction 
of the High Court. Increased encouragement in any code to refer inheritance law disputes to 
mediation or alternative dispute resolution will also reduce the volume of cases coming 
before judges. 
The High Court had almost exclusive jurisdiction in trust and inheritance laws in New 
Zealand for many years. Since the establishment of the Family Court in 1981, various aspects 
of inheritance and trust law have been delegated to the Family Court to the point where it has 
taken on a significant workload in this area. However, the High Court also retains sole 
jurisdiction in certain aspects of inheritance law. The traditional role of the High Court in this 
area is not a reason in itself to exclude the Family Court. At the very least, this jurisdictional 
issue should be reviewed and consideration given to appointing one court to handle all 
matters.  
In any inheritance code primary originating jurisdiction should be given to the Family Court 
in all matters subject to: 
• for Maori Land, jurisdiction remaining with the Maori Land Court; and  
• the power of a Family Court judge to transfer complex matters to the High Court. 
                                                                                                                                 
384  Re Williams: Kinniburgh v Williams [2004] 2 NZLR 132, [2004] NZFLR 467. 
385  Ward v Ward [2009] NZSC 125 (SC). 
386  Rose v Rose [2009] 3 NZLR 1, [2009] NZFLR 814. 
387  Sadler v Public Trust [2009] NZCA 364. 
388  Re Stewart [2003] 1 NZLR 809. 
389  Anthony Grant "New Zealand Sham Trusts - Facing International Criticism" NZ Lawyer (New Zealand, 18 
September 2009) at 15. 
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V Assets Located Outside New Zealand 
It is not the purpose of this thesis to discuss conflict of laws issues in detail.  However with  
increasing mobility and the greater likelihood that people will own assets in different 
countries, an inheritance code will need to state clearly what laws apply to assets located in 
New Zealand and overseas. 
For the purposes of relationship property, family protection and testamentary promises 
claims, property is categorised as movable and immovable. Immovable assets include land, 
and movable assets include bank accounts and shares (other than shares in a company owning 
New Zealand real estate).390 
Currently and for many years, if the will-maker is domiciled in New Zealand at the date of 
death a New Zealand court has had jurisdiction to make orders under the Family Protection 
Act 1955 affecting disposition of movable property whether situated in New Zealand or 
overseas.391 There is also jurisdiction in respect of immovable property situated in New 
Zealand but not in respect of immovables outside New Zealand.392  If the will-maker is 
domiciled at the date of death outside New Zealand orders can be made under the Family 
Protection Act 1955 to dispose of immovables situated in New Zealand but not immovables 
overseas. New Zealand courts cannot affect the disposition of the movable property of a will-
maker domiciled at the date of death outside New Zealand, whether that movable property is 
situated inside or outside New Zelaland.393 If there are immovable assets situated overseas 
and there are other assets in respect of which jurisdiction to make an order exists, the court 
can take the immovable assets into account in determining the provision, if any, that should 
be made for the applicant.394 
In respect of relationship property claims on death the Property (Relationships) Act 1976 
applies to immovable property situated in New Zealand regardless of the domicile of the 
parties; land overseas is excluded from the Act.395 Movable property situated in New Zealand 
or overseas is covered by the Act if one of the parties is domiciled in New Zealand.396 These 
rules are very similar to the rules that have been in force for some time in respect of family 
protection claims. 
The rules for family protection and testamentary promises claims are the same except in one 
respect.  In Re Greenfield397 it was held that as far as testamentary promises claims are 
concerned, there is jurisdiction to make an order in respect of movables situated in New 
Zealand of a person dying domiciled out of New Zealand.  The judge in that case stated that 
the Law Reform (Testamentary Promises) Act 1949 is a singular remedial measure in New 
Zealand and said it would be unjust to defeat a claim merely because of a matter of 
domicile.398 It is difficult to understand why different rules apply to testamentary promises 
                                          
390  Re Knowles (deceased) [1995] 2 NZLR 377. 
391   Patterson, above n 357, at [5.2]. 
392   Re Roper [1927] NZLR 731 at 742; “immovables” are land and movables are assets such as bank accounts 
and shares (other than shares in a company owning New Zealand real estate). 
393   Patterson, above n 357, at [5.2]. 
394  Ibid.  
395   Property (Relationships) Act 1976, s 7; N Peart, M Briggs and M Henaghan (eds), above n 379, at [6.3.1]. 
396   Property (Relationships) Act 1976, s 7(2). 
397   Re Greenfield [1985] 2 NZLR 662. 
398   Patterson, above n 357, at [13.26]. 
   
83 
and family protection claims; the reasoning in Re Greenfield is not convincing. I propose that 
the Law Reform (Testamentary Promises) Act 1949 be repealed and this will remove the 
anomaly. Even if this does not occur, for the sake of clarity and simplicity this anomaly 
should be removed. 
VI Forum Conveniens 
Apart from the rules in the Family Protection Act 1955, the Law Reform (Testamentary 
Promises) At 1949 and the Property (Relationships Act) 1976 regarding movables and 
immovables discussed above, there is a well developed set of principles governing conflict of 
laws and forum conveniens issues in disputes.  Relevant factors include: 
• the relative cost and convenience of proceeding in each jurisdiction; 
• the location and availability of documents and witnesses; 
• the extent of litigation in another jurisdiction and the state of those proceedings; 
• whether all relevant parties are subject to New Zealand jurisdiction so that all issues can 
be resolved in one hearing; 
• the existence of an agreement to submit to a particular jurisdiction or relating to the 
appropriateness of a particular forum; 
• where any judgment will fall to be enforced; 
• whether the defendant’s objection to jurisdiction or application for a stay, is brought to 
gain a tactical advantage;  
• the strength of the plaintiff’s claim; 
• whether the law governing the dispute to be resolved is New Zealand law; 
• procedural advantages in one jurisdiction; 
• a decision in another jurisdiction that it is forum conveniens.399 
This list of criteria is based on numerous decided cases400 and also the High Court Rules 
dealing with service out of New Zealand.401 
The textbooks indicate that the rules set out above in relation to movables, immovables and 
overseas assets are well established and relatively clear.402  While there have been difficult 
cases, the rules are accepted and largely mirror rules in other jurisdictions.403 The rules were 
reviewed and largely retained when the Property (Relationships) Act 1976 came into force in 
                                          
399  Laws of New Zealand Conflict of Laws: Jurisdiction and Foreign Judgments at [30].   
400  Some of the cases are discussed in the recent case Ochi v Trustees Executors Limited HC Dunedin CIV 
2008-485-002062, 18 December 2009. 
401  Rules 6.27-6.29. 
402   Patterson, above n 357, at [5.2] although this does raise conflict of laws issues with other countries. 
403   For example Lawrence Collins and others (eds) Dicey,  Morris & Collins on The Conflict of Laws (13th ed, 
Sweet & Maxwell, United Kingdom, 2009) at [27-011]. 
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2002. I see no need for major or even minor changes. It is important to remember that there is 
increasing acceptance of the need to harmonise cross-jurisdictional laws. For example the 
Hague Convention on the law applicable to trusts and on their recognition has been adopted 
by a number of countries including the United Kingdom in 1987.404 
As with other inheritance law issues, the current rules relating to jurisdiction where parties or 
assets are located or domiciled overseas (or partly in New Zealand and partly overseas) are 
contained in a mixture of statutes, decided cases and the High Court Rules. This affects 
access to the law and consistency. The issue will come up as people move between countries 
and acquire assets in different countries and under different ownership structures. An 
inheritance code which sets out the applicable rules for jurisdiction in a clear and 
comprehensive way is important.  
VII Summary 
What is proposed is that the law in relation to movables and immovables set out in the 
Property (Relationships) Act 1976405 and the other forum conveniens rules set out above be 
brought within the proposed inheritance code. It is proposed that these rules and the other 
forum conveniens rules cover all inheritance issues in the code. 
 
 
404  David Hayton, Paul Matthews and Charles Mitchell Underhill and Hayton’s Law of Trusts and Trustees 
(17th ed, LexisNexis Butterworths, London, 2006) at 1235; Recognition of Trusts Act 1987. 




I The Current Position 
Some will-makers transfer assets into family trusts or directly to individuals or set up joint 
ownership structures while alive with the intention or effect406 of defeating inheritance rights 
or claims. Some countries have anti-avoidance laws to prevent this. The Scottish Law 
Commission recommended in respect of intestacy407 that a child claiming a share should have 
to add notionally all lifetime gifts made by the deceased, other than Christmas, birthday and 
other conventional gifts (such as charitable donations) of a reasonable amount, to the share of 
the deceased’s estate to be shared by the children. 
As noted by the New South Wales Law Reform Commission408 the doctrine of “hotchpot” 
which originated in the Statute of Distributions409 provided that settlement and advancement 
conferred upon children during a person’s lifetime were to be taken into account in 
determining their portions upon intestacy. However, hotchpot was abolished in a number of 
countries including New Zealand because of the difficulties it created including uncertainty in 
defining advancement and the date of valuation of benefits received. Those jurisdictions 
retaining it usually impose time limits410 which can be arbitrary. 
The arguments in favour of anti-avoidance provisions include the following:411 
• If rules of law are established to protect people from disinheritance those rules should be 
protected from attempts to circumvent them;  there is little point having rules that can be 
easily evaded. 
• This is particularly so where the protective provisions are new and consistent with public 
opinion. 
• If laws are easily evaded or ineffective this brings the law and legal system into 
disrepute and creates “industries” specialising in evasion of the law which can lead to 
other harmful consequences.412 
Where spouses, civil union or de facto partners separate or divorce there are anti-avoidance 
or trust-busting provisions in the Property (Relationships) Act 1976413 and Family 
Proceedings Act 1980.414 In relation to the Property (Relationships) Act 1976 a personal 
representative can apply under s 44 but requires leave from the court to apply under sections 
                                          
406  The difference between “intention” and “effect” is significant as I will discuss shortly. 
407   Scottish Law Commission Discussion Paper on Succession (SLC DP136, 2007) at [13.5]. 
408  New South Wales Law Reform Commission Uniform Succession Laws: Intestacy (NSWLRC R116, 2007) 
at [13.5].  
409  Statute of Distributions 1670 (UK) 22 & 23 Cha II c10, s 5. 
410   New South Wales Law Reform Commission, above n 408, at [13.14]  
411   Scottish Law Commission, above n 407, at [4.10]-[4.16]. 
412  For example see the article “Divorce New Zealand Style” in the August 2009 edition of North and South 
magazine at 30 which discusses the use of family trusts to avoid relationship property laws and rest home 
fees and the problems this has created. 
413  For example ss 43, 44 and 44C. 
414  For example s 182. 
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44C and 44F and it is not clear whether applications can be made after death under sections 
44B and 44F.415 Why are these limitations and restrictions imposed on potential claims on 
death? There are no obvious policy reasons and the Property (Relationships) Act 1976 gives 
no explanation. 
As noted by the Scottish Law Commission416 most jurisdictions including Australia have 
anti-avoidance provisions; this includes New Zealand.417  
II Competing Arguments 
Arguments against anti-avoidance provisions are: 
• People should be encouraged (indeed, have a right) to plan the transfer of assets to the 
next generations; anti-avoidance measures could affect sensible and legitimate asset 
planning;  
• anti-avoidance rules complicate and slow down estate administration and add cost to the 
detriment of beneficiaries;  
• wealthy people employ lawyers and accountants to devise arrangements to get around 
anti-avoidance provisions; not only does this create industries specialising in evading the 
law, but it means that only those without the means to circumvent the law are caught. 
It is very difficult to answer the argument that having put rules in place to ensure provision 
for surviving spouses/partners and minor children, some protection is needed to ensure that 
those provisions are not easily avoided. In New Zealand we have for many years had anti-
avoidance provisions in place to back up laws in areas such as bankruptcy, company 
liquidation and relationship property.418 
III Section 88(2) 
Under the Matrimonial Property Act 1963 the personal representative of a deceased spouse 
could bring a claim without leave to establish the interests of the spouses in matrimonial 
property.419 The leading case on this was Irvine v Public Trustee420 where the Public Trustee 
commenced proceedings under the Matrimonial Property Act 1963 with the express purpose 
of bringing part of jointly owned property (which would otherwise have passed by 
survivorship) into an estate so that a family protection claim could be made by children of the 
deceased’s previous marriage. An application to strike out the proceedings was dismissed so 
that the determination of the beneficial ownership of assets could be brought to trial. 
Included amongst the 2001 amendments to the Property (Relationships) Act 1976 was s 88(2) 
which authorises the personal representative of a deceased spouse or de facto partner, with 
                                          
415 N Peart, M Briggs and M Henaghan (eds) Relationship Property on Death (Thomson Brookers, Wellington, 
2004) at [10.9]. 
416  Scottish Law Commission, above n 407, at [4.13]. 
417  Property (Relationships) Act 1976, s 88(2).  
418  For example Property (Relationships) Act 1976, ss 44-44D. 
419  WM Patterson Law of Family Protection and Testamentary Promises (3rd ed, LexisNexis, Wellington, 
2004) at [14.3].  
420  Irvine v Public Trustee [1989] 1 NZLR 67 (CA); see also Poppe v Grose [1982] 1 NZLR 209 (CA) 
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the leave of the court, to apply for an order under s 25(1)(a) of the same Act; that is, an order 
determining the respective shares of spouses or partners in relationship property or dividing 
the relationship property. The leading case is Public Trust v Whyman421 where Public Trust 
was appointed personal representative so that it could sever the joint ownership of assets and 
bring a half share into the deceased’s estate to be made available for a family protection 
claim. 
Section 88(2) is an anti-avoidance provision. It has been used primarily to prevent the 
survivorship rule for joint assets from defeating family protection claims. As noted in 
Whyman,422 the primary reason for allowing claims by a personal representative is to address 
situations of the type presented in cases such as Irvine v Public Trustee .  In the Whyman case 
William Young J stated:423 
The putting of substantial assets into joint names was, on the affidavits, effected with a 
full awareness of the consequences. The consequences for the children were obvious. The 
cancellation of the life insurance policy would appear to have been intended to remove 
the possibility of the children taking anything from the estate. So on the limited facts we 
have, it is open to inference that Mr Russell sought to structure his affairs to avoid 
fulfilling what would otherwise have been his moral duty as that term is applied in family 
protection litigation, and to defeat what would otherwise have been the statutory rights of 
his children associated with the breach of duty. 
And:424 
As is apparent, these seem to us to be the type of circumstances which were envisaged by 
the legislature when it enacted s 88(2).  So we would have thought that the Public Trust 
would have very reasonable prospects of obtaining leave under s 88(2) to commence 
proceedings. Indeed, for the moment, we can see no reason why leave would not be 
granted. 
Clearly Parliament saw the need to prevent will-makers from evading their obligations under 
the Family Protection Act 1955 and creating serious injustice by the simple expedient of 
putting assets into joint ownership. Nothing has occurred since 2001 to indicate that this 
protection is no longer needed; indeed there have been a number of cases on s 88(2).425 
IV Leave 
Prior to the Property (Relationships) Amendment Act 2001 personal representatives did not 
need to get leave of the court to apply for division of relationship property. The original Bill 
made no allowance for personal representatives to apply but this was added at the last minute, 
along with the requirement for leave. The requirement for leave creates unnecessary 
problems such as the interpretation and application of the term “serious injustice” and the 
                                          
421  Public Trust v Whyman [2005] 2 NZLR 696 (CA); see also Morgan v Public Trust HC Auckland CIV 2006-
404-003636, 20 November 2006. 
422  Public Trust v Whyman , above n 421, at [48]. 
423  Ibid, at [50].  
424  Ibid, at [51]. 
425  Re Williams; Kinniburgh v Williams [2004] 2 NZLR 132; [2004] NZFLR 467; Public Trust v Whyman 
above n 421; Morgan v Public Trust above n 421; Public Trust v Relph HC Auckland CIV 2008-404-1922, 
15 October 2008. 
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limitation of this power to “personal representatives” as opposed to “trustees”.426 Why should 
the personal representative have to get leave to apply for division of relationship property 
when the surviving spouse or partner does not? The surviving spouse has this advantage over 
the personal representatives of the deceased’s estate for no apparent reason.   
The background to this was the report of the Working Group on Matrimonial Property and 
Family Protection  which stated that the broad object of the reform was to ensure that the 
survivor was no worse off than a spouse whose marriage had come to an end during the 
parties’ joint lives. 427  The report stated:428  
It does not follow that the estate should be able to sue the survivor to ensure that the 
survivor is left with no more than his or her share of the matrimonial property.  Where 
one spouse has died the contest is no longer between two partners who take their share 
and then go their different ways.  It is between the survivor of a marriage and the 
beneficiaries under a will or on intestacy or potential family protection claimants. 
However, as commentators have pointed out,429 this is not consistent with the Act’s object of 
equality between the parties to a relationship.  It advantages the surviving spouse or partner to 
the detriment of the deceased and his or her estate. The New Zealand Law Commission in its 
Draft Succession (Adjustment) Act departs from this proposal; proposed cl 10(2) allows the 
administrator of a deceased person by application to the court to initiate a property division 
against a partner of that deceased or against the administrator of such a partner.430 Leave is 
not required.  
V Variation of Trusts 
If this exception to testamentary freedom is accepted because of the importance of providing 
for a spouse, partner or minor children, it is logical to extend this protection to the common 
situation where assets are transferred into a family trust with the intention or effect of 
avoiding family protection claims.  It is difficult to see how, from a claimant’s point of view, 
this is very different from a transfer to joint ownership. At present a personal representative 
can apply under the Property (Relationships) Act 1976 to set aside a disposition of property if 
its purpose is to defeat the claims or rights of any other person under the same Act.431 Leave 
of the court is not required and the meaning of “purpose” will be discussed shortly. 
Under s 182 of the Family Proceedings Act 1980 the Family or High Court on the making of 
an order dissolving a marriage or civil union, can inquire into certain settlements (or trusts) 
made by the parties and make orders varying the terms of the settlement or trust.  This section 
is based on old English legislation and has been used in New Zealand over recent years on 
marriage dissolution to make provision for one of the parties to the former marriage and 
                                          
426  N Peart, M Briggs and M Henaghan (eds), above n 415, at [3.1]; also New Zealand Law Society “Trusts 
Conference Booklet” (2005) at 51. 
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430  New Zealand Law Commission Succession Law: A Succession (Adjustment) Act (LC R 39, August 1997) at 
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431   See s 44; N Peart, M Briggs and M Henaghan (eds), above n 415, at [10.4.1]. 
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children of the marriage from a trust or settlement established before or after the marriage.432 
Section 182 applies on death if an order of presumption of death of a spouse has been made 
under s 32 of the Family Proceedings Act 1980;433 however it is most often invoked where a 
dissolution order has been made. The personal representative of either party to the marriage 
or civil union can apply for a review of an order under s 182.434 
If power to vary a trust and provide for certain parties is available on dissolution of a 
marriage or civil union, is there any reason it should not be available on death? Why should a 
surviving spouse, civil union or de facto partner be worse off? Like s 88(2) of the Property 
(Relationships) Act 1976 it could prevent will-makers from avoiding their obligations by 
transferring assets to a discretionary family trust. If a deceased person has settled assets on a 
trust while alive, the court could vary that trust to satisfy a support claim; a modernised 
version of s 182 could be enacted which would apply to support claims. This proposal does 
not as such breach testamentary freedom; arguably it may reinforce testamentary freedom by 
making assets available on death. Following the Supreme Court decision in Ward v Ward435, 
s 182 is about expectations and thus does not restrict freedom while alive. 
Should any beneficiary under a will be entitled to apply, and thereby enlarge the estate?  In 
keeping with the importance of testamentary freedom and restricting the intervention of the 
court, applicants should be limited to those who are eligible for and make a support claim 
(including litigation guardians for minor claimants) and the personal representatives of the 
deceased’s estate. The powers in s 88(2) and the proposed power to vary a discretionary 
family trust would be available only to benefit a support claim by a surviving spouse, civil 
union or de facto partner and children, accepted children or grandchildren under 21 years of 
age436. The following factors would be taken into account by the presiding judge when 
making a decision: 
• the size of the estate; 
• the circumstances of the surviving spouse, partner,  children and accepted children; 
• competing claims; 
• other provisions made for any claimants or likely to be made by third parties; 
• the relationship between the deceased and the claimant. 
This power would be available as a backup where inadequate provision has been made for the 
claimant and there are insufficient assets in the estate to make adequate provision for the 
claimant.  
Giving judges discretionary powers to vary a trust is preferable to rules setting aside the 
transfers of assets to family trusts. Problems arise where transfers were made some years 
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before death and parties have acted in reliance on this and altered their positions. There are 
also valuation issues such as the date to be used for valuation of the benefits conferred, and 
the accuracy of valuations obtained some years after the event. How do you apportion 
subsequent increases in values, particularly where the transferee has carried out 
improvements? What happens if the transferee has sold the property and then bought and sold 
several times? Over longer periods the dates and details of gifts may become “sketchy”. 437 
VI Intention v Effect 
The distinction between “intention” and “effect” is critical and this was recognised when the 
Property (Relationships) Act 1976 was passed. Section 44 empowers the Family Court to set 
aside a disposition if it was made with the intention of or in order to defeat a claim under the 
Act. However, proving the requisite intention of defeating a claim has proven to be a major 
stumbling block.438 For example in Coles v Coles439 the claim failed because the court 
decided that the intention behind the disposition to a company trust structure was to save tax 
and benefit children of the marriage rather than to defeat a claim.  In Gerbic v Gerbic440 the 
claim failed because Mr Gerbic’s intention in transferring significant assets into two family 
trusts was to avoid income tax and death duties.  In Stewart v Stewart441 the claim failed 
because the intention in transferring the family home to a family trust was to avoid creditors.   
In contrast, s 44C of the same Act empowers the Family Court to make compensatory orders 
if a disposition to a trust has the “effect” of defeating the applicant’s rights. For some time 
there was uncertainty about the meaning of this requirement.442 Some courts adopted a 
narrow approach to avoid undermining carefully planned asset protection schemes while 
others interpreted the requirement widely. However, in Nation v Nation443 the Court of 
Appeal took a broad approach deciding that the meaning of “defeat” is mechanical; it does 
not turn on bad faith or improper motive. While s 44C has had limited effect, that is largely 
because of the very limited range of remedies available under the section, and in particular, 
the inability to pay capital from the trust to the applicant.444 If, however, there are wide 
powers of variation, as there are currently under s 182 (including the power to pay out 
capital), this type of provision could be very effective. 
Recently in Regal Castings Ltd v G M & G N Lightbody,445 the meaning of intent to defraud 
was analysed in the context of s 60 Property Law Act 1952 and given a broader 
interpretation.  This has been extended to s 44 of the Property (Relationships) Act 1976.446 
However, in light of the historically narrow interpretation of s 44, the power to vary trusts 
should be available if a disposition of property was made with the intention or has the effect 
of defeating a claim under the proposed code. This raises the question whether the disposition 
should be set aside or assets resettled or whether (in line with s 44C) the court’s powers 
should be limited to awarding compensation. Setting aside transfers of money or property can 
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create a number of problems which I will discuss shortly.  Resettlement of assets can have tax 
and other implications 447 and involves the exercise of trustees’ discretions. There is doubt 
that courts are appropriate bodies to exercise that type of discretion. However, there are no 
such issues awarding compensation (including payments of capital and income) from the 
trust which received the disposition, and compensation should be paid where the transfer of 
assets to a trust was made with the intention or has the effect of defeating claims under the 
proposed inheritance code. 
VII Proposed Powers 
What specific powers should the court have? Currently under s 44C the court can require 
payment of a sum of money, and the transfer of property from one party to another out of 
separate or relationship property, and it can order payment of the whole or part of the income 
of the trust either for a specified period or until a specific amount has been paid. However the 
court cannot order payment of trust income if adequate compensation is available by ordering 
payment of money or the transfer of a property out of separate or relationship property. The 
powers of the court under s 44C are restricted to payment of trust income and then only if 
other adequate compensation is not available. I propose that the court be given power to make 
and satisfy support awards by varying  a trust into which the deceased will-maker has 
transferred assets or property and the power of variation will include a discretion to order 
payments of capital or income and the transfer of property or assets from the trust to the 
estate or to a successful applicant. The power should also extend to reducing or writing off a 
debt owed to the trust by a successful applicant. 
The wording of s 182 has created a number of problems and will need to be modified if used 
as a model for variation of trusts on death. As pointed out by the High Court in W v W448 
s 182 jurisdiction is a relic from the days when property rights were adjusted between 
separated spouses under what was known as the ancillary relief provision in the court’s 
divorce jurisdiction. The origins of s 182 in New Zealand go back to s 37 of the Divorce and 
Matrimonial Causes Act 1867.449 
In light of this long legislative history it is not surprising that there have been problems in the 
interpretation of the section against the backdrop of the Property (Relationships) Act 1976.  
The recent cases of Williams v Williams450 and Ward v Ward451 illustrate how applications 
under s 182 have increasingly been used to get around the limitations on the effectiveness of 
the Property (Relationships) Act 1976 when assets are held in trust.  In X v X452 the Court of 
Appeal added that s 182 was a route available to the courts when there was little, if any, 
relationship property available for division. However, as the Supreme Court pointed out in 
Ward v Ward:453  
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The fundamental starting point is that under s 182 there is no entitlement to a 50/50 or 
any other fractional division of the trust property. Nor is there any presumption in favour 
of a 50/50 or any other fractional division. 
Other specific problems that have arisen in the interpretation and application of s 182 include:   
• Interpretation of the words “post-nuptial settlement made on the parties” and whether the 
term “the parties” encompasses either of them or whether the settlement must be made 
on both of them.454 
• Does the expression “ante-nuptial settlement” include all trusts set up before a marriage, 
or is it restricted to settlements referable to the particular marriage?455 
• Section 182 is only available to spouses and civil union partners on dissolution; it is not 
available to de facto partners, nor is it available to spouse or civil union partners on 
separation. 
• Section 182(6) prevents a court from using its powers to defeat or vary an agreement 
made under Part 6 of the Property (Relationships) Act 1976. 
• There is a lack of guidance on how the court should exercise its powers. 
Some of these problems can be avoided by careful drafting but it will also be important to set 
out clearly the purpose of the proposed provision. The intention is to satisfy a support award 
by varying a trust into which the deceased transferred assets while alive. Remedies available 
to the court will include paying capital or income or transferring property or assets from the 
trust to a successful applicant or to the estate.  
I propose that when making an application for support, those eligible to make such a claim 
apply at the same time for variation of the trust into which the deceased made a disposition of 
property or assets. The right to apply should extend to litigation guardians of minor 
applicants and the personal representatives of the estate. Should there be a time limit on such 
applications? There is no time limit as such in s 182 although it is limited to “post” or “ante” 
nuptial settlements. The Insolvency Act 2006 refers to gifts between two and five years 
before bankruptcy adjudication.456 There should be a time limit, and I propose that the limit 
be five years in line with the Insolvency Act 2006 provisions and to enable capture of 
dispositions in a reasonable period before death.  
Should transfers of assets or money by a will-maker while alive, to companies or third parties 
other than a trust, be set aside or taken into account? Setting aside the will-maker’s transfers 
of assets or money can create problems in the following situations: 
• where the transfer was effected some years before death and subsequently there have 
been significant changes in the value of money or property; 
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• where the recipient has acted in good faith to alter his or her position in reliance upon the 
ownership of the asset or funds, for example, by improving the property or subdividing 
it; 
• where the transfer may have been in full or partial satisfaction of services or other 
consideration provided by the recipient; 
• where the personal or financial circumstances of the will-maker or recipient have 
changed significantly since the transfer of the assets in question; for example, the 
recipient may have developed serious health problems; 
• where the assets transferred by the will-maker have been sold by the recipient and there 
have been subsequent purchases and sales so that tracing the original fund is impossible. 
As noted earlier in this chapter, similar rules in relation to hotchpot were abolished in New 
Zealand some years ago for these reasons and it is doubtful that they would work today. It 
should be noted also that when transferring assets to a trust, the common arrangement is that 
the asset is “sold” but the purchase price is never paid because it is gifted by the settlor or 
transferor to the trust. Gift duty exemption is not available when an asset is sold to a company 
or transferred to a person who is not a close relative or very close friend because there is no 
“natural love and affection”.457 
Alternatively, should the transfer of assets to a particular person be taken into account in the 
event of a claim for further support from an estate? At present under the Family Protection 
Act 1955 where there are competing claims, provision made for certain family members, 
even through a discretionary family trust, is a relevant factor in the exercise of the court’s 
discretion.458 However, it must be remembered that under the proposals in this thesis these 
arrangements would be taken into account only where there are competing claims by a 
spouse, partner, children, grandchildren or accepted children under 21 years of age which are 
“support” claims as recommended in chapter 4 of this thesis. 
VIII Australian Legislation 
In New South Wales "Notional Estate" provisions have been enacted to deter avoidance of 
family provision claims by parties divesting property before death.  The timing of the 
transaction and whether the transaction is supported by proper consideration are critical 
questions.  The legislation is complex but in summary it works along these lines:459 
• A person enters into a transaction which causes property to be held by another or creates 
a trust over property (a "relevant property transaction"). 
• Examples of relevant property transactions include powers of appointment, joint 
tenancies, life insurance funds or schemes and transfers of other property or assets. 
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• The court can designate property as notional estate where a relevant property transaction 
took effect within three years before the date of death with the intention of denying or 
limiting family provision or took effect or is to take effect on or after the deceased's 
death. 
A particularly important issue in Australia is the interaction between superannuation death 
benefit claims and family provision claims. The death of a superannuation member will 
usually result in payment of a death benefit and an increasing portion of Australians’ wealth 
is held in superannuation funds. Usually the terms of the relevant trust deed determine how 
the death benefit is paid out. In New South Wales the notional estate provisions allow 
account to be taken of the impact of funds received externally (for example from a 
superannuation scheme death benefit) when making family provision orders.460 
Should New Zealand follow this path and introduce notional estate provisions to deter 
alienation of assets or establishment of structures to avoid support claims? The argument in 
favour of this is that there is little point having rules of law that are easily evaded and if laws 
are easily evaded the legal system is brought into disrepute.461 The arguments against the 
notional estate provisions are: 
• The Australian rules are very complex and have been enacted because disproportionate 
shares of individuals' assets are held in superannuation funds; this is not the case in New 
Zealand. 
• The rules are based on outdated estate duty provisions and there has been criticism that 
the rules are designed for estate duty collection, not avoidance of family provision 
claims.462 
• Problems have arisen with the timing of transactions and whether there is proper 
consideration; how far to go back and what constitutes adequate or partially adequate 
consideration.463 
• Problems have arisen where the original transferee has died and orders are sought 
against a subsequent transferee or transferees.464 
• Are omissions or failures to take opportunities such as failure to exercise share options 
caught?  
• Is it realistic or practical to attempt to bring into the net of "notional estate" an increasing 
range of "assets" both in New Zealand and in overseas countries which may in the case 
of overseas assets be subject to estate duty or stamp duty, or other rules of law such as 
the fixed share entitlements common in Europe? 
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While superficially attractive, the Australian experience is that the notional estate rules are 
complicated, arbitrary and difficult to enforce.  This mirrors the New Zealand experience 
with the imposition of estate duty up until 1991; there were notional estate rules in the Estate 
and Gift Duties Act 1968 but they were only marginally effective. Hotchpot, which is similar 
in many respects, has been tried and rejected in New Zealand and most of the Australian 
states. While notional estate provisions are certainly worthy of consideration, it is more likely 
that they will result in applications attempting to claw back assets that organised will-makers 
and their lawyers have gone to considerable lengths to remove from reach. It is relevant to 
note also that while a Code is intended by its nature to be comprehensive a code does not 
necessarily preclude all possible causes of action between the parties.465 
IX Draft Clause 
In light of these problems, and bearing in mind the different context in which an inheritance 
code would operate, a provision along the following lines is proposed: 
“Section …   Variation of Trusts 
1. Where:  
(a) in the period of five years prior to death the deceased has transferred, disposed of 
or settled assets on trust (“the trust”); and  
(b) this transfer, disposition or settlement was made with the intention or has the 
effect of defeating or reducing a support claim under this Act 
the court may in its discretion and on application vary the trust (or any other trusts or 
settlements into which the assets of the trust have since been transferred) to make 
provision for support claims under this Act. 
2. An application under this section may be made at the same time or after a support claim 
is made under this Act against the estate of a deceased person by any of the following: 
(a) an eligible surviving spouse, eligible surviving civil union partner or eligible 
surviving de facto partner of the deceased; or  
(b) an eligible child or litigation guardian for an eligible child; or  
(c) the personal representatives of the deceased or trustees of the deceased’s estate. 
3. Any application under this section must be made within 12 months after the grant of 
administration except with the leave of the court.  
4. When exercising its discretion under this section and without limiting its powers, the 
Court may take into account some or all of the following: 
(a) the extent of the assets of the deceased’s estate; 
                                          






(b) the extent of the assets of the trust; 
(c) the circumstances of the surviving spouse, partner, eligible children or eligible 
grandchildren of the deceased; 
(d) competing claims; 
(e) other provisions made for any claimants or likely to be made by third parties;  
(f) the relationship between the deceased and the claimant; and 
(g) whether an agreement under Part 6 of the Property (Relationships) Act 1976 has 
been completed by the deceased. 
5. Without limiting its powers the Court may make all or some of the following orders: 
(a) payment of a sum or sums of money (whether capital or income) from the trust to 
the deceased’s estate, any person or persons or any other trust; 
(b) transfer of property or any asset from the trust to the deceased’s estate, or any 
person or persons or any other trust; 
(c) payment of the whole or any part of the income from the trust for a specified time 
or until a specified amount has been paid; 





I Current Position 
Currently under New Zealand law it is possible to contract out of obligations under the Law 
Reform (Testamentary Promises) Act 1949 but it is not possible, during the lifetime of the 
will-maker, to contract out of, or enter into, an agreement not to make a claim under the 
Family Protection Act 1955.466 It is common practice to compromise or settle a family 
protection claim once the will-maker has died and without issuing proceedings; this occurs 
frequently by deed of family arrangement. Despite this practice, there is some doubt whether 
such agreements are binding, void or voidable. Patterson discusses this issue in detail, and 
while he expresses the view that such compromises are binding, he concludes that the only 
satisfactory solution is clarification either judicially or legislatively of the right to enter into 
after-death compromises.467 It is also possible to contract out of the death provisions in Part 8 
of the Property (Relationships) Act 1976 in relation to relationship property.468  
The policy or rationale behind the prohibition on contracting out of family protection claims 
is said to be based on public policy and is long-standing.469 In Gardiner v Boag470 the Court 
pointed out that it would not be fair if the compromise was agreed when the estate was small 
and it later increased significantly in value as where for example the applicant's health 
subsequently deteriorated significantly. The rule applied also in Australia and the United 
Kingdom until legislative changes were made.471 
In the United Kingdom since 1975 on granting a decree of divorce or nullity or judicial 
separation the Court if it considers it just, and if the parties agree, can order that either party 
to the marriage shall not be entitled on death to apply for an order under the Act.472 In New 
Zealand once a dissolution order is made, former spouses cannot make family protection 
claims because they are no longer “spouses” and do not fall within the list of potential 
claimants.473 In New South Wales the law was changed in 1982474 to enable a person to 
release his or her rights to apply for further provision. The release in New South Wales is 
subject to Court approval and before approving the release the Court will consider various 
matters.475 Securing a release of rights under the New South Wales Family Provision Act 
1982 is a course that has arisen in the context of property settlements on divorce where the 
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object has been to tie up matters once and for all between divorcing couples.476 For an 
illustration of the working of this section in practice see Singer v Berghouse (No 2).477 
The issue has also arisen in New Zealand in the context of matrimonial or relationship 
property settlements. In Re Hilton478 Dr and Mrs Hilton resolved matrimonial property 
matters between themselves on separation but Dr Hilton died before the marriage was 
dissolved. Mrs Hilton made a successful family protection claim on the basis that she was 
still Dr Hilton's spouse at his death and his obligations to her on death were different from 
and additional to matrimonial property entitlements on separation. It was not possible for the 
couple to contract out of their entitlements under the Family Protection Act 1955. The 
problem also arises where a couple separate, resolving relationship property issues but forget 
or fail to change wills that provide for each other. If a dissolution order is made, provision for 
a spouse in a will made before dissolution is void.479 If one party dies before a dissolution 
order is made, the provisions in the will in favour of the estranged spouse still apply. 
Similarly, estranged spouses and civil union partners retain rights on intestacy unless or until 
a separation or dissolution order is made.480 Making a new will is easily overlooked. 
It is anomalous that parties can contract out of relationship property issues once and for all 
but not contract out of family protection claims or intestacy rights on separation.  The 
existence and success of a claim depends upon whether the parties obtain a separation order, 
get around to dissolving their marriage or, in some cases, remember to change their wills.  
Clearly the legislatures in the United Kingdom and New South Wales recognised some years 
ago that when they separate “judicially” a couple should be able to contract out of their rights 
to make a family protection claim on death. This is mirrored in New Zealand in respect of 
relationship property rights but not family protection claims or intestacy rights. 
There is one further anomaly which should be noted. A separation order negates entitlements 
on intestacy;481 however, such an order does not prevent a family protection claim: s 26(2) 
specifically preserves family protection claims even if a separation order has been made. 
II Other Areas 
A person's ability to enter into agreements to make specific provision in respect of his or her 
estate while alive has long been recognised in New Zealand in other ways. A contract to 
leave property by will in a certain way if not carried out, can be enforced by an action for 
damages against the administrator of the estate of the deceased covenantor.482 Where the 
agreement relates to specific assets or a specific sum of money enforcement can be by way of 
specific performance.483 If the deceased dies insolvent the person with whom the agreement 
is made can prove the claim in the deceased's estate as a creditor along with other estate 
creditors.484 Mutual wills have also been recognised in New Zealand, Australia and the 
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United Kingdom for many years.485 The New Zealand Wills Act 2007 specifically authorises 
mutual wills;486 that is where two or more people contract between themselves to maintain 
and not to revoke wills without notice to the other.487 Property of a third party which is 
subject to a special (as opposed to a "general") power of appointment by the deceased by will 
is not subject to the provisions of the Family Protection Act 1955.488 A donatio mortis 
causa489 is recognised in the Family Protection Act 1955;490 although the property involved 
in the “donatio” is subject to the provisions of that Act. 
ssment.  
                                         
It is possible for spouses to enter into voluntary maintenance agreements which are binding 
according to the law of contract.491  Acceptance of such an agreement by the Commissioner 
of Inland Revenue does not stop a party from seeking a court order for spousal maintenance 
under the Act.492  Similarly it is possible to enter into voluntary agreements in respect of 
child support which are binding according to the rules of the law of contract but do not 
prevent an application for a formula asse 493
When a couple separates and resolves relationship property matters they do not expect that a 
family protection claim or intestacy rights will be available to the survivor if one of them dies 
before the marriage is dissolved. If they sign an agreement under s 21 of the Property 
(Relationships) Act 1976 resolving relationship property matters they usually expect and 
intend that this is in full and final settlement of all claims between them and do not realise  
that a potential family protection claim is left unresolved. Similarly if at the commencement 
of a relationship a couple sign a contracting out agreement which, preserves certain items of 
property and any inheritance that either subsequently receives as separate property, they 
would often want to contract out of obligations under the Family Protection Act 1955 and on 
intestacy (regardless of whether they separate or not). At present this is not possible in New 
Zealand. 
As outlined in the Summary of Key Principles in chapter 5 of this thesis, my proposal is that 
in line with the current law in relation to de facto partners, the right to make a family 
protection or support claim will come to an end once a couple legally separates. This would 
apply to spouses, civil union partners and de facto partners. I propose also that this extend to 
intestacy; that is, rights on intestacy cease if spouses, civil union partners or de facto partners 
legally separate. In addition, even if a couple does not separate, they should still be able to 
contract out of support claims on the death of either of them. 
III Proposed Change  
The Family Protection Act 1955 does not specifically exclude contracting out of claims; but 
decisions made many years ago held that public policy overrode any such agreement. In the 
 
485   Lewis v Cotton [2001] 2 NZLR 21; also Fisher v Mansfield [1997] 2 NZLR 230. 
486   Wills Act 2007, s 30. 
487   N Kelly, C Kelly and G Kelly Garrow and Kelly’s Law of Trusts and Trustees (6th ed, LexisNexis, 
Wellington, 2005) at [15.19]. 
488   See Nosworthy v Nosworthy (1906) 26 NZLR 285; also Patterson, above n 466, at [5.3]. 
489   A gift that takes effect on death - see Nicky Richardson Nevill’s Law of Trusts, Wills and Administration 
(9th ed, LexisNexis, Wellington, 2004) at [2.4.3]. 
490   Family Protection Act 1955, s 2(5). 
491   Child Support Act 1991, s 62(2). 
492   Section 66. 




cases of spouses and civil union partners the right to make a claim is completely removed if 
the marriage or civil union is dissolved.494  In the case of de facto partners there is no claim at 
all if the couple were not living together at the time one of them dies, or the relationship is 
one of short duration (except in specific circumstances).495 It is anomalous that the existence 
of a claim depends upon whether either or both of the spouses or civil union partners gets 
around to dissolving the marriage or civil union before death. If the parties are able to settle 
property rights while alive, subject to the requirements of the Property (Relationships) Act 
1976 it is difficult to understand why they cannot settle inheritance rights after receiving 
independent legal advice. It is time that New Zealand follows the lead of England and New 
South Wales in this respect.  
In line with England and New South Wales it should be possible in New Zealand for a 
married couple and civil union or de facto partners to contract out of a family protection 
claim against each other, and entitlements on the intestacy of the other party, in the same way 
that this can be done under the Property (Relationships) Act 1976. In line also with the 
Property (Relationships) Act 1976 the parties should be able to do this at any time and not 
just on separation. Each would have to receive independent legal advice before contracting 
out and the independent witnessing lawyer would need to certify that matters have been fully 
explained. It could even be incorporated in an agreement under s 21 of the Property 
(Relationships) Act 1976. It should also be possible for a court to make orders to this effect if 
the parties are in agreement. The fact that the financial circumstances or health of one of the 
parties may later change significantly is largely irrelevant. Once the couple separates, it 
should be possible to sever all ties in respect of property and assets. Subsequent changes are 
not relevant to division of property on separation and it is difficult to see why they should be 
relevant to inheritance. Resolution of support claims and intestacy rights on separation is 
consistent with the clean break principle and the desirability of certainty.  
It can be argued that because I am proposing that support claims for spouses and partners 
should be designed to enable them to enjoy a reasonable, independent standard of living until 
reasonably able to achieve this, they may not be able to predict future events and therefore 
should not be able to contract out of their rights. However, on separation spouses and partners 
would still be able to claim adult or spousal maintenance and also make an economic 
disparity claim496 in respect of relationship property. Once these issues are resolved there 
would be no potential family protection or support claims; most expect this anyway.  
IV Children and Others 
The position with respect to children and grandchildren is different.  In this thesis it has been 
proposed that only minor or non-adult children, accepted children and grandchildren should 
have family protection or support claims. If so, minor children, accepted children and 
grandchildren would not be able to contract out of their rights; there would always be 
concerns that they do not understand the effects and implications of giving up their rights or 
that they were subjected to undue influence. If, as I recommend, claims by minor children, 
accepted children and grandchildren are based upon a duty to maintain that child, it is 
inappropriate to attempt to contract out of such a right. The existence of a voluntary child 
support agreement does not prevent an application for a formula assessment. Therefore the 
                                          
494  That is because they are no longer spouses or civil union partners under s 3 Family Protection Act 1955. 
495  Sections 3(aa) and 4A. 




ability to contract out of a support claim should be limited to married, civil union or de facto 
couples who have obtained independent legal advice, and the terms of the agreement 
recorded in writing 
I have also recommended that claims by parents and relatives (other than minor children, 
grandchildren and accepted children) be removed. If so, there is no need for such parties to 
contract out of support claims. However if this is not accepted, I recommend that such adult 
relatives, upon receiving independent legal advice, should be able to contract out of support 
claims by a written agreement. I envisage that such an agreement would need to be witnessed 
and certified by a lawyer in similar fashion to an agreement under s 21 Property 
(Relationships) Act 1976. In addition the court should be given specific powers to ratify such 
arrangements. 
V Summary  
In summary, what is proposed is that a spouse, civil union or de facto partner, after receiving 
independent legal advice, should be able to sign a binding agreement under which he or she 
irrevocably waives all rights to make a support claim against the estate of another person and 
all entitlements on the intestacy of that person. I would not recommend that this extend to any 
potential benefits under the will of another person because that is easily effected by the will-
maker changing his or her will or the beneficiary disclaiming or waiving any gift under a 
will. If once the will-maker has died, a beneficiary wishes to waive his or her entitlements as 
beneficiary under the will, the beneficiary should be required to obtain independent legal 
advice before signing the waiver.  
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Chapter 9 
OUTLINE AND CONTENT OF THE PROPOSED CODE 
I Contents 
This chapter: 
• sets out the principles underpinning the proposed inheritance code based upon the 
discussion in the previous chapters; 
• discusses what is to be included; 
• outlines the suggested parts and subparts of the proposed code; 
• drafts some key definitions and sections of the proposed code. 
II Key Principles 
 The key principles derived from previous chapters are: 
• The importance of freedom of testation; the properly expressed wishes497 of a will-
maker should be given primacy. 
• Judicial intervention in inheritance law should be limited to situations where it is 
essential. 
• Relationship property claims should remain as they are currently. 
• “Support” claims (as defined in the proposed code) against an estate should be limited 
to spouses, civil union partners and de facto partners, living with the deceased at the 
date of death and in the case of de facto partners, excluding those in short duration 
relationship; and children, grandchildren, stepchildren, whangai or accepted children 
under 21 years of age. 
• The priorities of competing claims would be clearly set out.  
• Testamentary promises and other similar common law or equitable claims will be 
replaced by “contribution claims” which will be defined in the code. 
• In the cases of grandchildren, stepchildren, whangai and accepted children, support 
claims should be limited to those who were members of the deceased’s family. 
• Support claims should stand in priority behind estate debts, estate administration debts, 
claims based on contract, fiduciary obligations and contributions498 and relationship 
property claims. 
                                          
497  Wills affected by lack of testamentary capacity or undue influence would continue to be invalid. 
498  See chapter 5. 
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• Support claims of spouses, de facto and civil union partners should have priority over, 
but should not exclude, support claims by minor children, grandchildren or accepted 
children. 
• Competing support claims will be determined by a judge whose discretion will be 
guided by a list of relevant factors set out in the code. 
• The entitlements of spouses, civil union partners and de facto partners (other than those 
of short duration) on intestacy should have priority and will receive a statutory legacy 
set initially at $350,000. 
• Support claims by spouses, civil union and de facto partners should not exceed the 
statutory legacy and will be such as to enable the claimant to enjoy a reasonable 
standard of living until reasonably able to attain an independent standard of living.  
• In the case of minor children, grandchildren or accepted children, support claims should 
be such as to maintain the child in a reasonable way and to a reasonable standard and so 
far as practical educated and assisted towards attainment of economic independence. 
• The restrictions on dealing with Maori Land interests should be retained. 
• The Family Court will have primary jurisdiction under the inheritance code, but 
complex issues can be referred to the High Court. 
• The Crown should be able to waive its entitlements in the event of bona vacantia in 
favour of dependants of the deceased.  
• To prevent avoidance of will-makers’ obligations the court will have powers to make 
orders in respect of jointly-owned assets and assets settled by will-makers on trusts 
while alive. 
• The code will, as far as possible, include all succession and inheritance laws to the 
intent that all inheritance rules can be found in one place. 
• Causes of action based upon contract, tort, fiduciary obligations, contributions and 
constructive trusts will be either included in the proposed code or preserved. 
III What is to be Included in the Code? 
As described in chapter 2 of this thesis, a code is comprehensive by definition. Therefore, the 
starting point for an inheritance code is that all relevant statutes and common law rules 
should be included. There is really no issue for stand-alone statutes such as the Succession 
(Homicide) Act 2007 or the Wills Act 2007. They should be repealed and included in the new 
code. Other current statutes that will come into this category are the Law Reform Act 1936, 
Law Reform (Testamentary Promises) Act 1949, Family Protection Act 1955, Simultaneous 
Deaths Act 1958 and Administration Act 1969.  
It is more difficult where inheritance provisions are included in a statute dealing with other 
issues. For example, Part 8 of the Property (Relationships) Act 1976 deals with the division 
of relationship property on death and while similar to the rules on separation, it does stand on 
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its own. For ease of access and to ensure comprehensiveness, the best course is to include 
Part 8 of the Property (Relationships) Act 1976 in the proposed inheritance code. 
Dealing with each of the other statutes listed in chapter 1 of this thesis, and bearing in mind 
the desirability of having succession and inheritance laws in one place, I propose: 
• Life Insurance Act 1908 contains only a few provisions relating to inheritance laws. 
Because of its age, the Act can be repealed and any provisions still relevant to 
inheritance laws can be incorporated in the proposed code.  
• Maori Trustee Act 1953: The Maori Trustee obtains few, if any, grants of 
administration, and it is timely to review whether this power should continue.  
• Adoption Act 1955 is relevant in terms of the effect of adoption orders on inheritance. 
These provisions should be contained in the proposed code.  
• Trustee Act 1956 relates primarily to trustees, not executors and administrators. The 
provisions relating just to estate administration should be transferred to the proposed 
code.  
• Estate and Gift Duties Act 1968: The sections relating to valuation and surrender of 
annuities and life interests should be transferred to the proposed code.  
• Status of Children Act 1969 does not appear to contain any provisions that need to be 
included in the proposed code.  
• Family Proceedings Act 1980: Sections dealing with recovery of child support and 
maintenance arrears from estates should be transferred to the proposed code. 
• Protection of Personal and Property Rights Act 1988: The provisions relating to court 
approval of wills should be transferred to the new code, together with similar 
provisions relating to minors. 
• Te Ture Whenua Maori Act 1993: I propose that the code contains a part dealing with 
Maori land and Maori interests on death.  
• Insolvency Act 2006: I propose that the current Part 6 of this Act be incorporated in the 
proposed code.  
• Property Law Act 2007: Provisions relating to the effect of death on interests in land 
should be incorporated in the proposed code.  
Another issue is whether the High Court Rules dealing with probate and grants of 
administration should remain within the High Court Rules or be inserted into the proposed 
code. It is important that the rules relating to all High Court proceedings should be found in 
one place; the same applies to the Family Court. If as proposed in chapter 6 of this thesis 
inheritance laws come under the jurisdiction of the Family Court, rules relating to probate 
and grants of estate administration should be included in the Family Court Rules.  
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One point which has not been discussed in this thesis is whether New Zealand should have a 
wills’ register. The intention is to make it easier to find out quickly if a person who has died 
has a will and if so, locate it. It will also be useful where a person lacks mental capacity and it 
is unclear whether he or she has a will and if so, whether it should be altered under the 
Protection of Personal and Property Rights Act 1988. Many European countries have national 
registers under the Basel Convention of 16 May 1972 and a voluntary register has been 
established in the United Kingdom under the name “Willdata”. It seems wise to provide in a 
code for the establishment of a national wills register.   
Included in the inheritance code will be principles of construction of wills. The word 
“principles” has been deliberately chosen rather than “rules” of construction because the 
word “rule” implies mandatory or strict regulation; “principle” does not. There is authority 
for the view that expressions such as “guides” or “canons of construction” are preferable 
terms.499 
IV Outline of Code 
A. Key Principles and Creation of Code. 
B. Key Definitions and Jurisdiction. 
C. Administration of Estates 
D. Regime on Intestacy and Partial Intestacy. 
E. Wills and Testamentary Documents. 
F. Approval of Wills for Minors and Persons under a disability. 
G. Disqualification of Killer. 
H. Rules for Interpretation of Wills. 
I. Relationship Property claims on Death. 
J. Support Claims, Contribution Claims and Priorities. 
K. Insolvent Estates. 
L. Preservation of common law doctrines on testamentary capacity and undue 
influence. 
M. Maori land and interests in Maori land. 
N. Anti-Avoidance Provisions. 
O. Preservation of Rights on Death 
P. Transitional Provisions. 
                                          
499  Nicky Richardson Nevill’s Law of Trusts, Wills and Administration (9th ed, LexisNexis, Wellington, 2004) 
at [16.1]. 
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V Draft Inheritance Act 
The Parliament enacts as follows: 
1. TITLE 
This Act is the Inheritance Act 2010 
2. COMMENCEMENT 




The principal purposes of this Act are to – 
a. replace and simplify the existing statutory equitable and common law rules 
and presumptions regulating inheritance and succession laws in New Zealand  
b. change certain aspects of inheritance law; 
c. codify inheritance law in New Zealand; 
d. make inheritance law more accessible to New Zealanders; 
e. simplify the administration of deceased estates in New Zealand; 
f. empower courts to make property division awards on death; 
g. empower Courts to make support awards where no sufficient provision has 
been made under the will or on the intestacy of a deceased person. 
4. PRINCIPLES 
This Act is to be interpreted with regard to the principles stated in this section. 
a. The rules relating to division of relationship property as set out in the Property 
(Relationships) Act 1976 apply and extend to the death of either or both 
partners to the relationship. 
b. A surviving spouse or partner who does not have sufficient resources to 
maintain a reasonable, independent standard of living is entitled to support 
from the deceased’s property until the survivor is reasonably able to achieve a 
reasonable, independent standard of living of his or her own. 
c. A minor child, grandchild, stepchild or accepted child of a deceased (including 
whangai) if a member of the deceased’s family is entitled to support which is 
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sufficient to educate and assist the child towards attainment of economic 
independence. 
d. Causes of action or rights of a deceased person or against a deceased person 
continue and are available after the person’s death.  
e. A person (the killer) who kills another person (the victim) by committing 
homicide must not benefit as a result of the victim’s death from the victim’s 
estate or other property arrangements. 
f. The right of a person to dispose of his or her property by will as he or she 
thinks fit. 
g. The right of a spouse, civil union or de facto partner to settle or contract out of 
rights in relation to relationship property, support claims and entitlements on 
intestacy. 
h. The primary position and rights of a surviving spouse, civil union partner, de 
facto partner (other than de facto partners of short duration) on intestacy. 
i. The importance of facilitating and promoting the retention, use, development 
and control of Maori land on death. 
j. The importance of clarity and the efficient administration of solvent and 
insolvent estates. 
k. The importance of the intention and wishes of a will-maker when interpreting 
or amending that will-maker’s will.  
5. APPLICATION 
a. This Act applies to all natural persons and also to the estates of persons who 
die with a will or without a will after 1 July 2010. 
b. This Act does not apply to Maori freehold land, Maori customary land or 
shares in a Maori incorporation as those terms are defined in s 6 Te Ture 
Whenua Maori Act 1993; nor does it apply to trusts incorporated under Part 12 
of Te Ture Whenua Maori Act 1993. 
c. This Act is subject to the Rules in Part IV subpart 5 of this Act as to movables 
and immovables and applicable system of law.   
6. ACT BINDS THE CROWN 
This Act binds the Crown. 
7. ACT TO BE A CODE 
Except as otherwise expressly provided in this Act, and in particular section … of this 
Act which preserves certain causes of action, this Act has effect as a code in place of 
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the rules and presumptions of the common law and equity to the extent that they apply 
to: 
a. the interpretation, signing and validity of wills; 
b. grants of administration; 
c. claims on deceased persons’ estates; 
d. entitlements and priorities of entitlements to the property of a deceased 
person; 
e. entitlements to Maori land on death; and  
f. insolvent deceased estates.  
8. INTERPRETATION  
For the purposes of this Act unless the context requires another meaning the following 
definitions apply: 
“Accepted child” or “accepted children” includes any child, grandchild, step-child, 
great-grandchild or whangai of a deceased person who was a member of the deceased’s 
family or for whom the deceased accepted responsibility in an enduring way as 
determined by the Court after taking into account: 
1. the nature of the relationship between the deceased and the child; 
2. the residential living arrangements of the child; 
3. the child’s inclusion in ordinary family life and activities; and 
4. financial and other support provided by the deceased.  
“Administration” and "Grant of Administration" mean an order of the Court granting 
probate, letters of administration or letters of administration with will annexed or an 
election to administer in respect of the assets and undertaking of a deceased person's 
estate. 
“bona vacantia” means property which no longer has an owner, does not pass to any 
person or entity under a will or on intestacy, and passes by default to the Crown.  
 “Children” means any child of a deceased whether born to the deceased or adopted by 
him or her and includes a child in his or her mother’s womb.  
 “Contribution Claim” means a claim that arises where the following circumstances 
occur: 
1. contributions made directly or indirectly by the claimant to the property of the 
deceased; and 
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2. a reasonable expectation by the claimant of an interest or part of an interest in 
property; and 
3. a reasonable expectation on the part of the deceased’s estate to yield an interest to 
the claimant.500  
“Court” means the Family Court of New Zealand. 
“De Facto Relationship” has the meaning prescribed by s 29A of the Interpretation Act 
1999. 
"Deathbed Gift" means a gift made in contemplation of and conditional on death. 
 “Disposition of Property” has the meaning set out in s 2(2) of the Estate and Gift 
Duties Act 1968. 
 “Domicile”: a person’s domicile is determined in accordance with the Domicile Act 
1976. 
 “Eligible child” means any child or accepted child of a deceased person aged under 21 
years at the date of the deceased’s death. 
“Eligible Surviving De Facto Partner” means a surviving de facto partner who was not 
living in a de facto relationship of short duration with the deceased at the date of death 
and was not legally separated from the deceased at the date of the deceased’s death. 
 “Eligible Surviving Spouse” and “Eligible Civil Union Partner” mean a surviving 
spouse and a surviving civil union partner respectively who were not legally separated 
from the deceased at the date of the deceased’s death. 
“Intestate” means a person or circumstance where a deceased person dies without 
leaving a valid will or testamentary document as defined in this Act and “Partial 
Intestacy” includes a person or circumstance where a person leaves a will but dies 
intestate as to some beneficial interest in his or her real or personal estate. 
"Issue" means any lineal descendant of a person to all degrees and whether adopted or 
natural born. 
“Legal Separation” means the parties to a marriage, civil union or de facto relationship:  
(a) are physically separated; and (b) one or both parties regard the relationship as at an 
end.501  
"Maori Land" means land within the meaning of Te Ture Whenua Maori Act 1993. 
 “Minor” means aged under 21 years of age at the date of the deceased’s death. 
                                          
500  See chapter 5 of this thesis. 
501  See N Peart, M Briggs and M Henaghan (eds) Relationship Property on Death (Thomson Brookers, 
Wellington, 2004) at [2.6].  
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“Partner” means a civil union partner or a person living with another person in a de 
facto relationship.  
“Personal Belongings and Effects” means, in relation to any person who has died, 
taonga, vehicles, boats, aircraft and their accessories, garden effects, horses, stable 
furniture and effects, domestic animals, plate, plated articles, linen, china, glass, books, 
pictures, prints, furniture, jewellery, articles of household or personal use or ornament, 
musical and scientific instruments and apparatus, wines, liqueurs and consumable 
stores which immediately before death were owned by him or her or in which 
immediately before death he or she had an interest but does not include money or 
security for money. 
 “Property” includes both real and personal property and any estate or interest in real or 
personal property, any debt or thing in action and any other right or interest but 
excludes: 
1. Maori Land within the meaning of Te Ture Whenua Maori Act 1993. 
2. Immovable property located outside New Zealand. 
“Relationship of Short Duration” has the meaning specified in s 2E of the Property 
(Relationships) Act 1976. 
 “Relationship Property” and “Separate Property” have the meanings set out in the 
Property (Relationships) Act 1976 at ss 8 to 10. 
“Statutory Legacy” means the sum of $350,000 as increased annually in accordance 
with the New Zealand consumer price index published by the Reserve Bank of New 
Zealand. 
The relationship of “Step-parent”, “Stepson” or “Stepdaughter” or any other 
relationship described by a word containing the prefix “step” may be established by 
civil union or by de facto relationship as well as by marriage. 
 “Support Award” means a support claim awarded by the court under this Act.  
“Surviving De Facto Partner” means a person living with the deceased in a de facto 
relationship at the date of death. 
“Surviving Spouse” or “Surviving Civil Union Partner” means a spouse or civil union 
partner who survives the deceased and whose marriage or civil union with the deceased 
had not been legally dissolved prior to the deceased’s death. 
"Testamentary Capacity" means having a full understanding of the extent of assets 
owned, full understanding of persons to whom moral obligations are owed and 
understanding the effect and implications of making a will. 
"Undue influence" means influence or coercion over a person (“A”) by another person 
which destroys A’s freedom of action or impairs A’s judgement.  
“Whangai” means any person adopted in accordance with Maori custom.  
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 Part II 
 Administration of Estates 
This Part would largely follow Parts 1, 1A and 2 of the Administration Act 1969 with the 
following additional clauses:  
• Surrender of annuities and life interests. 
• Causes of action subsisting on death. 
• Recovery of arrears of maintenance and child support. 
Part III 
Regime on Intestacy and Partial Intestacy 
This part would largely follow Part 3 of the Administration Act 1969 with the 
following additional clauses:  
• Distribution of estate where no surviving relatives - "bona vacantia". 
• Discretion of Crown where estate vests bona vacantia. 
• Distribution of Maori estates. 
• Disclaimer of interest under intestacy. 
• Contracting out of entitlements on intestacy. 
• Transitional provisions. 
 Part IV 
 Wills and Testamentary Documents 
 Subpart 1 
Definitions. 
The definitions would largely follow the definitions in the Wills Act 2007. 
Subpart 2 – making, changing and revoking wills 
This Part would largely follow Part 2 of the Wills Act 2007.  
Subpart 3 
Court Authorisation of Wills 
• Court may authorise minors to make, alter or revoke a will. 
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• Will of minor made under order of overseas court. 
• Court may make an order preventing a person from making a will. 
• Court may authorise a will to be made, altered or revoked for a person lacking 
testamentary capacity. 
• Procedure for court authorisation of wills. 
• Criteria for court’s authorisation of a will for a minor or person lacking 
testamentary capacity. 
• Execution of will pursuant to court order. 
• Separate representation of person lacking testamentary capacity. 
• Retention and recognition of court approved wills. 
Subpart 4 
Construction of wills 
• What property can be disposed of by will. 
• When a will has effect. 
• Effect of simultaneous deaths. 
• Failure of a disposition. 
• Extrinsic evidence in construction of wills. 
• Purpose of construction of wills. 
• Words construed in their ordinary sense. 
• Legal terms construed strictly. 
• Whole will to be considered. 
• Dictionary principle. 
• Eiusdem generis (meaning of the same kind or nature) rule. 
• Two possible constructions. 
• Conflicting provisions. 
• Presumption against intestacy. 
• Change in will-maker’s domicile. 
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• What a general disposition involves. 
• Delegation of will-maker’s powers. 
• Income on contingent, delayed or future dispositions. 
Subpart 5 
Overseas wills and overseas laws 
• Recognition of overseas or foreign wills. 
• Rules for validity of overseas wills. 
• Deciding system of law applicable to wills. 
• Deciding system of law applicable to movables and immovables. 
• Application of overseas law applicable to wills. 
Subpart 6 
Disqualification of killer and simultaneous deaths 
This Part would largely follow the Succession (Homicide) Act 2007.  
Subpart 7 
Access to wills 
• Access to wills before grant of administration or if no grant of administration. 
• Availability of copy of will after grant of administration. 
• Power of court to prohibit availability of part or all of will or testamentary 
document. 
• Voluntary register of wills. 
• Determination of disputes on access to wills. 
PART V 
Relationship property and trust claims on death 
This part would largely follow Part 8 of the Property (Relationships) Act 1976 with the 
following additional clauses.  
• Applications for variation of trust settled by deceased and/or surviving 
spouse/partner. 
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• Appeals. 
• Incidence of orders against personal representative of spouse/partner. 
• Transitional provisions. 
PART VI 
Support claims and contribution claims and procedures 
• Support claims by a surviving spouse, civil union or eligible de facto partner. 
• Support claims by eligible children. 
• Contribution claims. 
• Preservation of other causes of action. 
• Priorities of support, contribution and other claims on an estate 
• Discretion of court on support claims and relevant factors 
• Contracting out of or settling support claims. 
• Applications to set aside agreement contracting out of or settling support claims 
and criteria. 
• Time limits and procedure for notification of support and contribution claims. 
• Lapse of notice of support and contribution claims. 
• Distribution of estate where no notice of claim given or notice lapses. 
• Assets subject to support and contribution claims. 
• Following and tracing estate assets. 
• Types of orders within jurisdiction of court. 
• Appeals. 
• Costs. 
• Transfer of proceedings to High Court. 
• Referral of proceedings to alternative dispute resolution. 
PART VII 
Insolvent deceased estates 
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This part would largely follow Part 6 of the Insolvency Act 2006.  
PART VIII 
Rules regarding validity of wills 
• Definitions. 
• Requirements for testamentary capacity. 
• Meaning and effect of undue influence. 
• Presumption of due execution. 
PART IX 
Maori Land and Interests in Maori Land 
• Further definitions. 
• Disposition of Maori land by will. 
• Succession to Maori land on intestacy. 
• Claims on Maori land. 
• Effect of support and contribution claims on Maori land. 
PART X 
Transitional provisions 
• Wills of persons who die before 1 July 2010. 
• Wills made before 1 July 2010. 
• Administration of estates of persons dying before 1 July 2010. 
• Administration of intestate estates of persons dying before 1 July 2010. 
• Correction by Court of wills made before 1 July 2010. 
• Consequential amendments. 
 Schedules 
Intestacy Table 
Form of notice of choice of option 
Form of notice of support claim 
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VI Key Sections of Inheritance Act  
The following are key clauses for inclusion in the Draft Inheritance Act 2010.   
• Entitlements of eligible surviving spouse, eligible civil union partner and eligible de 
facto partner on intestacy 
(1) Where a person dies wholly intestate the eligible surviving spouse, eligible surviving 
civil union partner or eligible surviving de facto partner of that deceased person is 
entitled to:  
 (a) the statutory legacy; and 
 (b) the deceased’s personal belongings and effects; and 
 (c) the share in the residue of the deceased’s estate specified in this Act or in the 
intestacy table attached to this Act. 
(2) Where the value of the deceased’s estate is less in value than the statutory legacy, the 
eligible surviving spouse, eligible civil union partner or eligible de facto partner is 
entitled to the whole of the deceased’s estate. 
(3) If the deceased is not survived by children, accepted children or any other issue, an 
eligible surviving spouse, eligible civil union partner or eligible de facto partner is 
entitled to the whole of the deceased’s estate.  
• Priorities on intestacy between eligible surviving spouses/partners and children of 
the deceased. 
(1) Where a person dies wholly intestate leaving an eligible surviving spouse, eligible 
civil union partner or eligible de facto partner and children, accepted children or issue 
the eligible surviving spouse, eligible civil union partner or eligible de facto partner is 
entitled to: 
 (a) the estate assets as set out in section X of this Act; 
 (b) one half of the residue (if any) of the deceased’s estate. 
(2) Where subsection (1) applies the child, children and accepted children of the deceased 
are entitled to the remaining one half of the residue (if any) of the deceased’s estate 
and if more than one in equal shares; provided that if any child or accepted child dies 
before the deceased leaving a child or children who survive the deceased such child or 
children take the share or interest their parent would have taken had he or she 
survived the deceased. 
• Powers of Crown where estate vests bona vacantia502. 
                                          
502 This clause is based on cl 38 of the draft Intestacy Bill 2007 shown as Appendix A to NSWLRC R116.  
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(1) If the Crown is entitled to an estate under this Act bona vacantia, the Minister of 
Finance or his or her nominee may on application waive or disclaim the Crown’s 
rights and entitlements in part or in whole in favour of: 
 (a) dependants of the deceased; or 
 (b) any persons who have in the Minister’s opinion a just or moral claim on the 
deceased; or 
 (c) any organisation or person for whom the deceased might reasonably be expected 
to have made provision; or  
 (d) the trustees for any person or organisation mentioned in subsections (a), (b) or 
(c); or 
  (e) any other person or organisation. 
(2) The Minister may grant a waiver or disclaimer under this section on conditions the 
Minister considers appropriate. 
• Contracting out of entitlements on intestacy 
(1) Any person (“A”) may enter into an agreement waiving or contracting out of part or all 
of his or her entitlements on the intestacy of another person before or after the death of 
that person on the following grounds: 
 (a) that the agreement is recorded in writing; and 
 (b) before signing the agreement A obtained independent legal advice from a lawyer 
as defined in the Property (Relationships) Act 1976; and 
 (c) the agreement must contain a certificate signed by the lawyer who witnessed A’s 
signature recording that before the agreement was signed the lawyer explained 
the legal effects and implications of the agreement to A.  
(2) An agreement entered into under this section is void unless all the requirements in 
subsection (1) have been met.  
(3) The court may set aside an agreement under this section if, having regard to all the 
circumstances, it is satisfied that giving effect to the agreement would cause serious 
injustice to any of the parties. 
(4) This section does not limit or affect any enactment or rule of law or in equity that 
makes an agreement void, voidable or unenforceable on any other grounds. 
(5) If deciding whether giving effect to an agreement under this section would cause 
serious injustice the court must have regard to the matters set out in section 21J(4) of 
the Property (Relationships) Act 1976.  
• Interpretation of wills 
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(1) The court has general jurisdiction to construe and interpret the meaning and effect of a 
will or testamentary document (“will”) and may take into account extrinsic evidence to 
the extent specified in section X of this Act.  
(2) The general purpose of the Court when exercising its powers of interpretation of a will 
is to ascertain and give effect to the intention of the will-maker as expressed in the will 
but only in the absence of a contrary intention appearing in the will. 
(3) In exercising its powers of interpretation the Court may use any or all of the principles 
of construction set out in the succeeding sections X to X of this Act as a guide to 
determine the intention of the will-maker expressed in the will. 
• Who can apply for division or declaration of relationship property 
The following persons may apply for an order under section 25(1)(a) or (b) or declaration 
under section 25(3) of the Property (Relationships) Act 1976: 
 (a) the surviving spouse, civil union or de facto partner; 
 (b) the personal representative or trustee of the estate of a deceased spouse, civil 
union or de facto partner;  
 (c) the Official Assignee in Bankruptcy of the property of either spouse, civil union 
or de facto partner; 
(d) any person on whom conflicting claims in respect of property are made by the 
surviving spouse, civil union or de facto partner or the personal representative or 
trustee of the estate of a deceased spouse, civil union or de facto partner; 
(e) an appointee in whom the estate of a deceased spouse, civil union or de facto 
partner vests under the Insolvency Act 2006. 
• Who can apply to sever joint tenancy 
Where a person dies owning any asset or property jointly with another person, the executor, 
administrator or trustee of the deceased’s estate or any surviving spouse, civil union or de 
facto partner may apply to the court to sever the joint tenancy and on making such an order 
the court may also order that a share or interest in the asset or property in question vests in 
the estate of the deceased and becomes subject to the terms of the deceased’s will or 
intestacy. 
• Application for variation of trust settled by deceased and/or surviving spouse or 
partner 
See chapter 7 paragraph IX of this thesis.  
• Contribution claims 
On the death of any person and within the time limits specified in this Act a contribution 
claim may be made against the estate of the deceased person and the court shall determine 
such claim and the amount of an award (if any) in its discretion. 
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• Support claims by surviving spouse, civil union, eligible de facto partner or eligible 
child.  
(1) On the death of a person and within the time limits specified in this Act an eligible 
surviving spouse, an eligible surviving civil union partner, an eligible surviving de 
facto partner or an eligible child may apply to the court for a support award from the 
estate of the deceased person. 
(2) The purpose of an award for an eligible surviving spouse, civil union or de facto 
partner is to enable the applicant to enjoy a reasonable and independent standard of 
living judged against the standard of living enjoyed by the applicant and deceased 
while the deceased was alive and until the survivor is reasonably able to achieve a 
reasonable and independent standard of living on his or her own. 
(3) The purpose of an award for an eligible child is to maintain the child in a reasonable 
way and to a reasonable standard and so far as practical, educated and assisted 
towards attainment of economic independence.   
(4) An award under subsection (2) shall not exceed the amount of the statutory legacy 
applicable at the date of the deceased’s death exclusive of any entitlements the 
claimant may have under the deceased’s will or on intestacy.  
• Priorities of support, contribution and other claims 
(1) Claims on and debts of an estate shall be paid in the following priorities: 
 (a) estate administration costs; 
 (b) reasonable funeral expenses; 
 (c) proven estate debts; 
 (d) the protected interest in the family home; 
 (e) relationship property claims; 
 (f) contribution claims and preserved causes of action; 
 (g) support claims by eligible spouses, eligible civil union partners, eligible de facto 
partners and eligible children. 
(2) In assessing support claims the court must give priority to support claims by eligible 
surviving spouses, eligible civil union and eligible de facto partners but not to the 
exclusion of support claims by eligible children.  
• Discretion of court on support claims and relevant factors 
(1) In assessing support claims by eligible spouses, civil union partners and de facto 
partners the court must take into account some or all of the following factors: 
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(a) the relationship between the applicant and the deceased including the nature 
and duration of the relationship; 
(b) the nature and extent of the deceased’s obligations and responsibilities to the 
applicant and any other family member; 
(c) the nature and extent of the deceased’s estate; 
(d) the financial resources and needs of the applicant and any other person 
applying for further provision or named as a beneficiary in the deceased’s will; 
(e) any physical, intellectual or mental disability of the applicant or any other 
person applying for further provision or named as a beneficiary in the 
deceased’s will; 
(f) the age of the applicant; 
(g) provision made by the deceased while alive to the applicant or under the 
deceased’s will or on intestacy; 
(h) the date of the will and circumstances in which it was made; 
(i) whether the applicant was being maintained wholly or partly by the deceased 
at the time of death; 
(j) whether any other person is liable to support the applicant; 
(k) the standard of living of the deceased and the applicant while both were alive; 
(l) whether adequate housing or accommodation will be available for a surviving 
spouse or partner; 
(m) the applicant’s custodial responsibilities for a child or children; 
(n) the applicant’s ability to continue in, train or qualify for suitable paid 
employment; and  
(o) any other matter considered relevant by the court. 
(2) In assessing support claims by an eligible child or eligible children the Court must 
take into account some or all of the following factors: 
(a) the age and stage of development of the child including the level of education 
or technical or vocational training reached by the child;  
(b) any other actual or potential sources of support available to the child including 
support from a surviving parent or a support award from the estate of another 
deceased parent;  
(c) the amount of support provided by the deceased to the child;  
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(d) the actual and potential ability of the child to meet his or her other reasonable 
needs;  
(e) the nature and duration of the relationship with the deceased; and 
(f) any other matter considered relevant by the court.  
• Contracting out of or settling support claims 
Any spouse, civil union partner or de facto partner, and any eligible surviving spouse, civil 
union partner or de facto partner (“A”) may enter into an agreement waiving or contracting 
out of part or all of his or her entitlements to a support claim against a deceased person’s 
estate at any time before or after the date of death of the deceased person subject to the 
following: 
(a) that the agreement is recorded in writing; and 
 (b) before signing the agreement A obtained independent legal advice from a 
lawyer as defined in the Property (Relationships) Act 1976; and  
 (c) the agreement contains a certificate signed by the lawyer who witnessed A’s 
signature recording that before the agreement was signed the lawyer explained 
the legal effects and implications of the agreement to A.  
(2) An agreement entered into under this section shall be void unless all the requirements 
in subsection (1) have been met.  
• Application to set aside agreement contracting out of or settling support claims.  
(1) Any person who has signed an agreement under this Act contracting out of a support 
claim can apply to set aside the agreement at any time before final distribution of the 
deceased’s estate affected by such agreement. 
(2) Before setting aside an agreement under this section the court must, after having regard 
to all the circumstances, be satisfied that giving effect to the agreement would cause 
serious injustice to any of the parties. 
(3) This section does not limit or affect any enactment or rule of law or in equity that 
makes an agreement void, voidable or unenforceable on any other grounds.  
• Requirement for testamentary capacity 
(1) A will or testamentary document is void and of no effect if at the time of signing it the 
will-maker lacked testamentary capacity. 
(2) The burden of proving testamentary capacity is on the person proving the will. 
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A comprehensive Code containing consistent policies is needed to replace the 20 statutes 
presently covering inheritance laws in New Zealand. A Code will facilitate access for all New 
Zealanders. There is urgent need for reform of New Zealand’s succession laws. As Professor 
Rosalind Croucher has noted “succession law is one of the slower moving waterways of 
jurisprudence.”503 While Australia has planned regular changes, reform in New Zealand has 
been piecemeal.  
II Underlying Philosophy 
A philosophical basis for New Zealand’s sucession law must be established. In chapter 3 of 
this thesis I analysed the two competing regimes currently in force around the world.504  Both 
systems attempt to balance testamentary freedom and personal obligations. I have concluded 
that in line with New Zealand’s history and longstanding recognition of private property 
rights, testamentary freedom must be the cornerstone of any reform.  
III Restrictions on Testamentary Freedom 
However, as recognised by Sir Robert Stout more than 100 years ago there have to be 
limitations on testamentary freedom. In line with current social policy in other areas of family 
law intervention is needed to protect the weak and vulnerable and in inheritance law this 
primarily means a surviving spouse or partner and minor dependent children. Other important 
principles that have been identified are certainty and clarity in the law and self reliance.505 
IV Proposed Reform  
Having identified these principles, the proposed code limits the number of potential claimants 
on an estate but at the same time it introduces anti-avoidance measures currently not in 
existence in New Zealand to enhance the potential claims of those who truly are in need of 
provision. 
As this thesis illustrates inheritance law provokes very different approaches which mirror the 
philosophical debate over testamentary freedom and personal obligations. Both approaches 
have merit. What is clear however is that reform is long overdue. Inheritance law reform is 
not a vote winner but the families and friends of the 27,000 New Zealanders who die each 




503  Rosalind F Croucher “Towards Uniform Succession in Australia” (2009) 83 ALJ 728 at 751.  
504  Fixed rule scheme and court-based discretionary system.  
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